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ABSTRACT 
 
Moral habilitation is the intentional and directed shaping of a new subjectivity in accordance 
with a culturally sanctioned, pro-social standard of daily ethical conduct. Treatment programs for 
sexual offenders are enterprises in moral habilitation that involve instilling participants with new 
values, beliefs, and practices. This research represents a person-centred ethnography that 
combined concepts of morality, stigma, selfhood, and agency with the treatment and community 
(re)integration of sexual offenders to learn how some of these men narrated their transformations 
from dysfunction to a state of self-regulation and greater wellbeing. To this end, 18 men of Euro-
Canadian or Aboriginal ancestry living in western Canada were interviewed about their 
experiences in sexual offender treatment programs, their transitions from prison to community 
life, and their changing self-concepts. In this transition, participants described their motivations 
to change as derived from their experiences of (a) a stigmatized, unfulfilling life, (b) the desire 
for a better or “normal” life, (c) social supports, and (d) a determined and willful mindset. They 
adopted multiple narrative strategies to protect their self-concepts while the progression of time 
and ethical self-reformation facilitated a transition from shame and self-doubt to self-acceptance. 
Through this research, I propose a model of Ethical Self-Reformation (ESR) that combines the 
institutional morality of treatment programs with stigmatizing public moral discourses to 
individuals’ enactments of agency, will, and motivation to sustain what is in effect amoral 
enterprise. Moral habilitation is conceptualized as the internalized, automatic responses of an 
embodied morality as practiced through the ESR model. This research concludes that sexual 
offender treatment programs can effectively lead to moral habilitation if the offender is willing to 
submit to the process; but it also advises that programs need to be more individualized if 
treatment responsivity is to be enhanced. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION_________________________________________________ 
 
 
1.1  Sexual Offenders and Society 
 In recent decades, societal discourses of sexual assault, sexual abuse, pedophilia, child 
pornography, sexual exploitation, and other forms of sex crime have increased significantly in 
their prevalence, enough to constitute a moral panic (Greer, 2003; Jenkins, 1998; Soothill & 
Walby, 1991). These discourses often focus on the most serious crimes committed by a minority 
of repeat offenders, creating the public perception that sexual offenders are untreatable and will 
always pose a threat to society. This is not to say that crimes such as sexual assault, sexual 
exploitation, and child pornography are not tremendously damaging and serious problems; but 
rather, the public’s general knowledge of the prevalence of these crimes along with the treatment 
and habilitation of the perpetrators is fraught with distortions, inaccuracies, and 
controversies(Roberts, 2002; Shilling, 2006).While society on the whole has a fascination with 
sexual deviance and offending behaviours, as evidenced by the plethora of crime shows in the 
entertainment media, public discourses stigmatize sexual offenders and promote their social 
abjection, that is, the casting out of that which is spoiled or detritus. The power of abjection is in 
its ability to fascinate while at the same time revile (Kristeva, 1982). As individuals with 
stigmatized, spoiled identities (Goffman, 1963), sexual offenders are the abject that society loves 
to hate; and yet they must live among us. When individuals have served their time following a 
sexual conviction, they inevitably return to the community where they must learn to rebuild their 
lives.  
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 Sexual offender treatment programs (SOTPs) are supposed to morally habilitate the 
people who participate in them so that they can manage their behaviour and avoid reoffending to 
become law-abiding citizens. Habilitation is not “rehabilitation,” the restoration of an individual 
to a previously normal or healthy state. Rather, habilitation refers to the transformation toward a 
new healthy or normal state. Moral habilitation identifies the individual’s behaviour and 
shortfalls in virtue, as defined by society, as the target for change. Recidivism studies (i.e. Beech 
& Ford, 2006; Hanson, Bourgon, Helmus, & Hodgson, 2009; Nicholaichuk, Gordon, Gu, & 
Wong, 2000) suggest that in many cases treatment does achieve these goals. Most men convicted 
of a sexual offence do not recidivate so it appears that habilitation is successful. However, the 
transformation from completing treatment to successfully integrating in the community is not 
always smooth. Society does not generally accept treated sexual offenders as transformed 
individuals and they are often stigmatized, ostracized, and treated with distrust. Understandably, 
this distrust is warranted because a small but significant percentage of treated sexual offenders, 
between 11 to 15 percent, will go on to reoffend (Hanson et al., 2009; Nicholaichuk et al., 2000). 
Why do some men find themselves committing new offences after treatment while others are 
more successful at implementing permanent life changes? What is the wherewithal that enables 
the agentic self-transformation from sexual deviant to responsible citizen? Does the gravity or 
horror with which society views their crimes dictate an immediacy of change that is unrealistic? 
Is the expectation for them to change too much, too fast? Furthermore, to what extent does 
society bear responsibility for an offender’s successes and failures, if at all? 
Even with relatively low recidivism rates, it is still important to ask why some men find it 
easier to take treatment lessons and apply them in community life than others. As they go 
through the treatment process, what parts of it, if any, do men take in and use? We have some 
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idea of how participants perceive and react to treatment programs (i.e. Auburn & Lea, 2003; 
Levenson, Macgowan, Morin, & Cotter, 2009; MacMartin & LeBaron, 2006; Reimer & Mathieu, 
2006; Waldram, 2007, 2008, 2012), but experiential studies of sexual offenders as mandatory 
consumers of these programs are largely absent. We know that treatment does play a role in 
preventing recidivism in the majority of men who complete it; but as for how they apply these 
lessons in the community after institutional release and parole/probation, little is understood. 
What is it about the person who can successfully habilitate and integrate that separates him from 
the one who cannot seem to do the same? Assuming that recidivism can be prevented through a 
concerted progression of self-improvement, how do men convicted of a sexual offence take these 
steps? What role does treatment play in this agentic process of individual growth? 
An even greater lacuna exists for research that studies the effect of stigma on offenders’ 
habilitation processes following institutional release. The image of the amoral, psychopathic 
sexual offender is a common but inaccurate stereotype (Gavin, 2005; Greer, 2003; Jenkins, 1998; 
Lancaster, 2011; Soothill & Walby, 1991). Men who have committed sexual offences frequently 
experience intense shame and guilt over their actions (Proeve & Howells, 2006). Not only are 
they made abject by society, but they also may experience self-abjection in viewing themselves 
as worthless or loathsome (Victor & Waldram, 2009). While the stigmatization and ostracism of 
individuals labeled as sexual offenders makes the process of community (re)integration more 
difficult, particularly with finding housing, employment, and support networks (Levenson & 
Cotter, 2005; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000), there is little known about how these experiences 
influence one’s sense of self. Self-esteem, self-confidence, and positive sense of identity are all 
important to sexual offenders’ beliefs in their capacities to change and become more “pro-social” 
people according to societal standards (Marshall, Fernandez, Serran, Mulloy, Thornton, Mann, 
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Anderson, 2003;Marshall, Ward, Mann, Moulden, Fernandez, Serran, & Marshall, 2005; Ward 
& Stewart, 2003). Consequently, it is imperative that research investigates how ostracism and 
social abjection may degrade offenders’ selfhood in ways that impinge on their development of 
pro-social lifestyles and their experiences of failed or successful community (re)integration.  
The main question posed in this research is: “How do men convicted of sexual offences 
narrate their transition from dysfunction to a place of enhanced wellbeing?” I focus on men’s 
transitions from sexual offender treatment programs, through their community (re)integration 
processes, and ending for most participants at the point where they self-identify as maintaining 
an offence-free lifestyle back in mainstream society. In this research, I bring together concepts 
that have not been sufficiently connected to the habilitation of sexual offenders – stigma, agency, 
and morality – to explain how the desire to become a better person is experienced by even the 
most abject of society. Furthermore, I introduce an experiential perspective of men’s motivations 
to engage in treatment, their perceptions of treatment, and the struggle to remake their lives when 
eventually returned to their communities. Forensic psychology has a tendency to dismiss these 
viewpoints, an issue that I discuss shortly, but criminology and narrative psychology have 
undertaken studies of the experiential aspects of criminal treatment and management. This state 
of affairs is unfortunate because to ignore the subjective experiences of men who sexually offend 
is to assume that they do not hold a stake in their own wellbeing and cannot contribute more 
substantially to the research that is investigating their own habilitation. 
1.2  The Forensic Psychological Approach to Sexual Offender Management 
1.2.1  Sexual Offender Treatment Programs 
Research on sexual offending behaviours and their treatment is dominated by forensic 
psychology, which has significantly advanced how we assess, treat, and manage sexual 
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offenders. Canada has been a world leader in the development of advanced forensic research and 
high quality, effective SOTPs. In Canada, SOTPs are split into three groups or tiers based upon 
the intensity and duration of the program (Marshall, 1999; Olver & Wong, 2013). The first tier 
represents high intensity programs that typically involve daily programming over a period of six 
or more months. These programs often take place within specialized psychiatric institutions 
where offenders go for the express purpose of treatment, although government restructuring has 
shifted more of these high intensity programs so that they take place within offenders’ “home” 
institutions. Second tier programs are of moderate intensity and involve the inmate attending up 
to three sessions a week for a period of four months on average within their “home” institution. 
Third tier programs are community-based treatment and maintenance groups that usually meet 
once a week for the duration that an offender is on parole or probation. 
Contemporary treatment for sexual offenders relies predominantly upon cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), which is a short-term therapeutic approach geared to helping 
individuals recognize their thoughts and the behaviours that follow from those thinking patterns 
(Schaffer, Jeglic, Moster, & Wnuk, 2010; Witt, Greenfield, & Hiscox, 2008). Intervention occurs 
by getting clients to change the way they think, thus assuming that changes in behaviour will 
follow. The content of SOTPs focuses on two areas: offence-specific and offence-related factors 
(Marshall, 1996, 1999; Schaffer et al., 2010). Offence-specific factors are those that relate 
directly to an individual’s sexual offence and are targeted in treatment for all participants. These 
factors include denial and minimization, cognitive distortions, victim empathy, pro-offending 
attitudes, crime cycle, relapse prevention, and deviant fantasies. Offence-related factors are those 
that may have contributed to an offence but are not necessarily problems for all treatment 
participants. Examples of offence-related factors include difficulty managing anger and other 
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emotions, deficits in social skills or problem solving abilities, and substance abuse. Of these 
targets, relapse prevention is a central feature in treatment (Pithers, Marques, Gibat, & Marlatt, 
1983; Polaschek, 2003; Shaffer et al., 2010; Ward & Hudson, 1996). Relapse prevention is a 
collection of practices that instruct individuals to recognize and avoid situations that have been 
determined through assessment procedures to be high risk for the individual to reoffend, should 
he encounter the situation in his day-to-day life. 
The most broadly accepted framework for SOTPs is identified as a Risk-Need-
Responsivity (RNR) model, which is premised on the knowledge that the propensity to reoffend 
can be mitigated by targeting offenders’ criminogenic needs – the cognitive, affective, 
behavioural, and interpersonal factors that are associated with sexual offending behaviours – in a 
manner that matches individuals’ specific learning styles (Andrews & Bonta, 1998; Andrews, 
Bonta, & Wormith, 2011). The goal of the RNR model is to reduce sexual reoffending by 
teaching offenders to recognize their offence patterns and institute proactive measures to prevent 
completion of their crime cycle. To this end, assessment tools are first used to identify offenders’ 
risk factors, which then help treatment staff to focus in on which areas of treatment the offender 
might need, and then provide services in a way to which they are more likely to respond.  
The determination of risk and need are accomplished through actuarial measures of 
assessment (i.e. statistically calculated predictions) that are based upon static and dynamic risk 
factors that determine how likely offenders are to reoffend (Andrews & Bonta, 1998; Marshall, 
Fernandez, Marshall, & Seran, 2006). Static risk factors are characteristics that the offender 
cannot change, such as age of first offence, prior offences, current age, marital status and 
childhood experiences; dynamic risk factors may include problems with intimacy, self-
regulation, substance abuse, and criminogenic attitudes or beliefs, which are all theoretically 
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amenable to change, and thereby potential targets for treatment intervention (Hanson, 2006; 
Marshall, 1996, 1999; Shaffer et al., 2010). Dynamic risk factors can be further differentiated 
into those that are acute – substance abuse, negative mood, anger, and victim access – and those 
that are stable: attitudes of tolerance toward sexual offending, socio-affective or intimacy 
deficits, difficulties with sexual and non-sexual self-regulation, and negative social influences 
(Hanson & Harris, 2001; Harkins & Beech, 2007). In the treatment context, these dynamic risk 
factors become criminogenic needs that are targets for intervention via treatment programming 
(Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990) and thus the primary foci of manipulation in moral habilitation. 
Generally speaking, offenders who are determined to be at the higher levels of recidivism risk 
are indicated for more intensive treatment programming (Andrews et al., 1990).  
Responsivity, the third principle of the RNR model, is a concept used in forensic 
psychology that identifies the degree to which an offender responds to a treatment program or 
activity. The responsivity principle brings attention to factors unique to the individual that can 
hinder offenders’ meaningful responses to treatment lessons. As it is currently conceptualized, 
responsivity is a collection of categorical variables that are used to describe individuals’ 
receptivity for, and behaviour within, treatment. General factors hypothesized to influence 
responsivity include: cognitive level of functioning, learning style, verbal and interpersonal 
skills, motivation, anxiety level during group sessions, presence of personality or other mental 
disorders, and ethnicity or culture (Andrews et al., 1990;Beyko & Wong, 2005; Looman et al., 
2005; Olver & Wong, 2013). So far, the investigation of treatment responsivity has received less 
attention than it deserves, particularly with regard to treatment motivation (Looman, Dickie, & 
Abracen, 2005; Ward & Stewart, 2003), although that may be beginning to change (eg. Willis, 
Yates, Gannon, & Ward, 2013; Wilson, Kilgour, & Polaschek, 2013). In the research literature, 
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responsivity is not clearly articulated beyond offender characteristics and the treatment 
environment, which leaves one to question how responsivity can be understood as a process 
occurring within a dynamic, agentic person who is situated within a particular social and cultural 
context. As it stands, responsivity is theoretically underdeveloped and needs to be expanded to 
account for social and cultural forces that inform offenders’ habilitation processes. Part of this 
expansion should involve the investigation of experiential treatment processes on individual 
outcomes. 
The efficacy of the RNR model has been well established (Andrews et al., 2011; Hanson 
et al., 2009; Olver & Wong, 2013), but it has also been criticized as taking a limited focus on 
human development and humanistic avenues of therapy. In particular, a collection of researchers 
from New Zealand (Ward, Collie, & Bourke, 2009; Ward, Gannon, & Birgden, 2007; Ward, 
Melser, & Yates, 2007) have critiqued the RNR model for: (a) disregarding aspects of narrative 
identity and individual agency, (b) minimizing the human impetus to seek a fulfilling life, (c) 
neglecting offenders’ non-criminogenic needs, (d) uniformity that limits consideration of 
individual needs and concerns, and (e) being too focused on psychometrics. Authors and 
proponents of the RNR model have responded to these criticisms indicating that RNR does take 
individual and non-criminogenic needs along with life fulfillment into account during the 
therapeutic process, but it places criminogenic needs in the forefront since it is these factors that 
most predict decreased recidivism (Andrews et al., 2011).  
The RNR model has been described as a deficit approach, for it emphasizes offenders’ 
weaknesses in order to target and strengthen the individuals’ skills in that area. In attempting to 
fulfill this goal, treatment focuses on a pre-determined set of “needs” that have been derived 
from a range of assessment tools. SOTPs that are based upon this program format train offenders 
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to identify potentially high-risk situations. This approach emphasizes avoidance goals, which are 
generally considered to be less effective for inducing behavioural change than approach goals 
that encourage individuals to focus on approved activities (Janoff-Bulman, 2012). The RNR 
model appears to take for granted that offenders lack both cognizance of their problems and 
certain skills to deal with them. It does not approach the individual as an integrated whole, only 
as “disembodied bearers of risk” (Ward & Stewart, 2003, p. 354). As a consequence, the lessons 
of treatment are also disembodied, reflecting the compartmentalized paradigm of forensic 
psychology. 
The same group of researchers who have critiqued the RNR model have developed the 
Good Lives Model (GLM) of offender (re)habilitation that they argue could be used to further 
enhance the RNR model (Ward et al., 2009; Ward et al., 2007). The Good Lives Model (GLM) is 
a strength-based approach that guides offenders to individually consider what constitutes a “good 
life” for them and to transform those images into realistic goals (Ward, 2002; Ward & Gannon, 
2006). Specific to sexual offender treatment, the GLM makes the point that habilitation should 
emphasize offenders’ abilities to obtain the primary goods that comprise their conceptions of 
what a good life entails. Defined, “primary human goods are states of affairs, states of mind, 
personal characteristics, activities, or experiences that are sought for their own sake and are 
likely to increase psychological well-being if achieved” (Ward & Gannon, 2006, p. 79). These 
may include: good health, adequate functioning, knowledge, competence and mastery in work 
and play, autonomy and self-determination, inner peace and freedom from stress, 
companionship, sense of belonging, spiritual meaning, happiness, and creativity. Secondary 
goods, such as relationships, satisfying work, and leisure activities, are the means to obtain 
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primary goods. Unlike the proscriptive avoidance goals emphasized in the RNR model, primary 
goods represent approach goals that keep offenders looking forward to a self-defined future. 
The GLM appears to have gained force in correctional practices as a reminder that sexual 
offenders should still be treated with the same ethical regard as other recipients of 
psychotherapy. There is a developing trend in forensic treatment to emphasize a positive 
psychological perspective that promotes treatment participants’ goals, desires, and capacities 
while also addressing criminogenic needs (Mann, 2004; Marshall et al., 2005; Wormith, 
Althouse, Simpson, Reitzel, Fagan, & Morgan, 2007) and the GLM explicitly addresses this 
neglected area. The GLM has also been subject to critique. It presents with face validity but the 
empirical assessment of treatment programs that are based upon its principles is still needed. 
Criticism of the GLM is further warranted because the primacy placed on human goods over 
criminogenic needs could neglect the possibility that the source of one offender’s fulfillment 
could be an action that leads to the violation of another (Andrews et al., 2011). 
The debate between the proponents of the RNR model and the GLM appears somewhat 
reducible to the differences between each model’s respective grounding in behaviourism and 
humanism. Those forwarding the RNR model have a pragmatic approach of considering 
fulfillment as something that is possible through anti-social means. Advocates of the GLM have 
a more optimistic view of people as essentially desiring to meet their needs through socially 
approved means. Perhaps it is naïve to assume that sexual offenders will only seek fulfillment 
through socially acceptable actions, if they develop the necessary psychological resources to do 
so; but this is a question for future research to pursue. Further, it is evident that a longitudinal 
approach is called for to investigate whether fulfillment through anti-social behaviour is a time-
limited orientation that one outgrows, or if there is a cumulative effect where what was once 
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fulfilling eventually leads to a collection of punishments and other negative outcomes that 
encourage or morally regulate the individual into a decision to change.  
1.2.2  Community (Re)integration 
The Canadian criminal justice system is structured so that community (re)integration 
takes place gradually with incremental decreases in supervision from parole officers, police 
services, and community treatment providers. The purpose of monitoring newly released 
offenders is to ensure that they have institutional supports to assist with deinstitutionalization and 
that they are complying with the terms and conditions of their parole. Successful completion of a 
SOTP can lead to a lower level of risk to reoffend thus opening the possibility for obtaining early 
conditional release into the community. In these situations, sexual offenders are typically 
required to attend third tier, or community maintenance programs, during their parole. These 
weekly programs serve to monitor sexual offenders, reinforce treatment lessons, and provide a 
space for men to discuss any difficulties that they might be experiencing during this transitional 
period.  
The (re)integration environment for sexual offenders can be especially problematic. 
Starting in the 1980s, governments mostly in the United States began to develop different forms 
of sexual offender legislation in response to a small number of high-profile offences committed 
against children by previously convicted and released sexual offenders (Petrunik, 2003). These 
new laws consisted predominantly of registration and community notification legislation that 
were designed to monitor offenders’ locations and alert communities to their presence, all under 
the assumption that such measures would promote community safety. A second rationale 
provided for sexual offender registries is that they would provide police with the knowledge of 
which offenders reside in their jurisdictions and thus information that could assist in future 
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investigations (Farkas & Stichman, 2002). Typically more cautious than American policy 
makers, Canada eventually put in place its own national sexual offender registry in 2004 
(Petrunik, 2003; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2006). Unfortunately, the creation of sexual 
offender legislation in both Canada and the United States has occurred more due to pressure 
from victims’ rights groups and the desire of lawmakers to respond to their constituents, than it 
has from proper consultation with scientific studies (Petrunik, 2003).  
 Community notification has a less detrimental influence on Canadian sexual offenders so 
far, primarily because registries have remained inaccessible to the public. The research 
investigating the outcomes and efficacy of community notification indicates that this practice 
might be largely ineffective (Ackerman & Sacks, 2012; Freeman, 2012; Tewksbury & Jennings, 
2010; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). The community notification of sexual offenders through news 
media or websites is detrimental to offenders’ (re)integration processes by destabilizing the 
community environment in several ways. Public identification as a sexual offender can induce 
additional strain and stress on an already difficult (re)integration process and it is associated with 
higher rates of depression along with feelings of hopelessness, shame, embarrassment, 
persecution, and isolation (Ackerman & Sacks, 2012; Jeglic, Mercado, & Levenson, 2012; 
Robbers, 2009). The consequences of stigma and ostracism from other community members 
commonly include loss of employment or housing, difficulty obtaining new employment or 
housing, harassment and verbal abuse, threats, harassment of family members, property damage, 
and less commonly, physical assault (Elbogen, Patry, & Scalora, 2003; Jeglic et al., 2012; Lasher 
& McGrath, 2012; Robbers, 2009; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). The newly released sexual offender is 
likely to face significant obstacles as he attempts to meet his physical, social, and emotional 
needs while upholding the requirements of his relapse prevention plan. For some men, 
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community notification may be somewhat beneficial. Surprisingly, public surveillance has led 
some sexual offenders to report feeling more motivated to prevent themselves from reoffending, 
that community members supported their recovery, that communities were safer when others 
knew their locations, and that notification had helped them to be more honest with other people 
(Elbogen et al., 2003; Lasher & McGrath, 2012). 
Men who are designated as high-risk sexual offenders are particularly prone to 
difficulties with community (re)integration, but Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA) 
have proven particularly beneficial for facilitating (re)integration and reducing recidivism. 
COSAs are formalized social support networks created for high-risk offenders who have limited 
access to family or friends who can be positive influences for them during the community 
(re)integration process (Cesaroni, 2001; Wilson & Prinzo, 2001; Yantzi, 1998). The main feature 
of the COSA model is that it is a voluntary program that requires the core member, the high-risk 
offender, to make a commitment to maintain daily contact with supporting members and to be 
open and honest about circumstances in his life. The circle supports core members by: (a) 
advocating for him to different community systems, (b) confronting him about less desirable 
behaviours and attitudes, (c) escorting and assisting him during times of emergency, (d) 
mediating with the broader community, and (e) celebrating successes (Yantzi, 1998).  
The main premise of COSAs holds that rather than having sexual offenders chased out of 
one community to another, public safety is better served when high-risk sexual offenders are 
monitored by a supportive group of “friends” who still hold the core member accountable for his 
behaviour. Supported and facilitated by Mennonite Central Committees across Canada, the 
underlying philosophy of COSAs is to provide an open and honest support mechanism based 
upon the Christian principles of community responsibility, service to others, and the love of a 
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reconciling God (Yantzi, 1998). Although many do, core and supporting members do not need to 
identify as Christian since it is the values and quality of friendship that are visibly central to 
Circle activities. COSAs were intended for those individuals who typically have very few, if any, 
social supports in the community, and they have been shown to be highly effective in reducing 
the incidence of reoffending for men deemed high-risk sexual offenders (Wilson, Cortoni, & 
McWhinnie, 2009; Wilson, Cortoni, & Vermani, 2007; Wilson, Picheca, & Prinzo, 2005). 
1.2.3  Forensic Psychological Research on Sexual Offenders: A Critique and Call for 
Interdisciplinarity 
Research on men who sexually offend is predominantly limited to studies on the etiology 
of offending behaviour, treatment practices and outcomes, recidivism, and the impact of sexual 
offender legislation. The vast majority of forensic and criminological research on sexual 
offending is conducted within a post-positivist paradigm that seeks to objectively measure, 
describe, and predict the phenomenon in question. Where positivism assumes a discoverable 
reality independent of human perspective, post-positivism recognizes that such claims must be 
attenuated and thus limits the discovery of knowledge to probabilities, not certainties (Crotty, 
1998). Meta-analyses are currently a popular analytic technique for assessing the efficacy of sex 
offender treatment (i.e. Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004; Losel & 
Schmucker, 2005). Although beneficial, meta-analyses involve only the collation and 
reinterpretation of already existing data. Quantitative investigative techniques, meta-analyses in 
particular, are very effective for summarizing a vast body of findings and assessing correctional 
practices on a large scale, but they are limited in their capacity to add new ideas and perspectives 
to the literature.  
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Quantitative methodologies are also valuable insofar as they can describe, predict, and 
explain “quanta,” data that are easily put to numerical form, but the acquisition of knowledge 
pertaining to experiential states and processes, “qualia,” may only be apprehended through 
qualitative, constructionist frameworks (Shweder, 1996). The primary disjuncture that 
contributes to forensic psychology’s methodological singularity can be traced to epistemological 
differences. The discipline’s adherence to a post-positivist paradigm translates into a prioritized 
search for objective “facts” and a rejection of the constructed meanings that form our 
individualized interpretations of reality. Where post-positivism is concerned with the discovery 
of knowledge, constructionism emphasizes the generation of knowledge in the course of human 
social activities (Burr, 2003; Crotty, 1998). Experiential, or subjective, knowledge is no less 
“real” to the person living it than the objective “fact” sought by the forensic psychologist. 
Additionally, forensic practitioners easily dismiss experiential knowledge of people labeled as 
criminals, in part because individuals are considered unreliable, but also due to the pervasive 
assumption that all offenders lie. In his work as a transcultural psychiatrist, Arthur Kleinman 
(1980) pointed to learning about and working within a client’s explanatory model of illness as an 
integral part of competently treating the person. To do so, however, requires the systematic 
inquiry of the constructed meanings that one holds toward her or his problem. 
Research on sexual offending has also been limited by disciplinary isolation, despite 
research literature from disciplines such as criminology, anthropology, and gender studies. 
Criminology and forensic psychology often work at odds due to epistemological and professional 
differences. As closed institutions, it is primarily “insider” researchers working within the 
correctional system who are allowed access to conduct forensic psychological research. This 
latter practice in particular ensures that forensic psychology remains very insular and elitist in its 
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theoretical perspectives and methodologies. Part of the reason for this tendency may be because 
forensic psychologists are responding to bureaucrats who desire “hard” numbers and evidence in 
order to justify decisions. The main drawback of disciplinary isolation is that alternative 
perspectives tend not to be applied to research topics and novel concepts are not paired with 
conventional ones. For example, the literature on sexual offending tends not to include concepts 
that relate to different aspects of human development such as self, individual growth, agency, 
and moral development.  
Overreliance on quantitative research omits the voices of those individuals who are the 
mandatory consumers of correctional practices. Qualitative studies are starting to emerge in 
forensic psychology (i.e. Auburn & Lea, 2003; Colton, Roberts, & Vanstone, 2009; Grady & 
Brodersen, 2008; MacMartin & LeBaron, 2006, 2007; Reimer & Mathieu, 2006), but these 
examples are still largely marginalized by the dominant body of forensic psychologists (Burnett, 
Victor, & Robertson, 2009). As a consequence, only a minority of the available literature on 
sexual offender treatment provides the perspectives of program participants.  
Academic discourse has dedicated significant effort to the treatment and management of 
men who have sexually offended, yet little is know about men’s experiences of rebuilding their 
lives within the broader community, especially once they are no longer under correctional 
supervision. One explanation for this lacuna is that once they are finished with community 
supervision, it becomes very difficult to track individuals or to get them to participate in 
research. A contributing factor is also the overreliance on quantitative research that requires 
random samples of large participant numbers, typically those who are currently institutionalized 
and easy to access. By utilizing qualitative methodologies where methodological rigor does not 
rely upon large sample sizes, representative populations, and random samples, it is indeed 
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possible to conduct research with past sexual offenders who are no longer under correctional 
management. 
It is common knowledge that the stigma attached to sexual offenders transforms them 
into community pariahs who are ostracized by their local communities, past friends, and even 
family. In the public sphere, oral and written communications contain discourses that generalize 
conclusions and reinforce stereotypes about who and what sexual offenders represent (Greer, 
2003; Jenkins, 1998; Lancaster, 2011; Soothill & Walby, 1991). These discourses commonly 
suggest that men who sexually offend cannot be “cured” and are incapable of change because 
they are sick or evil (Waldram, 2009). They dehumanize men who sexually offend as beasts or 
monsters who deserve no better than perpetual incarceration, castration, or even capital 
punishment (Camman, 2012; Viki, Fullerton, Raggett, Tait, & Wiltshire, 2012). These discourses 
are omnipresent in casual conversation, news and entertainment media, and public forums, and 
are enacted in social practices of discrimination, ostracism, and on rare occasions, vigilantism. 
To my knowledge, no research has yet to investigate how these messages influence the 
continuing development of the men who are subject to them.  
Although there are desistance narratives for some groups of criminal offenders (i.e. Gadd 
& Farrall, 2004; Maruna, 2001), inquiries on how men who have sexually offended work to 
improve their lives and prevent themselves from reoffending are largely absent from the 
literature. Desistance narratives are the stories past offenders give to describe how they finally 
transitioned out of illegal behaviour and criminogenic lifestyles into more pro-social activities 
(Maruna, 2001). In undertaking this research, I have assumed that men convicted of a sexual 
offence at some point desire to improve their lives. As discussed, the majority of men convicted 
of sexual offences do not go on to repeat their offences, or due to methodological limitations, we 
  18 
know that most are not convicted of second offences. The minority who do become repeat 
offenders typically struggle with a range of problems that reinforce their offending behaviours: 
past abuse and victimization, substance abuse, mental health issues, and deviant sexuality to 
name a few (Hanson, 2006; Hylton et al., 2002). The common thread that I assume between one-
time and repeat offenders is that they do not enjoy being sexual offenders and do not want to 
continue on an offending path, even if only on a pre-contemplative level.  
Culture plays an important but underappreciated role in the moral habilitation of sexual, 
and indeed, all criminal offenders. Culture influences treatment responsivity in multiple ways. 
The most obvious of these are differences in ethnicity, but substantial variation of cultural 
values, assumptions, and beliefs exist even within what might be labeled as “Canadian culture.” 
Forensic psychology appreciates that culture is important to treatment but yet this concept is only 
incorporated into forensic research rudimentarily. Culture is nearly always conceptualized in its 
most simplistic sense, as that of ethnic groups, and the reductionist post-positivist paradigm from 
which most of its research emerges minimizes ethnicity to that of an independent variable. The 
hostile environment of community (re)integration is recognized but not theorized from a cultural 
perspective to consider the discourses, values, and beliefs that inform the behaviours of 
government practices, civil society, community members, and the men attempting to integrate 
into this environment. Moreover, studies on treatment outcomes reduce culture to comparisons 
between Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal offenders (i.e. Beyko & Wong, 2005; Cortoni & Nunes, 
2007; Olver, Wong, & Nicholaichuk, 2009), or they ignore culture and ethnicity altogether (i.e. 
Nicholaichuk, Gordon, Gu, & Wong, 2000; Quincy, Khanna, & Malcolm, 1998). Aboriginal 
participants of mainstream forensic treatment programs clearly have less positive outcomes 
indicating that cultural processes and historical factors have a significant impact on responsivity 
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(Ellerby, 2002; Ellerby & MacPherson, 2002; Hylton, Bird, Eddy, Sinclair, & Stenerson, 2002; 
Wormith & Olver, 2002).  
Colonial forces have constructed Aboriginal identities with perhaps only marginal regard 
to the tremendous variation of indigenous self-identification (Waldram, 2004) and recognition of 
the influence of colonialism on criminal activity in the past two decades has led to research that 
emphasizes how Aboriginal offenders are culturally different from each other and from “non-
Aboriginals” without considering in what ways they may be the same. There has been 
recognition of the diversity among Aboriginal peoples, which has led to the addition of 
Aboriginal components within institutions (i.e. Aboriginal Issues Sub-Committee, 2000; 
Waldram, 1997; Zellerer, 2003), Aboriginal-specific programs (i.e. Reintegration Programs 
Division, 2009), and healing lodges (i.e. Correctional Service Canada, 2013). Unfortunately, 
these programs remain constrained by the institutional and bureaucratic structure of the state 
correctional system. Furthermore, programs are not individualized enough to cater to the diverse 
cultural identities beyond the generalized categories of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples. 
Failure to recognize the intricacies of culture and colonialism is a major shortcoming for forensic 
psychology because it is precisely those issues of cultural identity that are central to Aboriginal 
healing and habilitation (Waldram, Innes, Kaweski, & Redman, 2008). In order to better 
understand its very profound influence on human behaviour and subjectivity, culture needs to be 
treated as a process in research, not as an independent variable.  
1.3  Sexual Offender Narratives of Moral Habilitation 
1.3.1  Introduction 
 This research was designed to follow up on James Waldram’s (2007; 2008; 2013) 
ethnography of a prison-based treatment program for sexual offenders. In this project, Waldram 
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engaged in 18 months of participant observation of a first tier SOTP in a maximum-security 
psychiatric institution. Over that duration, he interviewed men in the treatment program at their 
arrivals and exits from the unit. Briefly, he conceptualized treatment as the moral habilitation of 
sexual offenders where group processes worked to shape new subjectivities for participants 
according to an idealized, pro-social standard of ethical daily conduct that even the average 
person in society may fail to live up to. Offenders were trained to self-surveil and regulate their 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviours as well as the behaviours of others on the unit to gain insight 
into their offending patterns, and to practice elements of their relapse prevention plan to carry 
forward once released back into the community. The next logical step in knowledge generation 
was to follow up with a post-release ethnography to investigate how sexual offenders utilized the 
skills and tools taught in treatment when returned to the community. Furthermore, it was 
imperative to study the influence of other factors that might help or hinder their community 
(re)integration process in light of the evidentiary gaps I have described in the available research 
literature. Therefore, this research investigates how moral habilitation and the process of 
developing a better life is undertaken in the context of cultural, interpersonal, and psychological 
forces that can be both hindering and helpful.  
1.3.2  Culture, Discourse, and Subjectivity 
 This research examined adult human development in its broader sense from a 
sociocultural perspective. To be more specific, I qualitatively investigated the influence of 
cultural discourses and practices on the psychological development of socially vilified 
individuals. This research queried how sexual offenders strive to become better people, and set 
within the disciplinary framework of cultural psychology, it was also informed by psychological 
anthropology, forensic and social psychology, criminology, sociology, and feminist theory. 
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Cultural psychology is the study of how cultural and psychological processes comprise one 
another in the context of human development (Shore, 1996; Shweder & Sullivan, 1990). From 
this perspective, culture is conceptualized as a socially embedded set of processes and not as a 
discrete ethnic group or geographically situated people. Culture is, in part, a learned sociality that 
is constantly in flux and in interaction with physical environments and physiological 
development such that biology, sociality, and psychology are interdependent. Incorporating a 
cultural analysis, I framed this research to take a meaning-centred approach that facilitated the 
evaluation of the shared and unique values and beliefs that may influence psychological 
development. My focus was on how the meanings that sexual offenders constructed through their 
participation in sociocultural activities influenced their perceptions of a changing moral selfhood.  
Two foundational and interlocking concepts underpinned certain assumptions within this 
research: discourse and subjectivity. Discourses are systems of knowledge conveyed by means of 
language and communication that confer power through the formation of subjectivities (Green, 
2008; Foucault, 1977, 1978; Weedon, 1987). They derive their power from their penetrating 
ability to form and maintain knowledge, ideologies, and thus beliefs about reality. All discourses 
are cultural, for they are formed within a specific social, historical, and cultural milieu; but not 
all discourses are explicitly moral ones. Public discourses become moral ones when they take on 
prescriptive and proscriptive expectations for socially acceptable behaviour (Zigon, 2009). 
Institutional discourses come from state and civil organizations or other authoritative 
collectivities, and may also be morally intoned (Zigon, 2009). Moral discourses inform us of 
what we should and should not do, and how we ought to be, performing a regulatory function in 
society (Dean, 1994, Hunt, 1999; Janoff-Bulman, 2012).  
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In the simplest sense, subjectivity identifies the interpreted products of one's mental 
functions. It “is used to refer to the conscious and unconscious thoughts and emotions of the 
individual, her sense of herself and her ways of understanding her relation to the world” 
(Weedon, 1987, p. 32). When combined with discourse, subjectivity is a much more complex 
theoretical concept. Subjectivity speaks to how in our subjection to discourses, we are influenced 
and transformed by them, and in being so become their cultural subjects. As social beings, all 
humans are subject to discourses and occupy subject positions formed through structures of 
knowledge and power (Butler, 1990, 1997; Foucault, 1977, 1978). Subjectivity must account for 
power relations because our subjective interpretations are formed in part culturally and 
historically within a context of material and ideological power structures (Luhrmann, 2006; 
Ortner, 2005; Weedon, 1987).  
Cultural discourses exert a profound and inescapable influence on the psyches and mental 
functioning of all who are subject to them. In this sense, subjectivity refers to “the cultural and 
social formations that shape, organize, and provoke those modes of affect, thought and so on” 
(Ortner, 2005, p. 31). Relaying a distinctly Foucauldian analysis in the construction of 
subjectivity, Weedon (1987) states, “[discourses] constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious 
and conscious mind and emotional life of the subject which they seek to govern” (p. 108). 
Discourses transform individuals into political and moral subjects where it is impossible to act 
with pure acultural autonomy. Because subjectivities are produced through culturally and 
historically contextualized discourses, they are flexible. Individuals can be viewed as partly 
knowing subjects to the degree that they recognize and understand how these discourses have 
formed their subject positions. As agentic beings, humans have the capacity to concede to, resist, 
or transform these discourses and their impact on our lives.  
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Sexual offenders are subjects of multiple discourses, many of which are morally imbued. 
Forensic discourses construct individuals as criminalized identities who represent varying levels 
of risk to reoffend, levels of required security enforcement, and amenability to treatment. Repeat 
offenders are constructed through the files of their criminal deeds and psychological assessments 
that follow them to every institution like permanent identity markers. Public discourses construct 
them as intractable sub-humans who should never be returned to greater society. To say that 
these discourses have no influence on sexual offenders is absurd.  
Individuals who have been identified as sexual offenders are not passive subjects in their 
own growth and development. They exert agency by performing acts of resistance and 
acceptance toward treatment and management practices (Gavin, 2005; MacMartin & LeBaron, 
2006; Victor & Waldram, 2008; Waldram, 2007), and through their responses to stigmatizing or 
hostile interactions with members of the community (Lasher & McGrath, 2012). The sexual 
offender is constructed as an object of knowledge in scientific discourses (Foucault, 1977,1978; 
Lacombe, 2013; Taylor, 2009). Furthermore, recidivism narratives constitute stigmatizing 
discourses that construct past offenders as untreatable, dangerous, or even evil (Greer, 2003; 
Jenkins, 1998; Soothill & Walby, 1991). The overall effects of discourses pertaining to sexual 
offending on the subjectivity, mental functioning, and agentic development of convicted sexual 
offenders are vague. The subject positions held by treatment participants along with their 
individual values, beliefs, and goals are likely to contribute to variations in treatment 
responsivity. I consider treatment and community (re)integration in this research as the medium 
through which participants can narrate the changes they have made in their lives. Some of these 
changes are direct teachings from treatment, some are made in opposition or resistance to certain 
aspects of the treatment programs, and some are independent of treatment. In this research, I not 
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only investigated the subjective viewpoints of men who were convicted of sexual offences but I 
utilized a cultural analysis to theorize about the interaction of subjectivities on individual 
development. 
1.3.3  Moral Agency 
 Agency and morality are two central concepts that acted as focal points for the theoretical 
framework of this research. To discuss sexual offenders’ transitions from dysfunction to 
wellness, I adopted a theory of agency that is socioculturally situated, developmentally emergent, 
and reflectively deliberative (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003). When articulating a 
definition of agency, it needs to be sufficiently complex so that it does not fall back to simplistic 
dichotomies between free will and false consciousness (Frank, 2006), or biological and social 
determinism (Martinet al., 2003). For this dissertation, I used Martin and Sugarman’s (2003) 
definition: 
Agency is the deliberative, reflective activity of a human being in framing, choosing, and 
executing his or her actions in a way that is not fully determined by factors and 
conditions other than his or her own authentic understanding and reasoning. As such, 
agency is a kind of self-determination. (p. 80) 
 
In other words, an agent is not immediately a rational chooser but more of a developing and 
enculturated person who reflexively makes and pursues possibilities for her or his own life 
world.  
 While agency is sometimes viewed as an individual characteristic, it is set within a 
sociocultural environment that shapes our motivations and presents a system of constraints that 
limits the options and resources available to us (Cote & Levine, 2002; Frank, 2006; Martin et al., 
2003). Agency is made possible through reflexive consciousness and the executive functioning 
of the self in that agentic behaviour requires that we reflect upon our motivations and follow 
through on our decisions. Of agency, Cote and Levine wrote: 
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It must be an idea reflexively understood by persons as a strength, vitality, or willfulness 
they have to engage in behavior. It must be sensed as being their own strength; a strength 
that is reflexively differentiated in their minds from their desires and the obligations they 
feel impinging on them. In other words, it is an attribute that persons can associate with 
their ability (a) to reason strategically about how to pursue goals, and (b) to contemplate 
questions about whether or not it is appropriate to pursue such goals. (p. 86, italics 
original) 
 
Agency is culturally contingent in that how it is expressed relies at least partially on the values, 
goals, ideals, and forms of personhood represented in a cultural milieu. It is embedded within the 
normativizing moral discourses that set strong parameters for what are considered to be desirable 
and appropriate goals or self-interests for individuals in relation to the expressed and embodied 
norms of the group. 
Agency is often considered one of the core defining elements of personhood because it 
mediates between moral discourses that tell us how we “ought” to act and individual experiences 
that suggest to us alternative ways of being (Sugarman, 2005). As agentic persons, we have the 
ability to evaluate and prioritize our goals and desires (Taylor, 1985). The moral aspect of 
personhood is most accurately used in its plural form, moralities, because like culture, there is 
not one clearly distinct set of virtues that speaks to all people in a culture at all times. Moralities 
inform our values, beliefs, senses of aesthetics, standards of ethical behaviour, and judgments. 
They are the sources of good and evil, and establish the characteristics that constitute “goodness” 
in a person. Philosophers, social theorists, and anthropologists have over history proposed 
multiple theories and definitions of morality and ethics (Zigon, 2008). Succinctly, morality is a 
historically shifting, collectively agreed upon belief system and social practice that guides 
humanity in the discrimination between virtue and vice, and right and wrong.  
Situating morality within the enterprise of anthropological research requires a more 
specific definition that accounts for the human capacity for critical self-reflection. One such 
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definition views morality as based upon “the acquired attitudes, emotions, and bodily 
dispositions of a person throughout their life” (Zigon, 2008, p. 17). This definition positions 
morality within human ontogeny to consider the development of individual moralities across the 
lifespan. Set within an anthropological framework, morality is operationalized into institutional, 
public, and embodied forms (Zigon, 2009). Institutional moralities are expressed through formal 
and non-formal organizations that wield some power or influence over a populace and make 
proclamations of truth or righteousness. Government and religious organizations are obvious 
sources of institutional moralities but other sources would include international organizations, 
civil society groups, and work place codes. The public discourse of morality often echoes 
institutional moralities but it comes from diffuse sources other than institutions like the media, 
social protest, art, and everyday teachings. Public moral discourses can support or undermine 
institutional moralities. Embodied morality identifies a habitus, or our dispositions to 
automatically act in a virtuous manner without having to reflect upon a course of action. It is the 
behavioural expression of an internalized moral compass. 
Agency involves the striving for specific goals, some of which have stronger connections 
to values, ideals, and other elements imbued with moral worth. Charles Taylor (1985) offers one 
of the most explicit integrations of morality and agency. The distinguishing feature of human 
agentic capacity, for Taylor, is the ability to undertake reflective self-evaluation of one’s desires. 
There is first a qualitative evaluation of the desire itself: can it be “classified in such categories 
as higher and lower, virtuous and vicious, more and less fulfilling, more and less refined, 
profound and superficial, noble and base” (p. 16)? By this standard, there exists a moral valence 
that is embedded within the quality of the goal and its potential outcome. Taylor’s explanation 
includes a differentiation between weak and strong evaluation. Weak evaluation identifies the 
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process of decision-making where the primary concern is simply the outcome, typically where 
the possible outcomes bear little or no relevance to qualitative valuations of worthiness or ethical 
principles. Taylor uses the example of making the decision to take a vacation in one location 
versus another. Strong evaluation involves reflecting on one’s motivation to undertake one 
course of action instead of another. Here, one “is concerned with the qualitative worth of 
different desires” (p. 16, italics original) where the reason for pursuing the various choices can 
be ranked according to its moral value. Consequently, motivation is important because it too can 
be more or less virtuous. 
The theory of agency articulated by Martin et al. (2003) does not explicitly address 
morality and ethics, but it does indirectly suggest a moral valence to goals and decisions based 
upon the authors’ interpretation of understanding and care. Accordingly, the moral accountability 
of the individual is premised on “the developmental emergence of a situated, deliberative agency 
capable of understanding” (p. 162). While people are socialized to have tacit understanding of 
unreflected knowledge regarding norms and assumptions, the authors differentiate that from the 
explicit knowledge that is gained through engagement and reflection of one’s life-world. “Care” 
is the primary motivating factor in their model, but it is not articulated in terms of ethics, even 
though the ethics involved with decision-making is what it describes. Care is defined, or reduced 
rather, to the concern one has for self in “a historical, sociocultural life-world of discursive and 
relational practices” (p. 117) and is made possible through the reflective understanding that 
emerges during development as an agentic being. Care is about ensuring the survival and 
wellbeing of the self. The choices that go into that goal are in essence ethical choices for they are 
guided by a set of principles and beliefs regarding the value of the desired endpoint and the most 
appropriate way to achieve it. Morality and ethics are clearly embedded in the assumptions of 
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Martin et al.’s (2003) theory of agency, but they are not pursued beyond the extent to which I 
have described here. 
 Cote and Levine’s (2002) conception of agency offers even less reference to morality. 
The extent to which they allude to morality or ethics occurs in their discussion of motivation for 
the relational self (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Markus & Kitayama, 1991) where the individual is 
actively responding to “the ‘pushes and pulls’ any agentic actor must contend with in balancing 
the interests and needs of self and other” (Cote & Levine, 2002, p. 86). Otherwise, Cote and 
Levine emphasize moral development only in terms of how norms and ontogenetic expectations 
contribute to individual agency.  
Even though morality is inseparable from agency, it is evidently under theorized in 
agency theory. Humans are considered agentic beings but there are times where we appear to act 
without agency: passive, aimless, and without care for the self or one’s future. It may be that in 
these situations, the person indeed does experience little care to act, or it could be that they have 
made the conscious decision to not act for some reason that is not immediately apparent. The 
moral element of care may be present, just differently motivated. Judging the degree to which a 
person makes use of his or her agentic capacity can only be accomplished in consideration of 
one’s motivation and the values s/he places upon the potential outcomes.  
Morality and agency both have in common the elements of reflection and motivation in 
their models, which facilitates their theoretical connection. Zigon (2007) developed a framework 
for the study of moralities that includes reflection and motivation as central components in 
ethical decision-making. He contended that morality could be an object of study by examining 
those instances when one is taken from embodied morality, the unreflective state characteristic of 
the absence of dilemma, to a “moral breakdown” where reflection is required to work through an 
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ethical challenge. The point of moral breakdown occurs when one cannot automatically and 
unthinkingly resolve a situation of moral consequence and instead must break into reflective 
contemplation about the best course of action. Zigon used the term “ethical demand” to identify 
the requirement to act and resolve a morally inflected situation. Moral breakdown and ethical 
demand pulls the agent out of unreflective automaticity. The motivation in these instances of 
ethical demand is to “Keep Going!” (p. 139) and work through the moment so one can return to 
the internalized, “unreflective moral dispositions of everydayness” (p. 139). For sexual 
offenders, the failure to ‘Keep Going!’ could mean a perpetual cycle of crime and incarceration, 
or perhaps even suicide in the face of perceived hopelessness.  
Cultural discourses and experiential knowledge inform the contents of reflection during 
moral breakdown, contributing to the ethical decision-making process. The impulse to work 
through the ethical demand of a situation and return to a morally unreflective state is one form of 
motivation. Another motivation is identified in the Good Lives Model (Ward, 2002; Ward & 
Gannon, 2006) as the drive to pursue the primary human goods listed earlier (i.e. companionship, 
autonomy, mastery, spiritual meaning, health, etc.). These primary human goods are also moral 
goods because the preferred means of obtaining and enacting them are strongly influenced by the 
cultural-moral realm (Taylor, 1989). The value we place upon moral goods informs our larger 
life goals and desires, and guides our agentic decision-making over the life course.  
Making a theoretical connection between agency and morality raises certain questions. 
For example, who defines the value and virtue of various goals? How does agency theory deal 
with tensions that arise when individuals’ desires conflict with societal desires or cultural ideals? 
The under theorization of agency and morality extends to evaluations of the means used to 
achieve goals. Who defines what is the better, more virtuous route to goal attainment? Can 
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someone act with agency if his or her goal contravenes accepted moral codes? In asking these 
questions, it becomes clear that structures and relationships of power are also part of the moral 
equation.  
Morality permeates all aspects of sexual offender treatment and habilitation far beyond 
the obvious concerns of harm caused and laws broken. The moral habilitation of men convicted 
for sexual offences presented a palpable instance in this research from which to query many of 
these questions about morality, agency, motivation, and power. SOTPs are embedded with 
assumptions of what constitutes a good life and how to pursue wellbeing (Ward, 2002); however 
it is unclear who is defining that concept of wellbeing and if it is even realistic for treatment 
participants. Treatment lessons are abstracted or generalized to the point of embodying an 
idealized model of society that bears little relevance to the lived realities of life in the community 
(Waldram, 2012) .To its credit, treatment aims in part to teach participants to be more self-aware, 
self-reflective, and to make better decisions, all of which are hallmarks of agency (Martin & 
Sugarman, 2003).  
Treatment is the basic mechanism for eliciting moral habilitation since its main goal is to 
prevent criminal behaviour, but it could also be interpreted as a means for past offenders to 
become better people. Understanding agentic development as “a historical progression of human 
moral agents toward fashioning more virtuous persons” (Sugarman, 2005, p. 808), this research 
uses men’s experiences of sexual offender treatment and its applications in community 
(re)integration to illustrate the successes and hurdles that are part of their institutionally-directed 
“fashioning of more virtuous” subjects. 
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1.3.4  Terminology and Assumptions  
 There are a number of clarifications that are necessary in order to more clearly identify 
some of my own assumptions and perspectives that informed this research. The labeling of men 
who have been convicted of sexual offences as “sexual offenders” not only reinforces the notion 
of a stigmatized and unchanging self, but it also does a disservice to the men who contributed to 
this research. I decided to concede to its use only for literary ease. The men who graciously 
assisted me in this research for the most part rejected the sexual offender label, often by invoking 
the language commonly promoted in treatment programs that sexual offending was something 
they did, not a determinant of their identities.  
A second clarification of terminology follows from Waldram’s (2012) ethnography and 
involves the assumptions made by terms such as rehabilitation and reintegration. These terms are 
based on a premise that the subject in question had previously been “habilitated” or “integrated” 
in society, thus the addition of the prefix “re-” to these terms suggests a return to these prior 
states. In reality, many men who sexually offend come from dysfunctional backgrounds and 
never existed in what we might consider a “functional” state. For these individuals, habilitation 
or community integration would be considered a first. For other men, community integration 
may have indeed represented some offenders’ circumstances prior to sliding onto a downhill path 
into sexual offending. In order to capture the variety of pre-incarceration experiences of the men 
in this study, I adopted the convention of using “(re)integration” for participants’ post-release 
circumstances.  
 In undertaking this project, I recognized that women sexually violate others and that this 
is an under studied area; however, I chose to focus my research solely on male sexual offenders. 
One reason for this decision was that men still comprise the vast majority of people who commit 
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sexual offences. A second reason for this decision was a very pragmatic one; it was immensely 
easier to recruit male sexual offenders due to their higher prevalence. I expected that there would 
be substantial differences between men and women who sexually offend and including only men 
in this research allowed me to focus specifically on the issues and characteristics that are unique 
to their gender.  
Another assumption that I brought into this project was that most men who sexually 
offend and abuse others are operating from a place of dysfunction. Sexual victimization, often in 
conjunction with substance abuse, may have become a means to cope with distress in their lives. 
Whether their crimes were only singular events or repeated patterns, I supported – and still do – 
the critical humanist assumption that people strive to improve their lives and wellbeing in spite 
of being only partially knowing subjects of the cultural, social, historical, economic, and political 
structures and forces around them. I further assumed that the majority of men convicted of sexual 
offences desire to improve their lives even though the awareness of how to do so may elude 
them. Despite the demonization of sexual offenders in civil society, they remain human and 
harbour all the goals and desires of other citizens. I also considered the stigmatization of men 
who sexually offend as detrimental to public safety because it negatively impacts their senses of 
self and self-esteem to the point where it is more difficult to overcome their problems. 
1.4  Overview of Chapters 
 The chapters that follow detail the development of this research and the progressive 
transformation of a population of men who are rarely involved in this manner of studies. Chapter 
2 identifies the epistemology and methodology through which this research was developed. I 
describe the progression of the project in terms of its fieldwork, participant recruitment, data 
generation, and data analysis. 
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 In Chapter 3, “Agency, motivation, and moral habilitation,” I introduce agency theory 
more fully and identify it as a form of self-determination that involves the development of 
decision-making abilities. The emergence of agentic self-determination and decision-making 
requires psychological autonomy, attainable goals, and the motivation to takes steps toward 
reaching them. I identified the agency in men’s moral habilitation processes and described the 
various motivations men declared as the drive behind their transformations. The moral bases of 
participants’ motivations were discerned as the desire to have a “Better Life” that is made 
possible by obtaining primary human goods, or what I describe as “moral goods.” Furthermore, I 
demonstrate that what on the outside appears to be a “lack of motivation” may actually be 
agentic behaviour directed by alternative motivations.  
 Chapter 4, “Moral regulation and the narrative management of stigma” establishes the 
forms and range of stigma experienced by sexual offenders and their responses to it. In their 
efforts to manage how others perceive them, sexual offenders adopted multiple narrative 
strategies to make moral claims disputing the essentialized and deindividualizing representations 
formed by public discourse. Attention is focused in this chapter on stigma and abjection, 
interactions with family and friends in the community, and the relation between stigma and 
moral regulation as each detracted from and contributed to participants’ moral habilitation. 
Stigma functioned as punishment and moral regulation by reinforcing the boundaries of 
acceptable behaviour in society. 
 Stigma can be a powerful force and combined with the vitriolic discourses directed at 
men convicted for sexual offences, it is not a far leap to consider the detrimental effect these 
sentiments have on these individuals. Where previous chapters investigate other aspects of moral 
habilitation, Chapter 5 focuses entirely on the transformation of self-concept over the course of 
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moral habilitation, from arrest and conviction to the years after warrant expiry and community 
release. “Stigma and moral selfhood: The four selves of ethical self-reformation,” identifies how 
moral discourses and interpersonal interactions within the community influenced men’s senses of 
self. Moral habilitation involved, in part, the transformation of self, which is framed as a process 
of ethical self-reformation that was connected to men’s shifting trajectory of increasingly 
autonomous self-concepts. 
 The sixth and final chapter, “Sexual offender treatment: A moral enterprise” integrates 
the arguments made in the previous chapters to construct a theoretical model of ethical self-
reformation and moral habilitation. It summarizes how morality is embedded within all aspects 
of sexual offenders’ moral habilitation through discourses, correctional practices, and stigma.  
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK______________________________ 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, I provided a basic description of sexual offender treatment 
programs (SOTPs) and their theoretical perspectives. I identified the gap created by the near-
exclusive reliance on quantitative methodologies regarding sexual offenders’ experiential 
knowledge as mandatory consumers and primary stakeholders in the treatment process. Add to 
that, there are the methodological challenges of conducting quantitative research on community-
released offenders who are no longer part of a “captive population” and therefore difficult to 
recruit. Consequently, the scientific and correctional community has only marginal knowledge 
about how men apply their treatment knowledge immediately and especially years after their 
warrant expiry date. We have so far only been able to speculate what aspects have been most and 
least helpful for living offence free. It is this last void in knowledge that led to the development 
of this research. 
This research queried how men convicted of sexual offences narrated their transition 
from dysfunction to a place of enhanced wellbeing. At the core of this question were the issues 
of human development and how individuals deal with and change when confronted with a crisis. 
Applying these concerns to men convicted of sexual offences, development becomes a moral 
issue in that not only should we learn more about how people transform themselves into better 
persons, but also we need to develop a much better understanding than we currently have of how 
sexual offenders come to desist from their abusive practices. The main research question and 
subsequent theoretical framework was informed by the various assumptions identified in the 
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previous chapter. I consider much of sexual offending behaviour to be a symptom or result of 
some form of psychosocial dysfunction, and that given the option, offenders will desire an 
improved quality of life, even if that just meant not suffering from the stigma of their offences. 
Furthermore, I assumed that the sort of stigma and possibly shame experienced by sexual 
offenders would have some negative impact on their selfhoods. Inquiring how sexual offenders 
narrated their transition from dysfunction to greater wellbeing involved targeting a number of 
areas currently not well known regarding the habilitation and (re)integration of sexual offenders: 
perceptions of treatment benefits and limitations, barriers to community (re)integration and 
possible resolutions, and responses to stigma, particularly on men’s self-concepts. Incorporating 
these various aspects of treatment utility and community experience into the research interviews 
offered multiple avenues through which men could narrate their transitions of moral selfhood. 
2.2  Methodological Framework 
 The investigation of experiential knowledge is best accomplished through a different 
epistemological paradigm than that offered by post-positivism. Consequently, a constructionist 
epistemology was better suited for the questions asked in this research. Constructionism 
understands humans as cultural beings who individually and collectively through their social 
interactions generate meanings from their life experiences (Burr, 2003). It is in this sense that 
humans are semiotic subjects “for whom the meaning of a situation is the major determinant of 
his or her response to it” (Shweder & Sullivan, 1990, p. 402). It is a meaning-centred approach 
that, in other words, signifies that the primary purpose is to learn how others make sense of their 
life worlds. I focused on this experiential knowledge that men convicted of sexual offences 
generated, for it is only through understanding their interpretations of treatment facilitated moral 
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habilitation that we can move toward understanding the larger scope of sexual offender treatment 
and (re)integration.  
This project was a person-centred ethnography that focused on individual interpretations 
of cultural values, beliefs, and assumptions (Hollan, 2001; Levy & Hollan, 1998). This variation 
on traditional ethnography enabled the theorization of subjective experiences and processes 
related to cognition, personhood, identity, self, and morality. The objective of ethnography is to 
make sense of social behaviour and practices from an insider's point of view while theorizing 
about it within the broader context of culture (Boyle, 1994; Geertz, 1973; Wolcott, 1995). 
Person-centered ethnography “tend[s] to focus on the ways in which people fashion culturally 
meaningful expressions from fields of experience in which meaning is routinely contested, and 
where culture is perennially under construction” (Chambers, 2000, p. 856-857). Emphasizing the 
individual within the culture is what makes person-centered ethnography particularly adept at 
separating the shared meanings from the individual differences that contribute to cultural 
heterogeneity.  
Interviews are one of several methods of data generation utilized in ethnography 
(Wolcott, 1995; Wolf, 2007) and the most appropriate for this research given the challenges 
presented by researching a largely hidden, yet highly stigmatized population. Person-centred 
interviewing in particular is useful for eliciting stories from respondents that reveal the subtleties 
of how individuals construct meaning from their lived experiences. It also treats participants as 
both “expert” informants of sexual offender treatment and (re)integration, and as respondents to 
personalized questions regarding the meaning of their experiences (Levy & Hollan, 1998).  
That said, it is important to not treat interview data as an uncritical reflection of reality or 
over-arching “truth.” Interviews are an intersubjective act of co-construction whereby the 
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interviewer and interviewee are dialogically reacting and interacting with one another (Holstein 
& Gubrium, 2004; Potter & Hepburn, 2005; Presser, 2004). The interviewee uses impression 
management techniques to impart a particular image of self and both members of the dyad 
respond in ways that shape future responses. Individuals who have been convicted of violent 
offences have sometimes used the interview situation as an opportunity to construct their selves 
as generally moral and good individuals who have made mistakes uncharacteristic of them or 
who have struggled to change into more virtuous persons (Maruna, 2001; Presser, 2004). In other 
words, the interview offered an opportunity for moral claims making that provided a rich source 
of data for this research.  
Given the decision to use individual interviews, I developed a semi-structured interview 
guide that queried participants on their experiences in three general areas: treatment, community, 
and self (Appendix A). More specifically, the interview guide solicited information on 
participants’ perceptions of treatment programming and its applications to community life, their 
interactions with family, friends, and other individuals, and the perceptions they held about 
themselves, how they had changed through their experiences, and what they hoped for 
themselves in the future. The interview guide left enough flexibility to follow up on significant 
questions that emerged during each interview and allowed for a person-centred interviewing 
style that solicited responses in the form of experiential narratives. The person-centred 
interviewing style asks individuals to describe their first-hand experiences in order to elucidate 
their interpretations of life events (Levy & Hollan, 1998).  
This research was performed in accordance to the ethical standards set out by the 
Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement on “Ethical conduct for research involving humans” and 
the University of Saskatchewan policy on “Research involving human subjects.” The certificate 
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of ethical approval is provided in Appendix B. In addition, two of the four data generation sites 
had their own formal ethics application processes that I followed. As for the two remaining data 
generation sites, I acted upon the advice given by community gatekeepers regarding the ethical 
protocol to follow. 
2.3  Fieldwork and Methods 
2.3.1  Participant Recruitment 
 The criteria for including participants in this research were deliberately broad. I was 
looking for men who had been convicted for a sexually based offence and who had participated 
in some form of treatment program specific to sexual offending. Considering the extreme stigma 
placed upon men who have sexually offended, it was appreciably difficult to, first, find these 
men in the community, particularly once they are no longer under the authority of the criminal 
justice system, and second, to convince them to talk about their experiences for the purpose of 
research. As a consequence, I flexibly included men who had experiences relevant to this 
research but who also fell outside the original parameters. Most participants had participated in a 
SOTP after conviction as a sexual offender; but there were some instances where participants 
were convicted of non-sexual offences yet still participated in treatment, and one case where a 
convicted sexual offender did not attend a treatment program. The range and variability of 
participants’ experiences are described in the next sub-section. 
 Due to the sensitive nature of this research, I was able to gain access to potential 
participants only through gatekeepers. Roughly one year prior to beginning the data generation 
process, I started networking with various governmental and non-governmental organizations 
that had access to men convicted of sexual offences in three prairie cities. In the end, four 
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different organizations agreed to act as gatekeepers through which I could contact potential 
research participants.  
Two of these organizations were Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA) operated 
by the local Mennonite Central Committee in two different cities. To develop a relationship with 
these gatekeepers, I met with the COSA manager from the first recruitment site several times to 
present a description of my project, an organizational consent outlining responsibilities for each 
party (Appendix C), and to further discuss who I was, my intentions with this research and its 
potential outcomes, and concerns for the protection of participants. These meetings were part of 
the trust-building process whereby the gatekeeper had to vet me as a person, and then my 
research as something that was worthwhile and safe for his contacts. Meeting with potential 
participants was made when the COSA managers were able to vouch for my trustworthiness to 
the core circle members. Once a trusting relationship was established with the first COSA 
manager, he provided me with contact information for COSA managers in two other urban 
locations. In one of these locations, I first spoke with the COSA manager by telephone and 
forwarded him my recruitment materials, which he then took back to the core and supporting 
members of his COSA. I later traveled to his location where we first met for an hour. Then I was 
introduced to the entire group of core members in that community during one of their weekly 
social meetings. In the third location, I met with three organizers of the local COSA but 
ultimately did not use that community as a data collection site. 
The actual recruitment process was quite different between the two COSA sites. In the 
first location, the manager spoke to eligible men on my behalf and provided each with a research 
invitation letter (Appendix D). He also arranged for me to meet with willing men in his office. In 
each case, I first engaged in casual conversation with the manager and the participant together. 
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At a comfortable point in the conversation, the participant and I relocated to a separate room to 
conduct the interview. This process occurred over a span of 13 months. Recruitment and 
interviewing at the second location took place in the span of three weeks starting from that first 
meeting with the group’s core members. The second COSA manager arranged the time and 
locations of interviews. The difference in recruitment processes reflected the different structures 
of the two COSA groups, but it also spoke volumes about the importance of the research 
relationship and how gatekeepers can be a community-based researcher’s strongest allies.  
 The third organization that acted as a gatekeeper in this research was a Correctional 
Service Canada (CSC) parole office. After obtaining ethical approval from CSC, I met weekly 
with men attending a parole mandated “maintenance” program. During my first meeting, the 
program facilitator introduced me to the group and I described who I was and my purpose for 
being there. I also handed out an invitation letter during this first meeting. I was not permitted to 
remain within the group during their meetings for reasons of confidentiality and possible 
disruption to the group process, but I was allowed to set up in an adjoining office while the group 
met. After that initial meeting, I would arrive early to converse with group members until the 
facilitator initiated the meeting. Then I would move to the adjoining office and be available to 
talk with group members after the meeting if they chose to do so. I continued this weekly 
presence for a four month duration during which time I was able to develop rapport and some 
measure of trust with group members. 
 The fourth recruitment site was under the jurisdiction of the local health authority and 
made through a psychiatrist with forensic clientele. Following the receipt of ethical approval 
from the health authority, this psychiatrist recruited participants on my behalf. In the end, I 
interviewed one of his clients for this research. 
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 Overall, gatekeepers helped me to recruit 16 participants. Six men were from the first 
COSA, five from the second, four from CSC, and one man was recruited through the forensic 
psychiatrist. In two instances, snowball sampling was utilized when a participant from one site 
knew and invited an acquaintance to participate on my behalf. In total, 18 men were interviewed 
for this research. Since most participants were recruited from two COSA groups, the participant 
sample is heavily biased toward men who are highly motivated to not reoffend and amenable to 
the COSA model. That, combined with the fact that all participants volunteered to discuss their 
experiences in an interview format, meant that my participant sample was far from representative 
of the diversity that exists among men convicted of sexual offences; however, since qualitative 
research does not typically attempt to make generalizations from samples to populations, 
representativeness is not of great concern. The sampling characteristics of the participants are 
only relevant in terms of considering how the various subjectivities of participants have 
contributed to the theoretical findings.  
Because sustained contact with participants was frequently not possible, the nature of the 
research relationship was limited. Some participants maintained a distance for privacy reasons 
and others resided in a community that was a fair distance from my own that precluded frequent 
contact. In other situations, gatekeepers lost contact with participants or the men recruited 
through CSC completed their time in the program. I had to develop trust with participants 
through either proxies (i.e. COSA managers) or just accept the limits to which interviewees 
would be forthcoming in their responses. The latter situation was particularly relevant for 
participants met through the CSC parole office. I had to reinforce the fact that my research was 
independent from CSC and that participants did not have to worry about their opinions finding 
their way back to an institutional authority. 
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2.3.2  Participants 
 It was not part of the objective of this research to take a formalized or structured account 
of participant demographics and I left it optional to participants as to how much information 
about their offence(s) that they wanted to provide. This approach left participants in control of 
their narratives, a position that is unlikely in the typical forensic context (Lacombe, 2008; 
Waldram, 2012). The only information that I did ask regularly was if that individual had 
Aboriginal heritage. As expected, some men were more forthcoming than others in what they 
wanted to tell about themselves and their crimes. Although having limited background 
information about participants makes it more difficult to construct a strong understanding of their 
subject positions, I felt it was important to not pry into their lives beyond what they were 
comfortable with; these men had more than enough such experiences during their time in 
correctional institutions.  
 Within this limitation, it was still possible to provide a rough sketch of my participant 
sample. Participants ranged in age from 27 to their early 60s but most men were between their 
mid 30s to mid 40s. The vast majority of men presented themselves as heterosexual but two were 
homosexual and one identified as a transgendered heterosexual1. One man seemed to express 
some uncertainty in that he had relationships with women but spoke to trying to overcome a 
“deviant sexuality”; he desired to become asexual. The cultural breakdown was somewhat 
diverse. Twelve men were of an unspecified Euro-Canadian descent, one was French Canadian, 
three were First Nations, and two were Métis. Of the three First Nations individuals, two were 
Cree and one was Saulteaux. The two Métis men declared that they did not identify with their 
cultural heritage at all and viewed themselves as generic Canadian. Three men in my sample 
                                                
1 Although this participant preferred female pronouns, I use male pronouns for her in order to protect her identity. 
The mislabeling of gender identity does not impact the analysis, as this issue is not directly relevant to the 
theoretical framework. 
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presented with some form of intellectual disability. I did not ask them about specific diagnoses. 
A fourth man indicated that he had been diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder 
(FASD) but I did not observe anything in his manner or thoughtfulness that would have led me 
to suspect any intellectual deficits. 
 Initially, this research was intended to have a much stronger focus on Aboriginal identity 
and the relation it bore to treatment responsivity. As part of my initial fieldwork, I upheld a 
weekly schedule of spending time at a local organization that provided culturally specific 
counseling services for Aboriginal clientele (Twigg & Hengen, 2008). I would routinely discuss 
different issues with one counselor in areas such as the sources of violence and abuse, cultural 
identity, healing, and the values and beliefs embedded within an Aboriginal worldview. These 
conversations were often frustrated by cross-cultural miscommunications that came from 
opposing worldviews. The Western paradigm of research employs the categorization of 
individuals to organize experiences and predetermine selection criteria for project inclusion. In 
my case, my research focused on a select group of sexual offenders, but inevitably, every time I 
used the term “offender” to specify my population of interest, I would raise the ire of my teacher. 
After many conversations, along with the intervention of an interlocuter who was present during 
some of these exchanges, I recognized that the Western research paradigm with which I was 
approaching my research was incompatible with the Aboriginal worldview that eschews the 
imposition of Western labels. The men with whom I was interested in learning were not thought 
of as sexual offenders, but rather as people who were suffering from cultural dislocation, identity 
loss, and childhoods of abuse and neglect. Labeling these men as sexual offenders effectively 
erased these foundational issues and transformed them into pathologized individuals for whom 
history and sociocultural context did not matter.  
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I was not going to be able to ethically and competently pursue an Aboriginal population 
unless I changed the direction of my research and invested significantly more time in developing 
a relationship with the community. Consequently, the men in this research who are Aboriginal 
were recruited incidentally through other locations and not with the intention of developing 
comparisons between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal offenders. I address cultural identity or 
history on an individualized basis in this research where participants’ narratives and claims 
warrant a focus on these topics. This procedure is consistent with person-centred ethnography, 
and avoids constructing a “false dichotomy” between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal identities, 
which can occur when comparative approaches are adopted (Waldram, 2012, p. 52).  
 With regard to participants’ criminal demographics, I received only enough information 
to provide broad breakdowns of differences. I was not given any consistent details about the 
specific crimes for which participants were convicted. Eleven participants had committed 
offences against children or under-aged youth, approximately seven of which had child victims. 
Five participants had offences against adults and two men where convicted of charges related to 
child pornography. For six men, the current conviction was based on their first and only offence 
with the remainder of participants being repeat offenders to varying degrees. The high rate of 
repeat offenders in this group is attributed to the recruitment process that sampled participants 
heavily through COSAs, organizations that were developed specifically for men deemed to be at 
high risk for reoffence. Last, two participants had been convicted and treated only through the 
provincial system; the remainder had all been in the federal system of corrections. Treatment 
programs utilized by the provincial system are generally low intensity or “maintenance” type 
programs. Many federal offenders are mandated to attend these programs with provincial 
offenders while on parole or when subject to Section 810 recognizance order. Many participants 
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were attending community programming in the form of low intensity treatment or maintenance, 
psychiatric services, or individual counseling at the time of interviewing.  
 As noted earlier, not all participants had been convicted of a sexual offence or had 
attended a SOTP. The decision to include these men in the research was based in part on their 
self-identification as having engaged in sexually abusive behaviour and by the additional breadth 
their perspectives added to the findings. Two men had not been convicted of sexual offences but 
elected to take a treatment program when it was offered. One of these men chose to do so since 
he had been convicted of assaulting a prostitute during an exchange of services. The other man 
was serving a life sentence and chose to take the program because he recognized sexually 
abusive behaviour in his past and saw the program as a way to learn more about himself for his 
future. Another man who took the treatment program had only sexually assaulted men in prison. 
The fourth man had been a repeat sexual offender who had never taken treatment. Lastly, one 
man was convicted and treated for sexually assaulting his ex-partner but insisted that she made a 
false claim that resulted in his conviction.  
Recruiting from a hidden population like sexual offenders presents challenges. The long 
duration of my recruitment phase was just one. The difficulty of recruiting participants also 
meant that I had to keep my inclusion parameters fairly open. Although some may consider this a 
limitation, the unanticipated and added benefit to having broad inclusion parameters is greater 
participant diversity. Where some participants had only been released from prison for a month or 
two, others had been living offence-free in the community for up to ten years, which supplied a 
cross-sectional element to this study.  
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2.3.3  Data Generation 
Early on in the data generation process, I interviewed participants twice to spread out the 
relatively long interview guide over two shorter sessions. As time progressed and data collection 
sites changed, it became clear that a single interview was more appropriate since many 
participants would have been difficult to connect with for a second interview. It was primarily an 
issue of convenience for them to meet only once rather than twice. Further, as I developed more 
experience in the interview process, I was able to refine my questions and technique to access 
more theoretically rich information in a shorter period of time.  
 Interviews from the first COSA group took place within that office location. For the 
second COSA group, I interviewed men predominantly in a church basement, although one 
interview took place in the COSA manager’s home. Two participants from the parole office were 
interviewed in the adjacent office during or after their maintenance group. The remaining four 
participants were interviewed in private office space on the university campus. At the start of 
each interview, I described the limits and conditions of anonymity and confidentiality to 
participants and had them sign letters of informed consent (Appendix E), specifying that they did 
not need to use their real name if they did not want to do so. Just prior to the start of every 
interview, I gave participants $20 honoraria for their time. One participant declined the 
honorarium stating he was doing the interview only to help out with the research. The length of 
interviews ranged from 40 minutes to two hours with the majority lasting approximately one 
hour and 20 or 30 minutes. All interviews were audio recorded, digitized into a computer file, 
and transcribed by hired research assistants. The transcriptions were coded primarily for textual 
content. Instances of emphasis, laughter, and sarcasm were noted but pauses and other verbal 
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intonations were omitted. Data generation took place over a period of 13 months as new 
participants were recruited.  
 With the approval of the ethics review board, I did not allow participants to make 
changes to their interview transcripts. The analytical method and assumptions I adopted in this 
research depended upon the spontaneity inherent to the socially constructed nature of subjective 
experience. Offering participants an opportunity to modify their transcripts would have 
eliminated the very spontaneity that this research depends upon. Further, some of the participants 
in this study were very transient and would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have 
maintained contact with following their interview. Participants were offered a copy of their 
interview transcripts, but only one participant took advantage of this offer.  
2.4  Data Analysis 
The analysis of data was an emergent process that was informed by thematic (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006) and narrative analytic approaches (Riessman, 2008). My overall approach was an 
intuitive one that depended on how the data could be linked to theory and narrated experience. I 
started with a deductive, theory-driven approach that gradually evolved into an inductive, data-
driven way of interpreting the data. I used a semantic analysis of the explicit themes as a means 
of organizing what was a very large corpus of data and it was only after I had the data coded in a 
manner that fit with my theoretical framework did I proceed to a systematic analysis of the latent 
content to “examine the underlying ideas, assumptions, and conceptualizations” (Braun & 
Clarke, p. 84, italics original). It was this latent analysis that I used to develop the theoretical 
findings of this research. The overall procedure was highly iterative as I shifted between theory, 
data, interpretation, to eventually amalgamate the data into themes and narratives.  
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2.4.1  Procedure 
Braun and Clarke (2006) described thematic analysis in six phases: familiarizing oneself 
with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and 
naming themes, and finally producing the report. The analytic strategy that I adopted mirrored 
these phases in the earlier stages of analysis and diverged into a more narrative based analysis in 
the later stages. Research assistants transcribed the majority of the interviews under the 
instruction that they were to transcribe for content alone and ignore aspects of delivery such as 
words stutters, speed, and intonation. In the process of familiarizing myself with the data, I first 
checked the accuracy of the transcripts, making corrections along the way and then surveyed 
each interview with a basic grounded (i.e. data driven) approach noting the preliminary themes 
and structures that were present.  
My next task was to begin the organization of the data for detailed analysis. This process 
was lengthy as there was a very large amount of data that was generated in this study. For this 
stage, I utilized Atlas-TI, a software program designed for qualitative data management and 
analysis. My first step was to identify and categorize all interview segments that referred to 
treatment, both the actual program experiences and direct references to lessons applied in the 
community context. I then coded “Treatment” into sub-categories based upon the instructional 
units generally taught in treatment – Cognitive Strategies, Emotion Management, 
Social/Communication skills, Empathy/Victim Harm, and Relationships/Sexuality – and 
emergent themes observed in the treatment category – Group Processes, Medication, Substance 
Abuse, and Cultural Programming. I further broke down Cognitive Strategies into the more 
specific instructional components of treatment: Denial and Minimization, Crime Cycle, Relapse 
Prevention, and more generally, Cognitive Techniques.  
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By this point in the analysis, I had made some significant observations that helped to 
clarify the direction that the emerging theoretical framework would take. I observed that 
“Transformation” had emerged as a crosscutting, inductive theme. “Transformation” spoke to 
personal growth and changes to the self through the experience of imprisonment and treatment; 
this was precisely the essence of the research question. Particularly, I noticed that participants 
readily spoke of their past selves as different from their current selves. Other significant themes 
that were surfacing were “Choice”, which I later wove into “Agency.” Some themes, like “Self,” 
represented a blend between deductive and inductive analysis. The various themes that I had 
generated by this stage in my analysis are summarized in Table 1: Early Codes and Themes. 
These initial themes and codes were not utilized for the final analyses in each chapter, but this 
stage was important for two reasons. It enabled me to make the initial observations and linkages 
between data that guided subsequent analyses. Furthermore, through trial and error these early 
organizational strategies contributed to the development of my analytic process. 
At this stage in the analysis, the most relevant data were organized under the three 
categories that were most closely related to moral habilitation and the research question: Agency, 
Self, and Community Integration. Initially, the predominant method was a theory-driven 
approach where I used key concepts in my theoretical framework as codes along with the 
theorized sub-components of concepts as subordinate codes. Additionally, I was always applying 
an inductive, data driven approach to identify potential themes that were not identified by my 
theoretical framework. The later stages of analysis were accomplished through an inductive, 
data-driven method. The identification and review of themes continued throughout all stages of 
analysis.  
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Table 1: Early Codes and Themes 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Deductive/Theory-driven Themes   Inductive/Data-driven Themes 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Treatment      Transformation & Change 
 - Cognitive strategies, empathy   - Dysfunction, wellbeing 
 emotions, communication, sexuality & 
 relationships, medication, institutional Substance Abuse 
 processes 
       Victimization, History of Abuse 
Community 
 - Family & friends, social interactions,  Mental Health Problems 
 hiding, disclosure, sexual offender  
 legislation     Religion & Spirituality 
 
Self       Support & Dependency 
 - Old self, current self, future self 
       Risk 
Agency & Choice 
 - Motivation     Withdrawal & Isolation 
 
Morality, Values, Beliefs    Control & Temptation 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  52 
Chapter 3 utilized deductive and inductive thematic analyses (Braun & Clarke, 2006), 
whereas Chapters 4 and 5 were written following strict narrative analyses (Riessman, 2008). The 
analytic approach for Chapter 3 differed from the others because I had a specific set of goals for 
what I wanted it to achieve. A deductive thematic analysis on the Agency dataset reorganized 
and reduced it along three codes derived from agency theory: Decision-Making, 
Growth/Learning, and Motivation (Cote & Levine, 2002; Frank, 2006; Martin& Sugarman, 
2003; Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003). The rationale for choosing a deductive approach 
was based on the desire to establish that sexual offenders were capable of agentic striving and the 
deliberate engagement in agentic behaviours. Civil society, public discourses, and even 
institutional discourses tend to construct sexual offenders as incapable of desistance and 
habilitation. It was important to set the tone for the remaining analysis by demonstrating that 
those discourses that claim limits on offenders’ capacities for growth are inaccurate and 
misleading. The analysis of Motivation in Chapter 3 was performed through an inductive 
thematic analysis. It was directed toward learning how motivation might be related to treatment 
responsivity and how participants’ mobilized their wills to make sustained behavioural changes 
in their lives.  
From that point on, my analysis became very specific and thus directed to only certain 
coded sections of the interviews based upon which elements could contribute to the final 
product. Narrative analysis, which is used to compare the different biographies research 
participants generate in their interviews (Riessman, 2008), was used to develop Chapters 4 and 5. 
The examination of men’s varying stories of stigmatized selfhoods and social interactions 
constructed a much larger image of moral habilitation. The last two analytic chapters were both 
derived from narratives extracted from the data sets coded as “Self” and “Community 
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Integration.” I organized the raw data into narratives for each participant that included their 
descriptions of reactions from family and friends, stigma, and their emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioural responses to those situations. For Chapter 4, I focused on participants’ narratives of 
social interactions, their interpersonal responses to stigma, and the various means with which 
they would engage in impression management strategies. The analytical emphasis for Chapter 5 
was on participants’ references to selfhood such as identity confusion, reactions to and 
overcoming stigma, and visions of the future.  
2.5  Conclusion 
Ethnographic research is inherently emergent because the relative lack of control that the 
researcher has over community and participant engagement translates into a continually evolving 
research process as the researcher navigates unexpected circumstances through improvisation 
and contingency plans. Emergence was a quality that characterized a large portion of this 
research. The research question, theoretical framework, and analysis were all modified and 
refined as the project progressed, culminating in a novel approach to the investigation of 
treatment and (re)integration for men convicted of sexual offences. The deductive analytic 
approaches taken in this research were especially useful for organizing data but also in 
demonstrating how individuals’ claims of performing certain activities, like self- reflection and 
agentic decision-making, are constructed in ways that can be referenced to theory. Inductive 
analyses are particularly useful for generating meanings around a particular concept, like 
motivation, and for making broad connections in seemingly variable behaviour that can offer 
new ways of theorizing processes such as moral habilitation.  
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CHAPTER 3: AGENCY, MOTIVATION, AND MORAL HABILITATION_____________ 
 
 
I like to think of everyone as being in the same boat... like, I mean some people 
are further along than others but we’re all just sort of broken people, trying to fix 
what’s broken and find what’ll make us whole, right? And like that’s a big broad 
goal, but... within that... you have room to move around.... I kind of see myself as 
just someone who’s trying to find the answer before I run out of time. You know, 
trying to find a reason to get up in the morning that I can care about. (Shane) 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 Sexual offender treatment programs endeavor to morally habilitate those individuals who 
participate in them (Waldram, 2012). Moral habilitation is “the process by which individuals are 
morally remade in the image of certain ideals regarding appropriate social and ethical conduct so 
that they become “fit” to be among us” (p. 101). Autonomy and agency are central components 
to moral habilitation and, indeed, to any healthy life trajectory. In this chapter, I demonstrate 
how men narrated their transition from dysfunction to wellbeing through a language of growth, 
self-discovery, and goal seeking that is commensurate to the development of psychological 
autonomy. The acquisition and refinement of skills such as mindfulness, self-reflection, and 
decision-making set the psychological groundwork for the emergence of agency. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the narratives of treatment to learn what role values and moral goods 
played in men’s experiences of moral habilitation and agentic development. This chapter first 
sets the stage for the remainder of this dissertation by establishing that men who have sexually 
offended construct themselves as acting with increasing individual agency in ways that are 
consistent with theory on agentic development (Martin, Sugarman, & Thompson, 2003). The 
majority of the chapter then turns its attention to the motivational factors that spur agentic 
behaviour and its grounding in conceptions of morality. 
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3.2  Theoretical Overview of Agency 
Agency is made possible through psychological autonomy, the human capacity to 
observe, think, and rationally choose a course of action (Chirkov, 2011). Psychological 
autonomy involves three psychological processes: (a) mindfulness or awareness of internal states 
– affective and cognitive – and external expectations and demands of the sociocultural context, 
(b) reflection upon these objects of our awareness and (c) rational decision-making that is based 
upon one’s awareness and reflections (Chirkov, 2014). Autonomous functioning matures as 
cognitive development combines with life experiences, enabling the individual to become 
increasingly sophisticated in his or her reflection and decision-making processes. In this manner, 
psychological autonomy blends closely to the situated, emergent, and deliberative properties of 
agency (Martin et al., 2003). Agency is situated within a person’s physical, biological, 
sociocultural, and psychological levels of reality that inform what is and is not possible along 
with that individual’s subject position. It is emergent in that the individual begins life as a pre-
reflective actor who gradually transforms into a self-reflecting agent through the capacity to 
remember and learn from experience. The capacities of self-reflecting agents to observe, 
interpret, reflect, and choose is what makes agency a deliberative exercise. Agency can be 
viewed as a form of “self-determination [that] equates with a kind of self-understanding that 
permits a deliberative, reflective activity in selecting and choosing, framing, and executing 
actions” (Martin et al., 2003, p. 114). 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, agency inherently contains a moral aspect that is more or less 
articulated in its different theoretical formulations (i.e. Cote & Levine, 2002; Martin et al., 2003; 
Taylor, 1985). The sense of care formulated in agency theory represents a moral valence because 
it speaks to what is considered “good” or beneficial to the self or recipient of the agentic action. 
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The understanding that human subjects have for norms, expectations, and consequences of 
decisions contains an implicit morality because, “for psychological persons (agents), 
understanding always includes a kind of valuing – a finding of significance and personal 
meaning in the life-world” (Martin et al., 2003, p. 117). As socially constructed entities, values 
and personal meanings are always at least partially informed by models of morality embedded in 
the sociocultural environment. Building from Taylor (1985, 1989), Sugarman (2005) expanded 
upon the moral aspect of Martin et al.’s (2003) framework stating that individual goals are 
developed within a context that is inherently cultural and informs valuation of human ideals of 
behaviour, expectations, and life circumstances ultimately transforming these ideals into moral 
goods. These moral goods are essentially the same as primary human goods (Ward, 2002; Ward 
& Gannon, 2006;Ward & Stewart, 2003) because they become orienting principles in our daily 
lives that are rooted in normative ethics and valuations of worth. Consequently, agency is 
expressed by questioning what gives our lives meaning and what is important in our lives, along 
with our attempts to act out our lives according to what we believe are the answers. 
The term “moral agency” is frequently used to identify agency that directly implicates 
ethical principles in decision-making outcomes. Moral agency attempts to differentiate between 
intentional behaviour that is guided by goals deemed to be morally or ethically worthwhile and 
goals that might be irrelevant to virtue. For example, Pasupathi and Wainryb (2010) wrote, 
“Moral agency can be defined as people’s understanding and experience of themselves (and 
others) as agents whose morally relevant actions are based upon goals and beliefs” (p. 55). The 
key phrase in this definition is “morally relevant actions” for it connotes an explicit, perhaps 
observable enactment of agency that directly invokes the deeper ethical principles of moral 
conduct that are formalized in society and are often expressed in criminal and religious codices. 
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In this sense of ethical conduct, moral agency is an obvious concern for the treatment and 
habilitation of men who have sexually offended. This chapter, however, examines agency in its 
broader moral sense of decision-making that is based upon the desire to improve oneself and live 
a “better” life. Differentiating between “agency” and “moral agency” muddies the 
conceptualization of agency for it suggests that ideas of morality can be separated from those of 
goals and agency. The theory of agency that I extend here asserts that all forms of agency 
involve goals and beliefs that are formed within a moral-cultural context. A more critical 
question to consider throughout this chapter is whether it is possible to act with agency in the 
absence of concern for the moral worthiness of potential outcomes. 
3.3  Sexual Offenders as Moral Agents 
The idea of being “broken” or psychologically damaged in the way Shane described at 
the beginning of the chapter consistently appeared in men’s narratives alongside a discourse of 
“getting better.” The moral trajectory of men’s treatment and (re)integration narratives was 
immediately obvious. Moral habilitation is human development that is specifically goal directed 
and implemented through an external source, in this case, treatment programs for sexual 
offenders. One of the implicit aims of SOTPs is to train participants to become self-regulating 
individuals who are better able to engage in agentic decision-making. Treatment specifically, and 
moral habilitation more generally, represent an example of governmentality, where dominating 
state-instituted discourses, structures, and practices are deployed to manipulate or control 
individuals into engaging in technologies of the self so as to remake their selves into a desired 
form (Foucault, 1988, 1978). Technologies of the self can refer to “a certain number of 
operations [that individuals might perform] on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being” (Foucault, 1988, p. 18). SOTPs represent calculated regimens that train sexual 
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offenders in a collection of exercises and routinized practices with the objective of reforming 
them into law-abiding subjects capable of being safely returned to the community. Self-
regulation is taught through technologies of the self, starting with the very components that form 
agency. 
In this first section, I connect the development of psychological autonomy to agentic 
capacity and demonstrate how these concepts are improved and expressed by research 
participants. The second section of the chapter is dedicated to the depiction of motivational 
forces that participants claimed guided their agentic pursuit of enhanced wellbeing. In the final 
section, I interrogate some of the gaps and inconsistencies in agency theory as it relates to the 
moral habilitation of men convicted for sexually based crimes.  
3.3.1  Psychological Autonomy and Agency 
Agentic decision-making emerges from the development of psychological autonomy, 
which speaks to the ongoing psychosocial growth and knowledge acquisition of human 
ontogenesis from a Western cultural perspective. For men who have been convicted of sexual 
offences, the current moral-political context dictates that their developmental trajectory requires 
moral habilitation in order to return to society. In this section, I demonstrate how narratives 
suggest the facilitation of psychological autonomy through treatment, the enhancement of self-
awareness and self-reflection along a particular moral trajectory, and the combination of 
motivation with goal setting to support agentic decision-making.  
3.3.1a  Awareness and Self-Reflection 
Men’s descriptions of their treatment experiences and subsequent changes to their senses 
of self were indicative of the development of psychological autonomy and the progressive 
emergence of agency. Increased self-awareness was consistently reported in many different 
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forms. Some of these involved recognition of internal states, that is, participants’ thoughts and 
emotions. Self-reflection was inherent to their narratives in the sense that much of the interview 
required participants to consider the more salient elements of their treatment experiences. Self-
reflection was frequently expressed through themes of enhanced self-understanding. The forensic 
treatment model requires men to reflect on the circumstances of their lives that led up to and 
included their offences, but this process is not without problems like memory recall and the 
tendency for other group members to co-construct the target participant’s narrative (Waldram, 
2007, 2012). The men in this research described how reflecting on their past experiences within 
treatment contributed to their self-understanding, usually regarding the influence of childhood 
experiences, the possible role that substance abuse has had in their lives, and the specific 
circumstances contributing to their offences that are typically expressed through their “Crime 
Cycles.”2 
Miles was a tall and lean Caucasian man whose height and “rough around the edges” 
appearance could lend to an intimidating presence. Despite this outward impression, Miles was 
very friendly, easy to talk to, and insightful. He spent roughly 20 years in prison for what was at 
the time called non-capital murder. A few months after arriving in the federal penitentiary as a 
teenager, he was brutally assaulted, raped, and left for dead. He learned to adapt to the extreme 
violence and danger of prison by becoming violent himself, committing his only sexual offences 
against other men in the prison. I asked him what he learned from the SOTP. In response, he 
described how working on his Crime Cycle forced him to think back to his early memories of 
childhood up to the time of his offences: 
                                                
2 The Crime Cycle is a unit within the treatment program that has men reflect on the social, physical, and 
psychological contexts preceding each crime so as to develop a better understanding of why they committed their 
crime. 
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You gotta really pick your life apart and... lay it out on the table. [...] Us humans, we’re 
like a vehicle, you know. Sometimes a vehicle breaks down [and] you gotta fix it, right? 
So sometimes we break down; we gotta fix ourselves type of thing. So... that’s basically 
what I did, right. I took all my parts… but you know, from being in prison so long, I truly 
believe that parts of me were frozen in time inside of me... and I don’t think I got some of 
them back yet.... I think some have come back and some are slowly coming back. I think 
it depends on me and how I adapt to the community, and make my daily life go on in the 
community. 
 
To clarify, I asked, “So it’s just like some things haven’t grown at all?” “Yeah,” Miles continued:  
It’s almost like I have to learn everything all over again. You know, almost like a small 
child. You know when a child is born, their parents [bring] them up through life, and 
that’s basically what I’m doing now. And I don’t feel stupid because of that. I don’t feel 
like I’m different than anybody else. It’s just the way my life went and it’s the way my 
life is now. I’m sort of enjoying learning these things again. You know, because this time 
I’m learning them in a much more positive way than I did from a small child where I 
went [and] took the wrong roads and stuff. 
 
Other men discussed developing awareness of others through the Victim Harm or 
empathy component of treatment. This part of the treatment program was often talked of as the 
most difficult and yet the most life changing. Tanner was a Métis man in his late 30s who had 
been sexually abused as a child. At the time of the interview, he was on probation from prison 
following a breach of parole conditions. Despite his own history of abuse, he claimed naïveté to 
the impact of sexual abuse on himself and his victims until he went through the Victim Harm 
component: 
Well if I really... knew the actual pain it was causing, I wouldn’t have done it. I didn’t 
realize what I was doing. Like, you know it’s wrong. Like you’re told it’s wrong, but 
when your body says, “It feels good, keep on going,” you... it’s ‘whatever.’ ‘Cause it was 
done to me for so long. I went looking for it ‘cause that was the only kind of love I knew, 
which I perceived was love. Which, that’s a distortion itself, but then I went and I thought 
I was passing it on, like the caring and stuff like that. I didn’t think I was causing any 
pain and stuff. If I knew actually... as much damage as I was doing, how much it was 
hurting, I wouldn’t have done it. 
 
Tanner produced a retrospective narrative to attribute his moral failing to ignorance. By 
explaining that he would not have offended if he understood the harm it caused, Tanner made a 
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claim for moral goodness but one that reduced offending behaviour down to a simple choice of 
to offend or not offend, as if agency is so easily dichotomized.  
At the end of our interview, I asked Tanner if there was anything he wanted to add. He 
started out with, “No,” but then quickly shifted direction to reinforce a previous statement: 
Like I said... I think the most important thing that we have to be aware of is our 
surroundings and be very aware of our feelings and stuff. Those are probably the most 
important things. If you’re not willing to change, no matter what you do, no matter how 
much you think and stuff, you’re not gonna change. You have to be willing and be on top 
of everything that’s going around.  Avoid... high-risk situations, avoid stinking thinking, 
as they call it. 
 
“Stinking thinking?” I asked. “Yeah, in Relapse Prevention,” he explained: 
You gotta be aware of this stuff and... people that are in touch with that would probably 
be very good people, you know, as long as they’re willing to be honest with themselves 
and others. I guess that’s the most important aspect that people like me have to be aware 
of if we want to kinda make it in society. 
 
Awareness and avoidance represented a new value system that is presented as a path that the 
participant not only ‘ought’ or ‘should’ do, but also must do in order to become a better person. 
The adoption of this value system is the foundation of the Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model 
of treatment and the moral habilitation of sexual offenders. It is part of a rigid system of 
normative ethics (Rottschaefer, 2009) that applies only for a small subsection of society. 
Furthermore, the narrative accounts that Miles and Tanner presented indicate that treatment 
activities such as the development of one’s Crime Cycle or participation in empathy training 
function as technologies of the self that repeatedly reinforced self-awareness and self-reflection 
that participants then directed toward their self-improvement efforts. 
3.3.1b  Decision-Making 
Men described awareness and self-reflection as emerging through the criminalization and 
treatment process, and seemed to contribute to the development of new decision-making 
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practices reflective of agency. These new practices, or technologies of the self, included planning 
ahead for activities or places to avoid, being selective with whom to associate, self-care and 
respecting personal boundaries, self-monitoring thoughts and feelings, and taking proactive steps 
when problems are encountered such as seeking out support. Men expressed that they had made 
changes in their decision-making processes. These changes involved being more aware of 
consequences, maintaining a mindset based upon a determination to change, reframing negative 
events as positive learning experiences, and focusing on one’s goals and potential options. 
Jason could be held up as an exemplar for agentic decision-making. He was a Caucasian 
man in his early 30s who was convicted for molesting a young boy. Jason was a large, sincere 
man with a penchant for sarcasm and laughter. Like many other men in my study, Jason had also 
been sexually molested as a boy. He described how his conviction initiated a chain of events that 
culminated in a transformed self: 
After my court date... I just woke up one day and said that this can either be the worst 
thing in my life and it could... drive me down or I could use it as a stepping stone to learn 
and to move on.  
 
His mindset from that day forward was focused on his goal of never having another victim. “It 
wasn’t easy, but with the mindset that I had and that ultimate number one goal... I said, ‘Okay, I 
gotta do this. Like I don’t know how I’m gonna do it, but I gotta do it.’” It was as if he was 
driven by some moral imperative. Jason had been out of the correctional system for ten years 
when I interviewed him. In that time, he had struggled with depression, finding meaningful 
work, and developing relationships; but he also talked with pride about how much he had learned 
about himself, his thoughts and feelings, and how he had never even thought about reoffending.  
In several instances, Jason described events whereby he had to assert himself, sometimes 
to go against treatment protocol, in order to better himself. He eventually came to identify 
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himself as a homosexual man and described to me how he worked to develop his attraction to 
adult men instead of boys. Although he was at first skeptical, he made use of the phallometic 
sessions that are part of the treatment process. In these sessions, an instrument called a 
plethysmograph is attached to the inmate’s penis to measure tumescence while watching various 
types of pornography. The purpose of phallometric testing is to measure men’s arousal to 
different sexual stimuli – including hard-core, violent, and child forms of pornography – and 
ascertain their ability to control their arousal.  
I went through the first couple of sessions... watching all this porn on tv, but then [the 
technician] goes okay, “Now, I don’t want you to get any kind of arousal from it.” And so 
we worked on that for, I think it was every other day for weeks because there’d be times 
where I said, “You know I started getting aroused by that and I know I shouldn’t so we 
need another session.” Like, I actually prolonged it by a number of sessions with the guy 
that was doing it at the time and he said, “Well, I don’t see the point.” And I said, “I do.” 
I never ended that until I... learned how to control it a lot better. Then once... you’re 
programmed not to get aroused to that then you have to find something else and so then I 
just started fantasizing, trying to do age-appropriate [men]. 
 
In another instance, Jason described his time in a halfway house when he had more free 
time than the residents who were required to do substance abuse programming. “I got myself a 
bus pass and I literally spent probably about two weeks of riding the buses getting to know the 
city.” The outcome of his decision was very beneficial to his (re)integration process. He 
explained: 
I was proud to say when I moved out of the [halfway house], I knew every bus route in 
the city... which helped me... plan to get to different areas of the city for jobs, for 
appointments, for looking for apartments, because I already knew if it was close to the 
bus route or not. 
 
Technologies of the self operate through the construction of docile bodies that willingly subject 
themselves to a prescribed regimen (Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1996). Sexual offender treatment 
programs are presented as the only option for change (Waldram, 2012), which may encourage 
docility in the subject to invest in the treatment process. Consequently, it seems likely that 
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agency in men like Jason is strongly influenced by the lack of alternative recourse. 
3.3.2  Struggling with Agency: Carl 
The ongoing process of becoming aware of and reflecting on circumstances or 
behavioural patterns can be a difficult process, by some accounts, which can impair motivation 
and decision-making. Carl was a 40-year-old Caucasian who fondled a pre-school girl and served 
time in a provincial institution. He described to me his attendance in a moderate intensity 
treatment program where there was little rapport between him and one of the program 
facilitators. It ultimately led to him “shutting down” or disengaging mentally from the program. 
My understanding was that he completed the program, but I wondered to what degree he had 
actually assimilated the information into practice. During our two interviews, Carl only 
occasionally invoked the treatment language, and to a much lesser degree than men in treatment 
(Waldram, 2012) and the other research participants in this study tended to do. Nor did he show 
much awareness about his behaviour and its implications. He often punctuated his talk with the 
phrase, “What do you do?” that left a sense that he felt cornered into inactivity or helplessness; it 
was a classic victim stance. Carl professed that he was in a “vicious circle” where he was “still 
dealing with the same thing” after two years. It had been five years since he was released from 
prison. He was stuck and did not know how to move on with his life. Carl talked about having 
depression and it seemed like he was caught in its snare at the time of the interview. 
 I also questioned the degree to which Carl had honestly reflected upon his past actions 
and current situation. In one of his rare engagements with treatment language, he acknowledged 
that he did cause harm to his victim, her family, himself, and his own family. When I asked him 
to reflect upon his decision to offend, he described to me his thoughts and what he subsequently 
learned about the situation: 
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I see what happened. I see how to correct it. I see how to prevent it. Do I see how I ended 
up there? Yes. You get desensitized to certain things or your own mind says, “Screw it. 
I’ve never gotten any help, might as well give caution to the wind.” ...Basically what I... 
got charged for, I grabbed one of the girl’s bums. And... right away when I did it, I went, 
“Too far.” I said to myself, “You went too far,” and I told myself, “They’re never [going 
to] come over again.” Next week I was charged.  
 
Carl appeared to demonstrate awareness and reflection as he continued to describe how he pled 
guilty, recognizing that his “mind’s not going in the right direction,” and he admitted that if he 
had not been caught, he likely would have taken the offending behaviour further. But, he then 
employed language that minimized the event. Describing a difficult social situation with a 
friend’s wife and her young daughter, Carl declared he was charged with “excessive tickling”: 
One situation with that friend... I got to know him and then his wife very well so... we 
were talking kind of privately and his daughter came over and was kind of being a 
nuisance. So I knew I could probably just scare her or run her away cause... kids are kids, 
they like to play. And so I went down, “I’m going to tickle you and scare you. I’m going 
to get you.” And because of the fact that that’s what I consider I was charged with is 
excessive tickling and with intent I went, “Okay, oh boundary there. I better watch my 
butt.” But yet it’s just a kid, just wanting to have some fun. And I knew... like when I go 
there, I know exactly what would happen. And that’s exactly what happened and we just 
went on talking. 
 
Afterwards, the friend expressed outrage to Carl that he dared touch his child even in that open 
context. Carl identified his intentional awareness to maintain a boundary, but yet his awareness 
did not extend to his minimization of the offence and consideration that parents may have very 
different ideas of appropriate interactions between him and their children once they are aware of 
his history. 
Reflexively, I recognized that my own biases were triggered by Carl’s narrative. Like 
others in forensic psychology, I buy into the assumption that risk to reoffend is mitigated when 
past sexual offenders demonstrate awareness through utilization of treatment discourse and 
implementation of a relapse prevention plan – often evident through men’s decisions to avoid 
“high risk” situations. Carl’s minimization of his offence and his failure to demonstrate 
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avoidance of children was a point of concern for me. He was not talking the talk, so I could not 
help but wonder if he could walk the walk. I also wondered if he was being honest with himself 
and I was somewhat disturbed with the thought that perhaps he still wanted to interject his self 
into children’s lives just a little too much. 
 Along with his dwindling sense of hope and contradictory reflections, Carl also seemed 
impaired in his ability to make and follow through on agentic decision-making. I asked Carl if 
there were things that he learned in treatment that were not working so well for him. “Well I 
guess, yeah, closing myself off,” he replies. “That’s probably, it is probably one of the worst 
things that you can do... but it’s been hard to go back,” referring to meeting acquaintances when 
he could not seem to make any headway in his life. “You can’t see the light at the end of the 
tunnel.” In conjunction with not being able to move on with his life, he alsoseemed to rely too 
much on distant and potentially unrealistic goals, all of which are contingent on him getting a 
pardon: 
My goals really can’t start until my pardon comes in, which is the hardest thing right 
now. I have no short terms goals. I could probably go back to school but [with] finances 
right now, I can’t. I wouldn’t mind taking some psychology courses and maybe pursue 
that.... I applied for [occupation] and I got accepted, but again, charges came up. So I 
can’t take that until my pardon comes in. 
 
Ongoing health problems combined with required criminal record checks made it difficult for 
Carl to find work. He was fixating on the future and not able to focus on what he needed to do in 
the present. On the whole, whether it is just a transient phase in his life or a more enduring 
characteristic, Carl was struggling with his sense of agency. In the absence of tangible goals and 
with his feelings of helplessness, he seemed hard pressed to take intentional actions that would 
enhance his wellbeing.  
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3.3.3  Summary 
 Autonomy theory suggests that reflection, awareness, and decision-making pertaining to 
internal states, external phenomena, and values are the cornerstones of psychological autonomy 
and self-determination (Chirkov, 2014). These characteristics of psychological autonomy and 
agentic decision-making were all evident in the narratives of this research. Awareness, reflection, 
and decision-making are all crafted in sexual offender treatment under a regime of power, 
coercion, and narrative re-emplotment where inmates’ stories become reconstructed by the group 
process (Waldram, 2007, 2008, 2012). Paradoxically, agency appears to be facilitated through a 
moral habilitation process that actually limits one’s physical and psychological autonomy under 
subjection to the state apparatus. This subjection represents the making of docile bodies who 
have chosen or allowed their subjugation to the governmentality of treatment (Foucault, 1977, 
1988). Spontaneously emerging agentic development, the kind that grows incrementally through 
the life course, differs from the agency emerging from moral habilitation. Moral habilitation, 
although it prompts agentic behaviour and seemed to be beneficial for the men in this research, is 
more of a parallel “fast-track” process whereby coercion, incentive, and science all combine to 
fashion and regulate new pro-social moralities. The constellation of these various regulatory 
forces comprises the fashioning of new subjectivities through governmentality and treatment-
enforced technologies of the self (Dean, 1994; Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1988; Rose, 1996). 
Narrative psychology and theory problematizes moral habilitation and the cognitive-
behavioural treatment paradigm by suggesting that the denial, minimization, and cognitive 
distortions that are targets for treatment are normative instead of being indicators of deviance 
(Waldram, 2012). Consequently, the governmentality of treatment can critiqued as operating 
against the narrative paradigm with which people make sense of their day to day lives (Bruner, 
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2002). Waldram (2007, 2008a, 2010, 2012) identifies this paradigmatic conflict as a source of 
confusion and frustration for men in SOTPs and indicates that responsivity may be improved if 
treatment facilitators worked within the narrative framework instead as adversaries to it.  
 With access only to retrospective narratives of treatment from a collection of men who 
for the most part described life improvements, the moral habilitation process noted in this 
research took on a less problematic and more beneficial hue. It instilled a new moralizing 
awareness and subjectivity for participants not just through recognizing past harms but by 
introducing a new belief system based on the values projected by treatment staff. Honesty with 
oneself and others is one aspect of this value system. Another aspect is vigilance to the ongoing 
introspection and self-monitoring of one’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. Many men 
accepted these perspectives and practices as part of a new way of life for them. This value 
system, while on one hand insisting that treatment participants are good men who have 
committed bad acts, on the other hand illuminates a prescribed behavioural pathway to becoming 
a better person. Maintaining these practices becomes one requirement in the broader goal of 
moral habilitation.  
3.4  Agency and Motivation 
Goal setting and motivation are central elements of agency. Without a theoretical 
consideration of motivation, we are unable to account for either an individual’s impetus to act in 
a particular manner (Frank, 2006), or the value of his or her desire for one goal over another that 
is a core part of the moral evaluation that defines agency (Taylor, 1985). Without the 
consideration of the source of one’s motivation, it is difficult to establish if an individual is 
acting with self-determining psychological autonomy or with a controlled agency that Chirkov 
(2014) described as unreflectively acquiescing to sociocultural prescriptions. Moreover, agency 
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involves more than psychological autonomy. It also involves the capacity to will, to commit 
oneself to an action or course of action. As experienced, “will” involves a sense of ownership 
toward an act, a sense of goal-directedness, and the sense of placing effort or energy into 
completing the act (Throop, 2010). It is relatively easy to develop and have goals, but to assert 
the will to achieve those goals is the real challenge. Can a person be truly agentic if s/he is 
insufficiently motivated to follow through on her or his decisions? Or are there other motivations 
of which we are not aware? This next section discusses the different goals and motivations 
articulated by participants.  
In forensic psychological theory, motivation is one of several factors that contribute to 
treatment responsivity (Looman et al., 2005). The responsivity principle of the RNR treatment 
model asserts that offenders are more receptive to treatment when it is delivered in a manner 
consistent with their learning styles, abilities, and other individual characteristics such as 
intelligence, education level, interpersonal skills, social anxiety, personality, and 
psychopathology (Andrews & Bonta, 2006). Despite being a key factor in treatment responsivity, 
motivation has been narrowly construed and largely under researched (Andrews & Bonta, 2006; 
Looman et al., 2005; Robertson, Barnao, & Ward, 2011; Tierney & McCable, 2002), possibly 
because it is difficult to assess, particularly if the offender is attempting to manipulate the 
appearance of his motivation (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998; Mann, Webster, Schofield, & Marshall, 
2004). Indeed, as Looman et al. reviewed motivation – which is sometimes conflated with the 
phrase, “treatment readiness” – it became evident that motivation is conceptualized in a manner 
that is exceedingly narrow. Typically, it is presented as an objective factor that can be 
operationalized, measured, or even pathologized as some form of deficit. For example, Barrett, 
Wilson, and Long (2003) used five indices to measure motivation: acceptance of guilt and 
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responsibility, willingness to disclose personal information, desire to change behaviour, and 
treatment participation, all of which were based on clinical observations. This measure is 
problematic for several reasons. First, motivation is only considered in the context of suitability 
for treatment and completely neglects the broader context of one’s life goals and vision for the 
future. Second, responsivity and motivation in forensic psychological theory place a near 
exclusive emphasis on cognitions and behaviours while offender emotions or affective concerns 
are not well considered. Furthermore, given Waldram’s (2010, 2012) critique that narrative 
strategies to minimize or limit responsibility for offences is normative, one could argue that all 
sexual offenders could appear low in motivation prior to learning and replicating the discourse of 
moral habilitation. 
What follows is an experiential account of sexual offenders’ motivations to change and 
improve their wellbeing. In men’s narratives, motivation was spoken of in ways that I 
categorized under four general themes: Unfulfilling Life, Better Life, Support, and Mindset. 
There was significant overlap and interconnectivity between these different themes that speaks to 
the depth and complexity involved in making substantial changes to one’s life.  
3.4.1  “Unfulfilling Life” 
Feeling that one’s life is empty and insufferable can be a powerful motivator to change 
according to the participants in this research. “Unfulfilling Life” was expressed through 
statements such as: “I just got tired of being the way I was” (Mel), “I hit rock bottom” (Miles), 
“It was time to straighten my life out” (Walter), “You wanna deal with your issues” (Evan), and 
“I didn’t want a part of this any more” (Myron). It was a common theme in men’s dialogue that 
identified the impetus behind their willingness to change. An “Unfulfilling Life” functioned as 
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an extrinsic motivator to “push” participants into moving away from their past behaviours and 
seek something better.  
Often, a participant’s recognition that he had finally reached his tolerance threshold of 
unhappiness and dissatisfaction was triggered by “hitting bottom” so that he felt as if he had no 
choice but to change. Mel described his experience: 
I think I done twenty-four, twenty-five years before I come to the realization that I 
wanted to fight the system for all those years. And then, finally I hit rock bottom, and I 
was in my cell one day, and the walls were coming in, and then the floor and everything 
was closing in on me, and I said, “Mel, you know you have three choices here. You can 
get a rope. You can hang yourself. You can go on living like you’re living and probably 
never ever get out of prison, or you can change.” 
 
The idea of “choice” came up frequently in interviews, often in the context of making the initial 
decision to change their lives, but also in discursively constructing that decision as having “no 
choice.” The prospect of remaining in the unhappy, unfulfilling state of mental suffering was not 
considered a tenable option.  
A minority of participants declared that part of their initial willingness to attend treatment 
was to obtain parole or receive a lower security rating in order to transfer to a more desirable – 
typically minimum-security – institution. Treated sexual offenders can also be given a lower 
rating of risk to reoffend when on parole that can pre-empt the possibility of community 
notification. This pragmatic and arguably less virtuous motivation to take part in a SOTP was 
considered one way to improve the quality of their lives, if only in a superficial manner.  
3.4.2  “Better Life” 
Where an “Unfulfilling Life” was the force behind moral habilitation, the desire for a 
“Better Life” drew men into the efforts of effecting life changes. This theme captured 
participants’ descriptions of their goals and desires for the future, and represented the “pull” 
towards self-improvement and personal fulfillment. It was most often situated in the present 
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tense during interviews and spoke to participants’ motivations to continue their developmental 
efforts into the future. The goals that men identified as being part of a better, more desirable 
future were framed into sub-themes:  “Relationships,” becoming a “Better Person,” and “Staying 
Out of Trouble.” Relationships encompassed participants’ goals to engage in future romantic 
partnerships, to develop or maintain friendships, and for some men, to regain access to estranged 
children. The men, especially those recruited through a Circle of Support and Accountability 
(COSA), often clarified that they had learned a great deal regarding what defined healthy social 
interactions, and attributed the dramatically transformed the quality of their social lives to these 
lessons. 
The desire to become a “Better Person” represented more than just the pursuit of moral 
goods. Transforming into a “Better Person” was narrated as a symbol of men’s goal of obtaining 
a sense of worthiness and respect in society; it was the embodiment of becoming morally 
habilitated. Ensuring that they did not have any more victims was an implicit part of this theme. 
“Better Person” was exemplified in phrases like: “[I’m] just trying to be a better citizen and... a 
better in society person” (Luke), “I’d like to be a good person for society” (Mathieu), or just 
simply “[to] better myself” (Jason). Other men utilized language that suggested the attribution of 
an illness model of their sexual offences. Danny, for example, was participating in a community 
maintenance program while on parole and emphasized, “My problem right now is getting 
treatment, getting better.”  
Some men situated their desire to become a “Better Person” in the past tense as their 
primary motivation to escape an “Unfulfilling Life.” The implied illness model was present in 
some of these statements as well: “In order to get myself better and to learn and to grow, this 
[was] something I had to do” (Chris). Evan, a traditional First Nations man, connected his 
  73 
habilitation to spiritual healing: “You wanna walk around with a clean soul or carry it around in 
here (pointing to chest).” Jacob’s assertion that, “I wanted to understand more of why I did what 
I did,” suggests that part of becoming a “Better Person” involved the acquisition of self-
knowledge to prevent future offending behaviour. 
Closely related to becoming a “Better Person,” another motivation underlying the idea of 
constructing a Better Life was identified as “Staying Out of Trouble.” This was a straightforward 
sub-theme that described goals such as staying out of prison, having no more victims, or staying 
sober. It overlapped somewhat with “Better Person” in that “Staying Out of Trouble” or prison 
was claimed as a marker of self-improvement.  
“Better Life” was a future-oriented vision that participants desired instead of the 
“Unfulfilled Life” they had been living. Sexual offenders’ motivations to make a “Better Life” 
for themselves were no different than what would be expected for nearly anyone who desired 
contentment in life. Participants described what most of us want from life – meaning and 
fulfillment, happiness, comfort, and wellbeing – features that are consistent with the moral goods 
that contribute to one’s idea of a “good life” (Taylor, 1985, 1989; Ward, 2002; Ward & Gannon, 
2006; Ward & Stewart, 2003).  
Feelings of relatedness, autonomy, competence, and self-esteem are important for our 
psychological wellbeing (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Kitayam & Markus, 2000; Leary, 2005). When 
asked what kind of person each wanted to be in the future, the men in this research almost 
invariably responded in ways that elicited these needs along with the moral goods that contribute 
to the ideal “good life” (Ward & Gannon, 2006). The common responses participants gave to 
describe a “Better Life” were to be happy, have a relationship, obtain satisfying employment to 
gain financial security, and spend time with friends and family. Helping others and generally 
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becoming a law-abiding citizen were also identified. Several men stated that they were happy 
with who they were now and could see their future as not much different other than a continued 
progression of growth and learning. Taken together the thematic categories of participants’ goals 
along with their desires for their future selves presented an impression of the kinds of goals that, 
if tapped into as a treatment resource, are likely to enhance motivation to change. 
3.4.3  “Support” 
“Support” along with the encouragement it offered was important to all men in this 
research and it was received from various sources. Most common among these sources were 
family and COSA members. Stigma often drove men’s previous friends away so they had to 
make new ones, something that was difficult for most. “Support” was a less common theme, but 
one that was more prevalent among men who might be said to have an intellectual disability. 
While support was deemed a crucial part of successful (re)integration, particularly among 
participants who were recruited from a COSA group, it was only with two of the three 
intellectually challenged men where “Support” was indicated as their primary motivation to 
commit to moral habilitation. Incidentally, these two men were recruited through a COSA and 
had not reoffended despite being subject to the Section 810 Recognizance order3 that was sought 
for high-risk offenders. Support for them included strong encouragement and frequent contact 
with their COSA “friends.” Todd described his main motivator for not reoffending as having 
“respect and compliments from others.” For Dennis, his success came from having “a very good 
nurse that... put [treatment lessons] a way that I could understand,” and knowing, “I had a 
support when I come home.” 
                                                
3 Named after Section 810 of the Canadian Criminal Code of Conduct, this recognizance order is applied for by 
provincial authorities when men who are offenders and no longer under correctional jurisdiction are still considered 
at risk to reoffend. It allows the state to place conditions and limitations on the individual as if s/he was on probation 
or parole. 
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Respect and self-worth were more salient for the lower functioning men, possibly 
because they had the additional stigma of intellectual disability that may have opened them up to 
more disrespectful experiences than others might expect. Dennis was a repeat offender who was 
in his early 50s. He was Caucasian but talked about how he liked to participate in traditional 
Aboriginal activities because he felt included and they helped him feel good about himself. 
Dennis’s intellectual disability was manifested in his responses, which tended to be brief and 
simple. Asking Dennis what he thought about the negative discourses on sexual offenders in 
society, he first responded indicating people should not “listen to gossip,” suggesting that it was 
best to ignore negative messages. But then he related a bothersome incident that occurred twelve 
years previous. “You listen to that [message], you gotta change.... [Sexual offenders] could 
change.... A doctor from the hospital... says that, “I’m a sex offender. I’m no good for nothing. 
Throw the key away.” Surprised, I sought clarification: “She said that to you?” “Yeah. Right to 
courts,” he continued. “I listened to that garbage she told court. I got no respect... [but]I proved 
her wrong. She said to the judge, ‘Throw the key away,’ that I was untreatable and I told her 
something. I says, ‘Watch me change.’” The disrespect Dennis perceived by being written off as 
a lost cause appeared to catalyze his determination to morally habilitate, which he was able to 
commit to through the support and encouragement of his COSA. 
3.4.4  “Mindset” 
In order for sexual offender treatment to be effective, most participants indicated that a 
“Mindset” characterized by will and determination was required. This theme was spoken of in a 
manner that subtly acknowledged the coercive nature of treatment while simultaneously claiming 
the value of giving in to the process. Having the proper “Mindset” meant making a commitment 
to change and then exerting the will to authentically engage in activities such as looking at 
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oneself honestly and following the advice and guidance of others. For example, Kevin, a 
Caucasian man in his early 40s, said, “That’s kind of one of the things that helped me I think in 
the program... was because I was so willing to put it out there and you know, share.” Miles 
provided a statement that succinctly described how goals, life vision, and determination are 
central to this theme: “You have to make a commitment to yourself, that you wanna change, and 
you have to do the work.”  
As noted, “will” consists of three experiential vectors: a sense of ownership, of goal-
directedness, and of expending effort (Throop, 2010). Jason used “Mindset” to describe the kind 
of determination and effort required to carry through with a process that was fraught with fears, 
uncertainties, and ongoing struggle. It seemed to capture the experiences of other participants, as 
well as the essence of willingness as articulated by Throop. Having the kind of “Mindset” needed 
to change oneself meant putting in active effort and often using every available resource to make 
it happen. The following set of excerpts illustrates the experiential nature of willing in all three 
vectors. Jason described his decision to change:  
I said, “I’m never going to have another victim....” That was my goal. I woke up with that 
in the morning and went to bed with that as a thought at night and what is it going to take 
for me to get there? And that was the mindset that I took. 
 
I later asked him if sexual offenders could be good people to which he responded: 
They can, yeah. Like my experience... it can take a long time to get over that... but when 
the person is determined and, you know, willing to do the anything it takes to get to being 
good then yeah. I certainly believe that people can change.... Anybody can change if they 
want to.... As long as the determination and willingness is there, then you can find a way. 
Like my way was through jail and that was the only way that it could’ve happened. 
 
Tanner used “frame of mind” to describe more of the deviant “Mindset” that enables offending, 
but can also imply the kind of “Mindset” needed to change: 
I’ve known people to take [treatment] and get out and they’re still in that deviant frame of 
mind. I’ve confronted them on their actions and they get really aggressive because, “No, 
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I’m cured,” or whatever, but they’re not. You can tell by what they’re doing, the way 
they’re acting that they’re not. [People] have to be willing... to look at themselves and 
figure out that what they’re doing is hurting somebody....  So it all depends on their frame 
of mind and if they’re willing to look at themselves and say, “Okay, I don’t want to do 
this no more.”  That’s about the only way you can get somebody to change. You can give 
them all the courses you want and stuff, [but] if they’re not willing to it’s not going to 
help. 
 
Jason and Tanner, as well as other participants, explicitly identified goal-directedness and effort 
as part of their habilitation. Moreover, the phrases, “Mindset” and “frame of mind” connoted a 
sense of ownership in that their willingness, or lack thereof, was embedded within a cognitive 
and emotional structure.  
I was curious about the source of this sense of will, of what gave my participants that 
final push in motivation to commit to a new path. For Tanner, it came from the Victim Empathy 
unit of treatment. In his words, “It really came out there, ‘cause I really realized what I was 
doing was actually hurting them. So that’s a major part, but everybody has a different place 
where it comes from.” Shane, an intelligent, philosophical, and highly self-reflective Caucasian 
man in his late 20s had mental health issues that contributed to his conviction for possession of 
child pornography. For him, self-change was an active choice and process: 
I really don’t know.... It’s just sort of something that I came up with that helps, like just... 
being deliberate.... The more intentional and deliberate we are, the more chance we have 
with succeeding in anything.... A lot of people just coast and think, you know, whatever 
comes, comes, and whatever I do, I do. And I don’t know. That just leads to stupidity and 
problems. And you know, I don’t want to wind up in jail again. I don’t want to hurt 
anybody. I don’t want my family to have to go through anything more than they’ve 
already gone through. Or my girlfriend, or my friends.... Maybe I just realized for me 
anyway, not doing those things requires a deliberate effort. So it’s kind of more out of 
necessity than even out of a driving desire. 
 
The third vector of will is the expenditure of effort (Throop, 2010). As Shane talked about the 
necessity of change, he employed the notion of “choice” like many other participants had as they 
described their “Unfulfilling Lives” as a motivation to change. Shane found the will and 
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determination to expend effort because any vision of a self or a future where he did not change 
was simply no longer a feasible option. Jason, too, highlighted how active effort was needed but 
not always present during treatment: 
Treatment will work as long as the person is willing. Like the old phrase goes, you can 
lead a horse to water but you can’t make him drink. That’s basically what it is. The good 
thing is that most of the people who I met at [treatment institution] do want to change, but 
you know it’s, “Yeah, I want to change” [mimics a casual tone]. No enthusiasm. No drive 
to get anywhere. They just want to be magically changed. 
 
Motivation is sometimes separated into intrinsic and extrinsic forms. For example, Self-
Determination Theory (SDT) conceptualizes motivation along a continuum that starts with 
amotivation, followed by extrinsic motivation, and ends with intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 
2000). Extrinsic motivation in this theory is considered less autonomous than intrinsic 
motivation since the activity, in this case treatment, is not considered rewarding in and of itself. 
SDT influenced the development of the Good Lives Model by identifying that the intrinsic value 
of primary human goods, or moral goods, tend to be more effective at motivating individuals 
(Ward, 2002; Ward & Gannon, 2006). SDT makes reductionist claims and attempts to categorize 
motivations into deterministic and reified forms that gloss over the complex and shifting layers 
of lived experience that complicate human motivations. That said, this theory does illustrate how 
motivation can be experienced along a continuum of willing engagement that can represent the 
growing sense of ownership that Throop (2010) identifies as a vector of will. Describing 
instances of minimal engagement in treatment, men would identify their motivations as derived 
from the desire for transfer to a lower security institution or lower category of risk to reoffend. 
The motivation to engage in treatment was always constructed as an extrinsic motivation since it 
was considered a difficult means to a desired end. Even men like Jason who were highly 
motivated to learn what they could from treatment described the process as awful to undergo.  
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3.4.5  Summary 
 Men who have been treated for sexual offending described multiple motivations for past 
engagements in treatment that, along with their actions and beliefs revealed during interviews, 
simultaneously represented different degrees of extrinsic motivation. Any attempt to reduce these 
different sources of motivation to a singular, reified form would mask the complexity of their 
engagements, both in their experiential sources and their degree of self-determination. 
Noteworthy, the manner in which some participants narrated their treatment engagement 
suggested a progression from lower to increasingly self-determined motivation in ways that 
paralleled the pre-contemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance stages of 
motivation (Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992). However, this conventional application 
of motivation theory did not appear to apply for all participants. An important implication of this 
research is that it appears deceptive to suggest that many men begin SOTPs with little or no 
motivation (i.e. Marshall & Moulden, 2006; Wilson & Yates, 2009); rather, these men are more 
likely to have multiple, perhaps even competing, motivations that are rendered invisible by the 
narrow operationalization of motivation in the means of assessment and clinical environment.  
3.5  The Motivation to Resist Treatment 
Sexual offender treatment involves submission to a process whereby participants have 
questionable authority over their personal narratives and are subject to the interrogations of both 
treatment staff and other participants (Waldram, 2012). Willingness to submit to this model is 
hindered by competing motivators and what appears to be a cost-benefit analysis of participation. 
The potential benefits are obvious: decreased recidivism, self-development, enhanced life skills, 
early parole, and a decreased risk classification that can prevent community notification upon 
release.  
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However, when thinking about treatment responsivity, it is vital to also understand the 
costs that affect motivation. On the forefront of costs is the risk that participation in a treatment 
program can open an individual up to violent attacks from other inmates if his status as a sexual 
offender becomes public knowledge (Waldram, 2012). Self-determination may also be at stake in 
that subjection to the treatment paradigm involves a paradoxical decrease in autonomy, keeping 
in mind that a highly agentic or driven individual may view the temporary loss of autonomy as 
necessary for his future wellbeing. The risk of having to deal with sensitive emotional issues in a 
group setting is a significant reason many balk at treatment, as is a lack of trust of the 
correctional system. Lastly, an incompatibility between the mainstream treatment model and the 
values embedded within traditional Aboriginal approaches to healing can also present a 
significant barrier for Aboriginal offenders. In this section, I present the experiences of several 
different men who resisted or were critical of treatment. 
Walter was the only man who I interviewed that had not taken a SOTP. He was an older 
Caucasian man who had a long history of substance abuse and sexual offences. He served a full 
14 years without parole for his most recent offence, which he said was based on a false 
accusation. Learning that Walter did not take a treatment program, I asked him about his choice. 
I had options, like you know, I coulda went to [treatment institution] but I didn’t want to. 
I’m not into writing an autobiography, which you gotta do and I don’t like living in the 
past. I live for today ‘cause it’s... I’m fifty-[some] years old now so there might not be 
tomorrow, you know, ‘cause of my [health] and stuff. 
 
Questioning further, I asked, “What put you off taking it? A lot of people agree to do it just to get 
early parole, right?” 
Yeah and that’s one of the reasons I didn’t go is ‘cause I knew, like even if I would have 
got... parole, I still didn’t have no where to go, you know.... That and I liked my job that I 
was doing at the pen. I just knew, I didn’t have nobody out here [in the community] so, I 
just figured, “Well, I’m going to do the whole bit and that’ll be it.” I didn’t know the 
publicity thing was going to come though. 
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Walter was subject to a community notification of his prison release and acknowledged now that 
“If I would’ve taken treatment... I probably wouldn’t have had the high publicity thing when I 
got out,” which suggests that had community notification laws been in place earlier in his 
sentence, he might have been differently motivated to participate in treatment. 
Regan was a Métis man in his mid-60s who had only the one criminal offence to his 
history. He was convicted of sexual assault against an underage friend and had been released on 
parole a month prior to our interview. As for being Métis, he did not readily identify with any 
traditional cultural values except for entrepreneurialism and a strong work ethic. When it came to 
treatment programs, Regan had a need to maintain his privacy that acted as a competing 
motivator that affected his responsiveness to treatment.  
I have to go through [maintenance programming] and... if I didn’t I’d... have to do 
another thirty days.... I’m going through programming, not totally understanding kind of 
why I’m there or the outcome of what’s going to happen, I’m not there yet.... Right now I 
don’t know. I know I’m uncomfortable and there’s some true feelings I have that I might 
say to you that I probably wouldn’t say in there. As far as I’m concerned, my life is none 
of those parole guys’ business. Never has been, it never will be.... My life is forced to be 
there... but I’ve always had kind of a personal life.  
 
Regan’s narrative was fairly representative of the resentment and reluctance men described 
experiencing when it came to submitting to the coercive state power. 
 A Saulteaux man in his 50s, Evan went through the residential school system and 
identified strongly with his traditional teachings. Other than mentioning alcoholism and getting 
an underage girl pregnant, he did not disclose very much of his past to me. Evan did not actually 
open up very much on a personal level, instead used second and third person language to talk 
about his experiences. This tendency was not so surprising considering that trust and sharing 
were closely connected values for him. In the correctional system, every detail pertaining to an 
inmate’s criminal and treatment history is recorded in files and becomes the primary authority 
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and “truth” with respect to that individual (Waldram, 2007, 2012). The recording of these details 
not only erodes the trust of inmates but it also runs counter to Aboriginal healing approaches 
where Elders have a higher standard of confidentiality (Waldram, 1997; Waldram et al., 2008). 
Evan explained to me the problems with trust and confidentiality: 
I used to talk to my friends who wouldn't talk in the groups, who wouldn't share anything. 
They don't share it in the group because [then] CSC (Correctional Service of Canada) has 
it. When CSC’s got it they use it on you all the time. So if you don't say anything, how 
can they use it against you? But if you say everything, they're gonna hold onto it as long 
as they could.  
 
“How?” I asked him. “The paper work trail?” 
Paper work. Everything. Make you go to programs, things like that, deal with all these 
issues. So a lot of people don't talk about it because they don't want anything to happen. 
You can give it to them and heal but they'll hold you longer cause they got all the 
information. An Elder, you can tell them something and they don't go and repeat it. It's 
just a part of their job I guess. I don’t know, trust. [Men] go and tell [CSC] and then 
bang, you're gone into a meeting right away and they're going a hundred miles an hour. 
 
Similarly, Danny, a young Cree man said,  
One of the psychologists asked me why I stopped coming to see him and I told him, 
“Because you write down everything I say and then everybody else knows about it.” He's 
like, “Oh,” and I go, “Yeah. Don't trust you no more,” and I walked away from him. 
 
Negative agency is the “refusal to cooperate” in situations where self-determination and 
autonomy are highly constrained, and where compliance with an activity is expected (Wardlow, 
2006, p. 14). It is a form of resistance to procedures or traditions that one is not in control of and 
cannot be changed or evaded in any other practical manner. Resistance to treatment or particular 
aspects within it can thus be viewed as an example of agency on the part of subjects who 
disagree with established practice, particularly with Aboriginal men who feel threatened by 
correctional procedures.  
 Participation in sexual offender treatment is an emotionally difficult process. It can bring 
up feelings of shame and guilt to do with one’s crimes along with memories and unresolved 
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feelings stemming from childhood abuses. Evan alluded to the difference between mainstream 
treatment and the value of his Aboriginal healing practices:  
There's more to life than just sitting there talking about those things. You gotta be able to 
heal. You can't sit and heal there if you [are] crying all the time. You gotta be laughing. 
You gotta laugh and forgive yourself and move on. But when you forgive yourself, you're 
supposed to leave that stuff right there. But working through with CSC they keep digging 
it up, digging it up, digging it up, making you feel bad over and over and over.  Wouldn’t 
you carry that bad feeling every time you deal with that? People feel worse than when 
they go in there. And then you dig up all that garbage and they're left carrying it around 
and it's all fresh in their mind. Of course they feel bad. 
 
Evan used traditional ceremonies, talking circles, and Alcoholics Anonymous in his self-directed 
healing process. These activities seemed to validate his sense of worth as a human being, 
allowing him to move on, whereas his description of the mainstream approach seemed to elicit a 
pervasive sense of shame that degraded one’s self-worth. 
 The focus of SOTPs is a narrow one that only addresses issues that are directly related to 
the offence. Details from an inmate’s history, including their own victimization, are considered 
irrelevant unless they bear immediate relevance to the individual’s Crime Cycle (Waldram, 
2012). This narrow definition of “the problem” presents a barrier to treatment responsivity. 
Danny explained part of his frustration:  
I tried to deal with some of my other issues but when it came down to the report, none of 
those other issues that I was dealing with ever came up.... Nothing said that, “Danny 
[Surname] was engaging in looking at himself and looking in himself and really dealing 
with some of the issues that he needs to be dealing with.” None of that was said. Just only 
things related to the treatment, that's it. And some of those issues that I was dealing with 
were related to treatment.  
 
He also described how this narrow scope was enacted in the group sessions: 
Say I'm having a day where everything's going wrong and I'm getting stressed and angry. 
Whoopdi-do. I brought that up in group but we're not gonna deal with it. But as soon as I 
say, “Well, I had this thought about this kid.” “Ok, there that's good. We're gonna focus 
on that now.” And everything changes just to that thought. 
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It appears as though some participants, particularly the Aboriginal men, and treatment providers 
are not in agreement as to what is the problem. Danny and Evan both expressed that their 
perspectives were ignored or that treatment providers did not understand the full impact of their 
personal history. Like in Evan’s description of “digging up the garbage,” Danny also felt that his 
historical and emotional problems were ignored. I asked him, “Did they ever deal with your 
abuse issues at all?” Shaking his head no, “None of the sex offending that was done to me, the 
verbal, physical abuse, nothing, other than the fact that my girlfriend had passed away, none of 
those issues [were ever dealt with].”  
 While a supportive nurse can help with any emotional fallout that occurs through the 
treatment process, some men perceived that there was no way to properly deal with the pain and 
other negative emotions that surfaced, suggesting that forensic treatment fails to provide a 
culturally safe environment (National Aboriginal Health Organization, 2008). Cultural safety 
requires the recognition that a particular therapeutic modality is embedded with cultural values 
and assumptions that may not be shared by the client (National Aboriginal Health Organization, 
2008). Aboriginal offenders in particular exhibit very high drop out rates in programming 
combined with lower success rates (Hylton, Bird, Eddy, Sinclair, & Stenerson, 2002). Forensic 
psychology has made only marginal progress in understanding this problem due to a limited 
conceptualization of cultural difference and its profound impact on the meaning of sexual 
violence and models of healing.  
 One of the limitations to responsivity theory is that forensic psychology has only studied 
it within a narrow scope, particularly when it comes to men’s motivations to undergo a treatment 
program. Responsivity theory would benefit from conceptualizing motivation within a broader, 
developmental context that includes the individual’s life goals along with primary moral goods 
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and the various sources from which motivation might be enhanced. The men in this study 
typically had a vision of a future self and life that was different from the one they had when they 
committed their offences. Tapping into these broader human desires and encouraging ownership 
of an offender’s wellbeing through the intrinsic valuing of these goals can further amplify the 
amount of effort one might be willing to expend in the moral habilitation process. Further, 
humans are not so simple as might be suggested by sentiments like, “sexual offenders lack 
motivation upon beginning treatment,” but rather it is important to recognize the competing 
motivations that detract from the treatment process. It is frequently self-protectionism that elicits 
resistance. Moral habilitation is a complicated endeavor and may take time to consistently 
maintain one’s motivation and make transformation an observable process.  
3.6  Inconsistencies in Agency and Moral Habilitation 
In the literature, agency theory has not yet been applied to the moral habilitation of men 
convicted for sexual offences. Within this context, there are questions and inconsistencies that 
remain unanswered. For example, is a person agentic if they are not acting in his or her best 
interests? Where does the authority to define “best interests” or the worthiness of a goal come 
from? Is part of agency the process of working over time to develop that motivation to 
persevere? What kinds of expectations for agentic change are there when it comes to moral 
habilitation? This section discusses and attempts to resolve some of these gaps in agency theory. 
3.6.1  Who Defines Moral Worth? 
By definition, agency identifies our capacity to make and follow through upon decisions 
that are deemed to have inherent moral value or worthiness; but there is less consideration in 
theory for who defines the moral worth of a goal, especially in the face of competing values. 
This absence was brought to light in my interview with Todd. In his late 20s, Todd was a man 
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who forensic psychologists might label as an intellectually disabled sexual offender. He had a 
long history of sexual offending starting in his adolescence and he was classified as a high-risk, 
homosexual pedophile. After his release from prison, Todd had a Section 810 recognizance order 
placed on him that he then breached by walking through a park. He was given three years of 
supervision for that breach and when I met him, Todd had roughly eight months remaining.  
I completed my standard interview with Todd fairly quickly and I was surprised when he 
called me the following week to request a second interview. He started that second meeting by 
saying that he had stopped taking one of his medications against the advice of his psychiatrist 
and group home careworker. My immediate reaction was one of concern that this decision could 
lead to a possible reoffence. Knowing that I had an ethical and legal obligation to report if a child 
is being harmed or at risk for being harmed that trumps any ethical obligation to participant 
confidentiality, I focused part of the interview on determining if there was any specific risk 
associated with Todd’s disclosure. Todd assured me that his careworker was aware of his refusal 
for medication, and indeed was trying to convince Todd otherwise, and that he had plans to 
speak to his psychiatrist about it in the near future.  
Todd had previously talked to his psychiatrist about going off this medication, whereby 
he said that his psychiatrist had discounted his concerns:4 
It happened a few times before where I’ve had conversations with my caretaker about my 
medications and I’ve even tried talking with my Dr. [name] about it.... He can change the 
medication but what’s been happening is I haven’t seen any change in my medication 
whatsoever. When I was in [institution], they gave me some medication to help me 
maintain control of myself and when I got out, one of my medications had been increased 
without my consent. I brought it up to my doctor and he wouldn’t change it. 
 
“Did he explain why?” I asked. “No. Not really,” was Todd’s response. “He thought it would be 
better for me, but the way I see it, if I can’t learn to control these urges on my own, what was the 
                                                
4 My ethical dilemma was resolved by the fact that this event was obviously part of an ongoing issue between Todd 
and his healthcare team. 
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point of treatment?” Todd went on to explain that he did not want to be on medication anymore 
and people “won’t even listen to what I have to say.” It was clear that Todd had little autonomy 
with respect to his treatment plan, especially considering that he had to meet the conditions of his 
Section 810 in order to remain in the community.  
Through our conversation, it became apparent that Todd was taking two medications and 
it was only one of them that he decided to stop. The first medication was to assist him with 
mental clarity and the second one was to suppress his sexual arousal. It was this second 
medication that reduced his sexual urges to which he really objected and had stopped taking. He 
considered this latter medication a “temporary benefit... for people just getting released... that 
they might need that extra assistance until they learn to control themselves.” The way that Todd 
described the role of these two drugs in his life reveals how his personal values contributed to his 
decision. He said to me, “Preferably I would [like] to be off all medication so that I can be 
myself. I can understand being on these medication[s] for a while, but not for the rest of my life.” 
It appeared as though for him, the drugs interfered with the life vision he had for himself. 
Challenging Todd about how he would monitor himself in the future without the medication, I 
asked if there was anything that might help him control his thoughts. At this, he seemingly 
contradicted previous statements sighing, “If there was such a medication, I would take it right, 
but as far as I know, there’s no medication.” Confused, I asked, “So the current medication 
doesn’t help you control your thoughts, just your urges?” “Just my urges,” he confirmed. “The 
other medication I’m taking helps me to think clearly. If I do have to go into hiding just to get 
the police off my back, then I’m going to have to stop taking that medication too.” 
Although Todd initially seems to contradict himself, careful observation shows that the 
objects of pharmaceutical intervention differ in each statement. He largely accepts the drug that 
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improves his cognitive clarity. That he objected to the drug that inhibits his sexual arousal, but 
would invite a drug that changed the content of his sexual thought patterns suggests that he might 
desire an end to his deviant sexual interests. Todd valued being able to have a sexual aspect to 
his life. Moreover, there may be more to how the medication affected him that he was not telling 
me. Anti-androgen drugs, if it was one of these that he was indeed prescribed, can have a range 
of negative side effects besides impotence that include sleep disorders, changes to hair growth, 
weight gain, breast development, decreased bone density, and depressive symptoms among 
others (Thibaut, de la Barra, Gordon, Cosyns, Bradford, & WFSBP Task Force on Sexual 
Disorders, 2010). In this context, Todd’s decision to stop taking his one medication was an act of 
self-determination. 
Sexuality is a highly valued aspect of the human condition and sexual offenders are no 
different with respect to this influence. The above example demonstrates that there is a double 
standard for sexual offenders based upon what is at stake for the individual and what is at stake 
for society. Despite still valuing their sexuality, men like Todd who have deviant sexual interests 
must learn to change their sexual predilections or have them intensely controlled if they want to 
remain out of prison. Todd’s decision to stop taking this one medication was an agentic act 
because he was guided by a vision of how he wanted his life to be, where retaining some 
measure of sexuality, or perhaps even masculinity, was a worthy part of his life vision. However, 
by forensic treatment standards, Todd’s decision was placing him at a higher risk to reoffend. It 
did not matter that he had successfully completed treatment a few years earlier. The stakes are 
too high when it comes to ensuring that an offender has no more victims. As I show in the next 
section, the implication is that the moral habilitation of men who have sexually offended needs to 
take place at a rate that exceeds typical developmental progress in order to be rendered “safe” to 
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the community. In other words, they must change and become habilitated more quickly than 
what society allows for others attempting to improve some aspect of their lives.  
The twist of moral habilitation is that unlike general therapies and treatments for mental 
illness, “therapy is offered to inmates, not so much to make their lives better, as to make our 
lives better” (Waldram, 2012, p. 225). Todd’s example determines two things. First, sexual 
offenders are only allowed to be autonomous if their decisions conform to societal standards. As 
the object of moral habilitation, Todd’s ability to decide for himself what was good for him in his 
life was discredited and removed. Through agents such as his psychiatrist and careworker, 
societal norms in effect decided what was ‘good’ for him. Todd’s own moral agency that was 
based upon his idea of a good life became negated and redefined as dangerous because it went 
against the acceptable norms of society. To answer the question who defines moral worth, it is 
the individual who determines what is worthwhile for his or her own life through his or her own 
agentic capacity; but that individual valuation becomes legitimated in relation to its adherence to 
social and cultural norms.  
Second, Todd’s example demonstrates how the moral habilitation project is not one of 
restoration to some previous state of being, as is suggested by the term rehabilitation; but rather 
is one of transformation (Waldram, 2012). Habilitation is “a process that seeks to inculcate in 
others, through the overt use of power and control, that which we most admire or wish to 
emulate morally, ethically, and socially” (p. 225). As a homosexual pedophile, there was no 
desirable “normal” for Todd to return to and with the prospects of him developing age-
appropriate attractions seemingly dim, the best solution by forensic psychology was to transform 
him into an asexual being. The difficulty with this solution is that it oversimplifies our social 
needs and the moral goods that are part of our desired futures. In the end, Todd’s motivation to 
  90 
keep himself from reoffending had more to do with being respected by others and being 
recognized as a valued and autonomous being, and less to do with a potentially unsustainable 
model of (a)sexuality imposed upon him by the state. The critical lesson to take from this 
example for agency theory is that the moral worthiness of the goal, while often based on 
normative ethics, is specific to the agent. Therefore, agency is relative to the actor’s desired life 
vision as s/he reflects upon the potential consequences of her or his decisions. 
3.6.2  What if Moral Habilitation is Too Slow? 
Human development writ large naturally occurs as a dynamic progression with stops and 
starts, progression and regression. Likewise, emergence over time is a core feature of agency 
(Martin et al., 2003). The difficulty with the moral habilitation of men who have sexually 
offended is that with the stakes being so high, these men are subject to a higher standard of 
developmental change. In essence, they may be unable to change themselves fast enough for the 
requirements of society. The following two cases illustrate two different pathways with which 
developmental emergence of agency can unfold in the context of moral habilitation.  
3.6.2a  Mathieu 
Mathieu was a Francophone in his early 30s who had been convicted of attempted 
murder, unlawful confinement, and assault causing bodily harm. He had hired a prostitute with 
the objective of pursuing a bondage fantasy but when she protested to being restrained, Mathieu 
became enraged and beat the woman to the point of needing multi-day hospitalization. Despite 
not being convicted of a sexual offence, Mathieu considered himself a sexual offender given the 
context of his crime. He had successfully completed a moderate intensity treatment program in 
his home institution. Mathieu was reluctant to take a treatment program due in part to the risk of 
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other inmates finding out, a potentially hazardous situation that could see him becoming targeted 
for violence by other inmates. He described to me those early days in the treatment program: 
Well, at first, I didn’t want to do it but because it’s the only thing that would let me out 
early. I just sit there and [mimics a defensive, crossed arm posture], “Yeah whatever. 
Screw you guys. I’m not going to learn anything here.” And after two weeks I was sitting 
there, I said, “Well, if I’m going to sit here, might as well learn something.” So I decided, 
“Well I’ll listen to them,” and it did make sense in a lot of thing[s]. 
 
Mathieu’s narrative suggests that he too resented being coerced into treatment and felt the need 
to initially reject the program’s activities to maintain some measure of autonomy. Given the 
opportunity to observe treatment and agentically reflect upon how it could benefit him, Mathieu 
gradually reframed treatment as something with which he could actively participate. His initial 
reluctance followed by acceptance represents the transformation of personal meaning that may 
be a normal part of the dynamic progression of agency. Moreover, his narrative reveals that 
meaning-making processes are an important part of motivation and will. Once he chose to invest 
himself in the program, he “put a lot of time into it” and in the end said, “I learned a lot about 
myself.”  
Reciting what he learned about himself, Mathieu revealed the value and personal 
importance that he had begun to hold toward his treatment, a shift that could be an indication of 
expanding ownership regarding his moral habilitation. Mathieu’s narrative further illustrated his 
learning process by incorporating a model of developmental emergence that he had recently 
picked up from his maintenance group session: 
I’m learning right now that there’s a child in you, there’s an adult in you, there’s a parent 
in you. Before I was running just on child. “I want this, I want this, I want this.” Then 
you got the... adult in you [that] say, “Well maybe that would be good for you,” [laughs].  
 
What Mathieu seems to be learning bears strong similarity to an Aboriginal medicine wheel 
model that depicts human development in four stages – childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and 
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the elder years – each with their own developmental roles and characteristics (Waldram et al., 
2008). This does not mean that Mathieu’s treatment program was an Aboriginal-based program, 
but it does imply that the idea of growth over time is a common feature across different models 
of human development. Moreover, the idea of having to relearn things as an adult that one should 
have learned as a child was evident among many of the men interviewed. 
Mathieu was a good example of someone who has made solid changes in his life. He took 
an anger management program in prison and described times when he was able to refrain from 
angry outbursts or other rash decisions in the community, particularly at his place of 
employment. In opposition to the “loner” he used to be, he had learned to regularly use his social 
supports to engage in ideas that supported his decision-making. All of these changes did not 
occur over a brief period of time. Mathieu spent seven years in prison where it can be very 
difficult to make changes while surviving by the “con code” (Waldram, 2012). He was released 
on parole for a few months before breaching one of his conditions and returning to prison for 
another 20 months. When we spoke, Mathieu had been on parole for roughly four months.  
3.6.2b  Danny 
Danny was an example of someone who was gradually learning from his mistakes, 
learning to correct them, and still stumbling in the process. In his late 20s, he was an intelligent, 
articulate, confident, and ambitious individual who took pride in his self as a person. He was 
reflective and introspective about how his experiences had affected him. Growing up on a 
reserve, he closely identified with his Cree heritage and traditions but also welcomed mainstream 
approaches to therapy if he saw value in them for achieving his goals. Danny had served time in 
youth and adult institutions for multiple offences against boys. He was also one of several men in 
this research who had been sexually abused as a child. 
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Danny was passionate about improving himself and having an offence-free future. Like 
Mathieu and many other participants, he had found that anger management programming was 
very helpful for controlling his temper. He talked about being much more aware of himself due 
to the treatment programs that he had taken. When I asked him about how he was moving on 
from his past, he replied: 
I don't necessarily put this behind me. I'm basically putting it in a [mental] file and it will 
always be there... for me to learn and to watch what I need to watch for... ‘Cause if I just 
put it behind me and forget about it, then that allows me... to put away everything that 
I've learned. But to... have it there... it allows me to be aware of all the things I've learned 
and what I can do to keep on for the rest of my life preventing myself from offending 
again. 
 
He believed in the importance of accepting responsibility and being honest with oneself: “When 
you actually admit to yourself that you have a problem and you're working on it... then it just 
becomes easier to talk about and you're not ashamed of it.” Danny presented himself as a star 
pupil, a shining example of self-awareness and dedication to self-improvement and a victimless 
future. He had only been out on parole for a month or two but he was doing everything right to 
ensure his success. 
Social support was another highly meaningful subject for Danny and he held it as crucial 
to community (re)integration and desistance from offending. After talking about the difficulties 
he had as a youth, I asked, “If you'd gotten help at that time...do you think your own offences 
wouldn't have happened?” He replied: 
No because I'd be getting support. I'd be dealing with issues.... Lack of love, loneliness, 
my depression, my anger, these are contributations [sic] to me offending because I 
wanted to fill the void of all that. Sex offending was a manipulated thought, that I thought 
was helping me get rid of some of those feelings and making me feel better. 
 
This time out, Danny had a strong and healthy support system to help him out; but the sad irony 
was that I learned several months later that Danny was back in prison for reoffending, not just a 
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breech of parole conditions. He had been going back to school and had showed so much promise 
for stepping permanently outside of his offence pattern. It seemed that his mental state started to 
go downhill but he hid this from his social supports, possibly for fear of disappointing them or 
thinking that he was capable of handling his problems on his own. This situation suggests that 
Danny may have been naïve about what it takes for him to not reoffend. He could no longer say 
that he offended because he did not have support.  
Consistent with theory (Martin et al., 2003), Danny’s experience of agency and self-
improvement was emerging over a long period of time. While Danny demonstrated more 
knowledge and understanding about his life, it would be ridiculous to suggest that he was aware 
of all the potential pitfalls he might have to face. For Danny, learning to be safe in the 
community – to others and himself – was likely to be part of a much longer and more involved 
process, despite having made substantial gains. Tanner stated this emergent process of agentic 
growth best: “I put [ten or 15 years] into offending. I’m gonna take at least that much time to get 
out of it.” Danny’s experience demonstrates textbook development of agency by using the past to 
choose a better and more self-determined future. While Danny was learning in a typical, 
incremental fashion, it was too gradual and resulted in a new victim. The expectations for moral 
habilitation are much higher.  
3.7  Conclusion 
Agency is deliberative, emergent, situated (Martin et al., 2003), and inherently moral 
(Sugarman, 2005; Taylor, 1985). As a deliberative activity, agency requires motivation for which 
goals provide the ultimate foundation. In the case of treatment for sexual offenders, motivation 
most often came through the coercive force of governmentality and the desire to change or learn 
more about their offences. The end or ultimate goals that they generally sought were the desire to 
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have a better life, to stay out of trouble, have no more victims, become a contributing citizen, to 
have satisfying relationships with partners and friends, and to feel generally competent, 
respectable, and worthwhile as human beings.  
Research participants described their motivations as tending to shift during treatment so 
that they bore the appearance of greater autonomy as they came to appreciate the relevance and 
utility of treatment for their lives. However, it is possible that the appearance of autonomy in 
participants’ decisions to engage in treatment were more rooted in their transformation into the 
docile bodies that are subjects of governmentality (Lacombe, 2008, 2013; Waldram, 2012). This 
is not to say that all participants perceived all aspects of treatment as relevant to their 
circumstances, or completely subjected themselves to the state regime. Some men certainly 
questioned the ideas or implementation of treatment, but on the whole, participants employed at 
least some aspects that they found valuable. Contrary to belief, men do not appear to arrive at 
SOTPs with a lack of motivation. Rather, they experience a range of competing motivations that 
affect their treatment responsivity. Some men in this research were motivated primarily by the 
prospects of parole or a decreased security rating, others by the need to understand their crimes, 
and some wholeheartedly embraced their treatment as having saved them. Some of the 
Aboriginal men practiced negative agency because they were motivated to protect themselves 
from harm at the hands of the correctional system and its practices.  
The moral aspect of agency is both normative and relative. It is normative in the sense 
that moral goods and the means to acquire them are based upon the normative ethics espoused in 
cultural ideals. The relative aspect of moral agency is tied to the individual’s subjectivity that 
emerges experientially within his or her situatedness. The moral habilitation of sexual offenders 
is a process of enhancing their moral agency by instilling the values consistent with increasingly 
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autonomous forms of motivation. Men’s criminal transgressions are laid down as proof that they 
cannot be trusted in society and so it becomes important to impose a new value system on the 
individual. Treatment proscribes against moral relativity and the remaking of subjectivities is 
effected via technologies of the self that are conducted within a rigidly normative moral 
framework characterized by the moral goods of a “Better Life.” A significant challenge for moral 
habilitation is that it is a fast-track process of human moral development that is still not fast 
enough for the needs of society. This limitation presents difficulties when trying to balance the 
typical progression of human psychosocial growth with the shorter-term pragmatics of 
habilitating men to cease their offending behaviour.  
I started this chapter with a quotation from Shane who spoke of how we are all just 
“broken people” in some way and whose goals are to repair ourselves. Miles used the same 
description by adopting a metaphor where, just like a vehicle, people sometimes break down. 
Fixing what is broken seems simple enough: you find the part that is the problem, you choose the 
solution, and you implement it, often with some expectation of success. In reality, self-
improvement is more prone to be a long-term, ongoing, and difficult process that involves honest 
self-reflection, clear goals and vision for the future, and the determination to keep going forward 
in spite of challenges and setbacks. 
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CHAPTER 4: MORAL REGULATION AND THE NARRATIVE MANAGEMENT OF 
STIGMA_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
When I first got out, I really felt that I had it stamped on my forehead and if I ran 
into anybody that I knew, right away they’d just yell it out, tell everybody. 
(Jacob) 
 
4.1  Introduction 
“Sexual offender” might be just about the most stigmatizing label in Western society, 
with perhaps the exception of labels that identify a specific type of sexual offender: child 
molester, pedophile, child killer, or child rapist. Individuals with these labels are viewed in the 
general public as sub-human, evil, or highly disturbed (Waldram, 2009). Labeling theory tells us 
that the subjects of stigma have a tendency to internalize their label along with the corresponding 
behaviours and traits assumed by the general public, in essence constructing the stigmatized 
person as one who is more likely to conform to the role and identity placed upon him or her 
(Dotter & Roebuck, 1988; Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, & Dohrenwend, 1989; Tannenbaum, 
1938/1957). It is difficult to look at the whole person when the label stands for something so 
repulsive or horrific. The sexual offender label becomes a stigmatized master status that 
supersedes all other traits, roles, and identities held by the individual (Dotter & Roebuck, 1988; 
Lacombe, 2008). Similar positions toward the deindividualizing forces of labeling are held by 
deconstructionists (Foucault, 1976; Taylor, 2009) and narrative criminologists (Presser, 2009; 
Presser & Sandberg, accepted). Moreover, Lacombe (2008, 2013) warns against the potential 
consequences of identifying with a stigmatized label in her ethnography of a Canadian SOTP. 
Stigma has a far-reaching negative effect upon the stigmatized. It is associated with 
decreased self-esteem, self-deprecation, loss or replacement of identity, decreased sense of 
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mastery, depressive symptoms, social withdrawal, loss of social status, social exclusion, 
discrimination by others, reduction of social support networks, increased social stress, and loss of 
employment and income (Crocker & Quinn, 2000; Link & Phelan, 2001; Major & O’Brien, 
2005; Wright, Gronfein, & Owens, 2000). Stigmatized individuals may passively accept their 
social position, but more often stigma elicits a number of self-protecting responses to manage 
one’s identity through strategies of avoidance, resistance, and stigma reduction (Goffman, 1963; 
Link & Phelan, 2001; Major & O’Brien, 2005; Maruna, 2001; Meisenbach, 2010; Presser, 2004; 
Sandberg, 2009; Thoits, 2011). 
Stigma can play an important role in the moral regulation of society. Moral regulation is 
composed of three elements: moral order, social control, and self-regulation via ethical self-
formation (Critcher, 2009). The strength of the moral regulatory response to a situation, and 
likelihood of it developing into a moral panic, depends on the extent to which any of these three 
aspects are believed to be in violation or enforceable (Cohen, 1974; Critcher, 2009; Garland, 
2008; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). Sexual violation and exploitation are clearly serious 
transgressions to the moral order and will occupy an assumed status in this framework. This 
chapter focuses on the relation between social control, stigma, and moral regulation. I begin by 
assessing sexual offenders’ responses to the dehumanizing discourses and stigma that ultimately 
threaten their personhood and worth as a human being in the eyes of others. Specifically, I 
describe and theorize about the nature of stigma and abjection in sexual offenders’ social 
interactions as well as the kinds of narrative strategies they employ to ameliorate stigma and 
protect their senses of self and identity. Sexual offenders’ responses to stigma can help determine 
if stigma is a detrimental or beneficial force in their moral habilitation.  
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4.2  Stigma and Abjection 
Stigma is a mark of discredited identity. It identifies one as having some aberrant feature 
of their personhood that separates the subject from those who are seen as having conformed to 
the expected norms of the group (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001). The process of being 
stigmatized involves recognizing and labeling some difference, which is associated with negative 
attributes and that forms the basis of making the stigmatized person a discriminated outsider who 
holds a much lower social status (Link & Phelan, 2001). Stigma is a discursive phenomenon that 
is constructed through the communicated judgments of the stigmatizers and the stigmatized 
(Meisenbach, 2010). The stigma assigned to sexual offenders is collectively molded and 
refashioned through public and institutional discourses from government press releases, news 
and entertainment media, social networking, and civil society campaigns to name a few (Greer, 
2003; Lancaster, 2011). Moreover, because sexual offenders are part of the discursive 
construction of stigma, they are not merely passive subjects to it; rather, they actively and 
agentically challenge, resist, avoid, and even acquiesce to their own stigmatizing process 
(DeJordy, 2008; Link & Phelan, 2001; Major & O’Brien, 2005; Thoits, 2011; Winnick & 
Bodkin, 2008). Stigma changes with and is dependent upon discourses, material conditions, and 
historical contexts (Campbell & Deacon, 2006; Foucault, 1976; Meisenbach, 2010). For sexual 
offenders, this means that the intensity of their stigma is highly variable, usually depending on 
the publicity and nature of their crimes as well as the degree to which they can “pass,” that is, 
hide their stigma in daily life interactions.  
Analytically, there are multiple ways to consider the stigmatization of sexual offenders. 
Stigma operates on political, institutional, and symbolic levels (Campbell & Deacon, 2006) with 
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each having some role in how sexual offenders are positioned in society. The disgust that society 
collectively holds toward sexual offenders structures not just offenders’ position in society but 
also the social, political, and moral order of the society itself (Miller, 1997). Sexual offending is 
highly politically charged, particularly with civil society and the broader public demanding the 
state to “do something” about it. Politicians may be left pandering to these public calls through 
new laws and measures that provide more of a mask than actual solution (Lancaster, 2011; 
McAlinden, 2000; Petrunik, 2002). Community notification legislation is one example of a less 
than efficacious solution that heightens stigma to the detriment of sexual offenders’ moral 
habilitation (Farkas & Stichman, 2002; Levenson & Cotter, 2005; Sandler, Freeman, & Socia, 
2008; Tewksbury & Jennings, 2010; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). The institutional context of stigma 
involves the criminological and psychiatric labeling of sexual offenders, which can 
deindividualize, shame, and possibly even increase their propensity to reoffend (Levenson & 
Cotter, 2005; Taylor, 2009). The symbolic context of stigma for sexual offenders is rich and 
abundant, filled with imagery of monsters, devils, deviance, evil, mental illness, and the 
implication that each image represents a threat to public safety (Lancaster, 2012; Waldram, 
2009). Primarily, however, sexual offenders symbolize a threat to the moral fabric and order of 
society.  
 The stigmatization of sexual offenders may also be considered through its outcomes. 
Stigma is a persistent state that is difficult to escape and involves individual, structural, and self-
discrimination (Link & Phelan, 2001). Sexual offenders are frequently subject to individual 
discrimination in the forms of social rejection, harassment or verbal abuse, and difficulty in 
finding housing and employment (Levenson & Cotter, 2005). Housing difficulties often include 
structural discrimination as well through proximity laws stating that the individual cannot live 
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within a specified distance of schools, parks, or playgrounds. Sexual offenders are routinely 
prohibited from certain occupations and international travel. Employers who require criminal 
record checks for each employee might be considered another form of structural discrimination. 
Self-discrimination takes place through the stigmatized person’s own beliefs and behaviours as 
s/he develops expectations for social responses (Link & Phelan, 2001). Repeated rejection 
influences many sexual offenders to self-discriminate by withdrawing from social interactions 
and self-stigmatize by internalizing the derogatory beliefs expressed in stigmatizing discourses. 
Rising out of the psychoanalytic study of the individual, abjection theory has been 
extended to the collective social body of society and can explain the felt experience of revulsion 
that supports the ongoing stigmatization of sexual offenders. Kristeva (1982) articulated what is 
possibly the best-known description of abjection theory. Accordingly, the experience of 
abjection is founded on the most basic of distinctions that humans make, the separation of Self 
and Other, the original separation occurring between the infant and its mother. At the bodily 
level, we distinguish between self and not-self when we abject bodily matter from within to the 
outside. Saliva, urine, feces, menstrual fluid, and semen all become substances that elicit disgust 
combined with an odd fascination for such matter that becomes out of place (Douglas, 1966; 
Kristeva, 1982; Miller, 1997). This phrase, “matter out of place,” is fitting because these 
substances exist in a liminal state where they no longer belong within the body and they have 
been transformed into a polluting force that cannot be reintroduced (Douglas, 1966).  
Abjection theory has been applied in a myriad of ways, to not just substances of 
individual bodies but to conceptualize the disgust and rejection of people within the larger social 
body. It has been applied in contexts such as the elderly (Gilleard & Higgs, 2011), racism (Hook, 
2004), rape as a weapon of war (Diken & Lausten, 2005) and forensic clients (Jacob, Gagnon, & 
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Holmes, 2009). At the level of the social body, individuals will enter liminal states in the context 
of rituals or stages where one part of their life is ending and another is beginning. In ritual 
situations, there is always an aggregation rite that welcomes and introduces the transformed 
individual to the group (Douglas, 1966; Turner, 1969). In Western culture, abjection is far less 
associated with rites of passage than it is with the discrimination and ostracism of people felt to 
be Other. Douglas contrasts ritual and ostracizing abjection with instances like the permanent 
marginalization of ex-prisoners to the periphery of society, mostly because the aggregation rites 
that return the liminal subjects of ritual to the populace are either absent for criminal offenders, 
or fail to convince the public of their transformation. The community still feels that the subject of 
ostracizing abjection represents some manner of danger or pollution to those still residing within 
the social body. Abjection theory adds to the concept of stigma by introducing a theory of 
disgust that explains on a felt, embodied level the intense compulsion to reject and avoid the 
subject. 
The stigmatization of sexual offenders corresponds to theories of abjection and social 
pollution. Through their actions, sexual offenders have transgressed a moral boundary within 
society by profaning the moral and bodily integrity of another. Perpetrators become the 
embodiment of disgust and revulsion because essentializing perspectives lend to the belief that 
their crimes are a reflection of their entire being; their offences are not viewed as isolated, 
uncharacteristic incidents. The taint placed upon sexual offenders is experienced like a contagion 
that repels the company of others. As polluted souls, sexual offenders are abjected from society 
through ostracism, discrimination, and outright hostility at times. Their offences are a permanent 
blemish on their social identities that set them at the margins of society from which even the 
completion of treatment does not make a convincing argument for their return to the social body.  
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Stigma, and by extension abjection, have numerous negative effects upon a subject’s 
selfhood. As mentioned already, stigma involves individual and structural discrimination, along 
with self-discrimination, which speaks more to changes in one’s self-concept (Link & Phelan, 
2001). The need to feel like we belong to the group is one of the most basic and fundamental 
characteristics of humanity, and self-esteem can be thought of as a rough measure of how well 
we meet that need (Tice & Baumeister, 2001). Social rejection causes psychological distress 
along many lines, decreasing self-esteem, sense of belonging, and sense of a meaningful life, and 
increasing feelings of anger, sadness, and hurt (Major & O’Brien, 2005; Tice & Baumeister, 
2001; Williams, 2007). Stigma also threatens a person’s identity, which can contribute to stress-
induced health problems, anxiety, fewer cognitive resources for memory and problem solving, 
and hyper-vigilance for potential future threats (Major & O’Brien, 2005). The stigma ascribed to 
sexual offenders becomes insinuated into their interpersonal relationships with family and 
friends eliciting painful and punitive social rejection. 
4.3  Stigma and Abjection from the Social Body 
For the men in this research, stigma and abjection came from all directions in life: family, 
friends, spouse, employers, co-workers, and even church members. The most painful experiences 
participants divulged involved abjection from their families, particularly from a spouse who 
denied access to their children. Painful feelings of rejection were also provoked when long time 
friends would turn their backs on participants. The stigmatizing responses men received from 
members of the public at large had the capstone effect of making men feel as if there was 
nowhere they could be safe from ostracism and the risk of public humiliation. Stigma spilled into 
nearly every aspect of their lives.  
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Two participants, Carl and Jacob were both married with small children at the time of 
their offences. Carl, a 40-year-old Caucasian, had been married for 12 years when he was 
convicted for inappropriately touching the pre-school daughter of family friends. His wife 
divorced him and he lost access to his two daughters. When we spoke, it had been roughly six 
years since he had seen or heard from his children. Carl’s identity was strongly tied to his role as 
a father and without his family, it appeared that there was very little in his life that he felt good 
about. “From being twelve years married to having nothing, you lose that companionship,” Carl 
sighed. “You don’t see the kids grow up.” Carl sounded despondent as he continued, “It’s hard 
‘cause then you keep thinking, ‘I did this. I put this blame on myself,’ and then you hide.” 
Jacob was an attractive Caucasian man in his late 20s and he was on parole for an 
undisclosed offence at the time of his interview. I asked him how hard it was for him to move on 
from his past. He started, “I still have difficulties just because of the nature of what I had done.” 
His voice began to crack as he continued. “My biggest difficulty is not having seen my daughter 
in three years. It’s been very hard. There’s stuff that I have to deal with to be able to get access to 
her.” His imprisonment represented a tremendous disruption of his life but he approached it with 
a positive and agentic attitude: 
I got divorced when I was in jail. I got served divorce papers. So there’s trying to get past 
that.... Moving on is just more for my own wellbeing and I know I need to. If I don’t, I’m 
just going to be stuck in a rut forever. I can’t have a pity party. That’s not gonna help. 
 
 Some men had no family to speak about since they had long ago lost contact or had been 
rejected by them. Sometimes this was due to their recurring anti-social activities and other times 
the details were just left undisclosed. A couple of men had lost contact with all family and 
friends while serving life sentences. Most of the men in this situation had acquired new 
“adopted” families through their participation in a Circle of Support and Accountability (COSA) 
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for which they were extremely thankful. One COSA group would meet weekly with all of its 
core and supporting members. Those meetings were a connecting point where core members 
could talk openly about their concerns and seek advice from those who had already been in that 
position. The men in this group saw themselves as a family where members accepted one another 
as they were and did not reject anyone for what they did in the past.  
 Kevin was a Caucasian man in his early 40s who, despite being classified as a 
homosexual pedophile, had an extremely supportive family. His parents included him in their 
social circle of fellow church members and his brother would come by when he was feeling 
really depressed. Kevin suspected that those “movie nights” were really “suicide watch nights,” 
but he was very grateful for his brother’s company. Despite the love and support from his 
immediate family, his brother’s ex-spouse demanded Kevin’s exclusion from family events and 
holidays, because she refused to allow Kevin near his adolescent niece and nephew. He 
explained: 
Even though I’ve assured them that I never abused the children in any way... never had 
any fantasies about them or anything like that, she is so locked up in the image of the 
pedophile as somebody who lurks around alleys at night in a trench coat and grabs 
children and rapes them.... She can’t separate that image from me and that’s all she sees 
now. She doesn’t see me as the person. That makes it really difficult because obviously I 
want the kids to be able to experience family things too. [But] if they’re there, I can’t be. 
 
Kevin initially let his abjection get him upset and depressed until he decided to take control over 
those experiences. Knowing that he did not want to feel depressed every time a family event 
came along, Kevin described coming to recognize what he could and could not control. “What 
I’m doing is saying that she’s punishing me, but she’s not punishing me. I’m choosing to feel 
punished and... there’s nothing I can do [to]... change her mind.” Kevin learned to cope with his 
abjection through his agentic decision to plan alternative and enjoyable activities that overlapped 
with family events.  
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 Men with supportive immediate families would still have negative experiences with 
extended relatives. Jacob related an incident with a close, but extended, relative. “After hearing 
that I was going to be released, [she] phoned up a person that lives in the same town as my 
parents.” In this call, his relative commented to a neighbor that she “should keep a close [watch] 
on her kids and keep the doors locked because the monster is getting out.” I asked Jacob how 
that incident affected him. “It was really disheartening, knowing that one of my own family 
members said something like that. [It] kind of twists your stomach, makes you a little nauseous.” 
The hurt was accentuated because Jacob had a very close, brotherly relationship with another 
member from that family when he was younger. 
 Tanner’s experience of family ostracism was unique from those of other participants. 
Many of his family members stopped talking to him when he went into treatment. Tanner was a 
Métis man in his mid 30s who did not closely identify with his Aboriginal heritage. He had a 
long history of offences against children and he had been victimized in his childhood as well. 
Tanner’s entry into treatment was viewed as threatening by his family who did not want their 
secrets to be revealed: 
Growing up we’re taught whatever happens in the family, stays in the family. It doesn’t 
leave the house. That was broken ‘cause the only way I could [go] for treatment was if 
was I willing to be honest...and there was a lot of skeletons in the closet that had to come 
out.... If the one [secret] started coming out, then the others would come out and [the 
family] knew that. 
 
Tanner explained that his family was aware of his offending but “nobody was saying anything.” 
Further, the family also knew “what happened to us as kids and nothing [was] brought out.” I 
asked him why there was so much silence in the family regarding the abuse that went on. He said 
there was an unspoken rule to maintain the family secrets. Verbalizing a secret that everyone 
pretends not to know would mean defacement for the entire family (Taussig, 1999). Tanner only 
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started talking with his mother after a group therapy session helped him to meet with her and 
open an honest dialogue.  
 Abjection from friends and acquaintances is even more pervasive than rejection by one’s 
family. Almost all of the men in this research described instances of friends refusing further 
contact with them. A Caucasian man in his mid-20s, Shane had many such experiences, 
including one involving the best man from his wedding: 
Shortly after I got married, I moved away and I communicated with him by email for 
awhile. Then the conviction came and I sent him an email once I was able to and was 
like, “This is how things have played out in my life.” He sent me an email back saying, “I 
can’t have people like you in my life.” I’m the same person! I went from being one of his 
best friends and him being the best man at my wedding to, “He can’t have people like me 
in his life.” I didn’t change. The only thing that changed was one piece of information 
about me. 
 
Shane felt it was important to be open about his convictions with the people in his life. He told 
his new girlfriend and she was supportive of him but her family certainly had reservations. His 
girlfriend’s brother would exhibit outright verbal hostility toward him but disapproval was often 
more subtle from others. Shane related the experience of visiting his girlfriend’s grandparents. 
“They tried to be nice to me,” he said. “But at the same time I overheard conversations between 
them about how I’m just not ever going to be past the stuff in my life. I’m just not ready to be a 
part of another family.” He continued on about how they thought his presence would divide the 
family. Summarizing this experience, Shane observed, “People don’t really treat you differently 
but you know they’re thinking differently.” 
 Regan was a Métis man in his mid 60s. He had just been released on parole for his first 
criminal offence, an alcohol-related sexual assault. Like many other men, Regan held 
stigmatized views toward sexual offenders. “Prior to my incident... I didn’t want to be associated 
or have anything to do with someone that was convicted” of a sexual offence. While his views 
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had now changed, those of his previous friends have not. “They just left. Like they just won’t 
have any contact and I don’t want any with them. I don’t want to have to explain myself to 
them.” When asked how he felt about the situation, Regan respond, “Like a loser. I did 
something that was non-forgivable and I don’t have enough years left to repair it.” 
 Kevin’s abjection from friends left a strong emotional imprint on him. “I had a lot of 
rejection when I got charged,” he related to me: 
Phoning people and having them hang up... or just flat out tell[ing] me they didn’t ever 
want to talk to me again and “don’t call back.” You give up after three or four of those 
and wait for people to call you.... So there’s definitely anxiety regarding that kind of 
thing.[...] I’m more concerned about people finding out and their reaction, than actually 
being afraid for my physical health. I’ve been beaten up. I know what it’s like. I know 
after a while the physical hurt goes away. 
 
Kevin said his, “anxiety revolves around rejection.” Along with this, the abjection led him to 
avoid people in public. “If I’m in the mall and I see somebody I used to know, I’ll just go the 
other way or do what I can to not make eye contact.” He was afraid of being recognized; 
therefore, in any public venue, Kevin was vigilant about scanning crowds. “I don’t know how 
they’ll react, and rejection for me is really, really difficult.” 
Being publicly cast as a sexual offender opens that person up to a myriad of negative 
responses from the public ranging from the subtle to direct confrontation. Of course, the public at 
large must first be made aware of the individual’s status as a sexual offender, which often occurs 
through media publicity, word of mouth, or through their identification by ex-inmates. Of the 18 
men who contributed to this research, eight had experienced media publicity that revealed their 
identities to the public, often with photos. Rarely do interactions with members of the public lead 
to the offender being physically harmed. Such instances did not occur to any research 
participants here, although Kevin described how he was physically assaulted in the back of a 
transfer van after one of the correctional officers let on to the other inmates in transit with him 
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the nature of his crime. State impropriety excluded, the public stigma more often leads to 
humiliation and shame.  
Walter was the only man in this research who did not take part in a treatment program. 
He was a Caucasian man in his late 50s with multiple convictions for undisclosed sexual 
offences. Just prior to his community release, the police posted a community notification of 
Walter’s release, which led to a confrontation at the shelter where he was staying. Walter 
described how another individual staying at the shelter saw his picture and release notification on 
bulletin board, and tried to instigate a conflict. Walter said he had to go “out the back door of the 
hostel so I didn’t have to confront that guy ‘cause I didn’t want to fight.” In the end, the 
instigator got expelled from the hostel and Walter found a small apartment in which to live. His 
notoriety meant that Walter “got a lot of strange looks,” so he “tried staying away from people 
mostly.” The only other situation he experienced was a name-calling incident. “I was walking 
from the probation office [and]... right across the street there’s an apartment building. Some guy 
was yelling, ‘Skinner,’ and all this. I just kept on walking. ” 
Sexual offenders often face considerable challenges when it comes to finding sustainable 
employment. Most employers now seem to require criminal record checks and even if a potential 
employee’s criminal history is acceptable to the employer, his parole conditions may not be. 
Conditions of parole usually include proximity restrictions that may prevent employment close to 
schools or parks, and mandatory attendance for weekly meetings and programs that could limit 
available work hours. Assuming that someone with a sexual offence conviction can obtain 
employment, his stigma may prevent him from retaining the work.  
Carl was fired from a job when a coworker expressed discomfort working with him. “The 
hardest thing [is] to... find people out there you can trust.... I have had that thrown back in my 
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face, where I’ve decided to trust somebody.” Continuing, Carl complained, “I lost a job over it, a 
job that I was good at. They had no reason to fire me for it and they still fired me.” He was bitter 
about his experience but at least felt somewhat vindicated by winning a wrongful dismissal suit 
afterwards. Jacob had a similar experience as well but did not pursue legal action. 
Kevin was in constant anxiety of the same thing happening to him. He feared that 
someone would find out about his conviction, forcing his employer to dismiss him: 
It’s a rare day that goes by where I don’t worry that somebody’s going to find out about 
my past. And then [I wonder], “Will I lose my job? Will I lose everything that I have 
right now...?”That’s kind of a constant in the back of my mind... especially when I’m 
really happy. Then I’ll think, “Oh gosh, don’t get too happy ‘cause this could be your last 
day of work.”  Well that’s kind of silly in a way but... if the wrong people find out... the 
other guys in the shop may decide they don’t want [me] working there and put 
management in position where it’s him or us. 
 
Considering that being labeled a sexual offender is an invisible stigma, it is relatively 
easy to “pass” in society so that interactions are not always tainted with feelings of abjection. Of 
course, passing is much more difficult for individuals who were subjected to community 
notifications where their crimes and photos are made public knowledge. Shame combined with 
social abjection hypersensitizes men to the fear of being publicly “outed,” which would likely 
subject them to further humiliation and rejection. Tanner recalled one instance where he was 
outed in public: 
When I was in school, one of the ladies that was involved with my nephew found out 
about my charges.... We had a yelling match in the hallway [where] she... called me a 
pervert and all that stuff.... Whoever was in the school heard it. So that was pretty bad.... 
They didn’t see me, but they heard me... ‘cause we were in the hallways and they were in 
the classrooms. 
 
Tanner’s response during this incident amounted to getting angry and “us[ing] some colourful 
words.” Despite his worries, nothing else came from the incident. Although he did have another 
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instance where someone disclosed his stigma in a public manner, “the one at school was the 
worst” because there were people who knew him that were present. 
The fear of stigma and public shaming is strong in the early phases of community 
(re)integration, but it does gradually subside after a couple of years. The loss of children and 
spouses seems to be the most painful aspect of abjection, followed by the public humiliation and 
social rejection it spawns. Being able to pass in society with an invisible stigma sets up a 
constant fear or even paranoia that someone will find out about them, risking all the gains they 
may have made since their release from prison: employment, relationships, friendships, 
anonymity, and maybe even housing. Where stigma invokes merely a cognitive appraisal of a 
spoiled identity (i.e. Link & Phelan, 2001), abjection brings to light the emotional force of 
extreme stigma. Abjection’s linkage to disgust and repulsion normally reserved for polluted 
substances like feces, gives new meaning to metaphorical phrases such as, “I’m just a piece of 
shit” (Chris). The initial experiences of abjection leave a lasting impression on first time 
offenders, sensitizing them to possibilities of future rejection that they would much rather avoid.  
4.4  Managing Stigma 
Stigma threatens a person’s self-esteem, self-concept, and sense of identity by eliciting 
negative self-appraisals and overwhelming one’s capacity to cope with the stressors involved 
(Major & O’Brien, 2005). Considering what is at stake, it stands to good reason that sexual 
offenders develop a repertoire of responses and impression management strategies to protect 
themselves. Stigma may invoke a range of responses that may variably operate to resist, reduce, 
accept, or avoid negative judgment. Strategies of deflection and challenge are two means of 
resisting stigma (Thoits, 2011). Where challenging denotes a confrontational approach with the 
aim to change the influence and outcome of stigma, deflecting is a subject’s attempt to block the 
  112 
effect of stigma upon her or himself and direct it toward a person or crime that is perceived as a 
greater threat. Reduction strategies act like face-saving measures. People who have made 
negative impressions through public failure or humiliation tend to engage in stigma reduction 
tactics such as making excuses, apologies, self-serving attributions, performing favours for 
others, and denigrating or distancing themselves from those who are in a similar position (Leary 
& Kowalski, 1990). Some people may acquiesce to and accept their stigmatized representations, 
often with resulting reductions to their self-esteem, but others try to protect themselves by 
avoiding potentially stigmatizing situations altogether (Goffman, 1963; Link & Phelan, 2001; 
Major & O’Brien, 2005; Meisenbach, 2010). 
Impression management strategies may involve a mixture of responses to stigma:  
resistance, reduction attempts, acceptance, and avoidance. Making favourable social 
comparisons to others, restricting display of one’s failings, voluntary disclosure, keeping secret 
one’s invisible stigma, avoidance of stigmatizing situations, compensation, withdrawal and 
isolation, and direct confrontation are all active means of impression management (Goffman, 
1963; DeJordy, 2008; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Meisenbach, 2010; Winnick & Bodkin, 2008). 
While these strategies can be performed through physical actions, like avoidance of threatening 
situations, other strategies are distinctly enacted through discourses that involve the retelling of 
situations or events with more favourable interpretations. These narrative strategies are 
“patterned ways of communicating personal meaning through story, including efforts to 
communicate something specific about the character or essence of the narrator” (Waldram, 2010, 
p. 257). Consequently, narrative strategies may be viewed by the narrator as a means of lessening 
the impact of stigma. The narrative mode of thought (Bruner, 2002) is evident in a number of 
impression management strategies: reframing stigma as a benefit for the lesson it brings, 
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reframing stigmatizers as needing education or sympathy, using stigma for secondary gains such 
as an excuse for failure or sympathy, and using narratives to construct images of an alternative 
self (Goffman, 1963; Presser, 2004; Meisenberg, 2010; Sandberg, 2009). 
The motivation to present oneself in a less stigmatized form comes from the desire for 
certain social and material outcomes, maintenance of self-esteem, and identity development 
(Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Moreover, these motivations are more heavily primed when there is a 
discrepancy between one’s current image and the one s/he desires, and when the desired image is 
relevant to one’s goals. Conviction for a sexual offence typically involves a dramatic loss in 
social status and damages the offender’s public and private image. Their previous identities are 
overridden by the master status of a singular sexual offender identity. Self-esteem plummets as 
does access to material resources and social capital. What is at stake for sexual offenders, 
especially those convicted for the first time, is their way of life along with their sense of place 
and respect within society. They take available opportunities to minimize social rejection, regain 
their pre-conviction image or construct a positive self-image where none had previously existed, 
and move on from the past. Impression management is the one means that is readily available for 
them to attempt these tasks. 
Like other stigmatized groups, sexual offenders utilize several strategies to manage 
stigma and the impressions others have toward them. Waldram (2010) identified five narrative 
themes that sexual offenders employed to claim moral agency and substantiate their abilities to 
act in accordance with the collective moral standard. Each of these narrative themes – Agentive, 
Passive-Victim, Consequential, Dissociative, and Heroic – represented particular strategies that 
sexual offenders adopted to describe how their offences came about. In the following section, I 
present the narrative claims that men used as strategies to resist or moderate their stigmatization, 
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protect their identities, and build a case for why they should be accepted back into society. Some 
of the discourses employed by participants did not challenge the actual stigma but instead made 
exceptionalist claims of why the stigma should not apply to them. Other men deployed rhetoric 
and discourses that challenged their stigma on the basis of its existence, attempting to invalidate 
the taint it imposed. The narratives that the men in this research routinely employed to manage 
other people’s impressions of them are represented by six thematic categories: “I’ve Changed, 
I’m Better,” “I’m Not a Pedophile,” “It’s Blown Out of Proportion,” “It’s Their Problem,” 
“Everyone Makes Mistakes,” and “That’s Only a Part of Me.” 
4.4.1  “I’ve Changed, I’m Better” 
“I’ve Changed, I’m Better” was a ubiquitous narrative strategy throughout men’s 
interviews. Generally speaking, this claim involved the presentation of some form of evidence to 
demonstrate their moral habilitation along with a statement of newfound contentment, and a plan 
or desire to continue that process. For example, Regan explained, “I’m repairing myself... I’m 
happy being sober, I’m aware of what I did, [and] I’ve taken steps necessary to curb any 
problem.” Danny, with a bravado that typified his speech, claimed how his desire to work on his 
treatment plan in prison had trumped any concerns for his safety: 
If people wanna be an ass to me, they’d be an ass to me. But that's their problem, not 
mine. I don't need to deal with that shit. I'm dealing with my own right now. I don't have 
to go around worrying about if I'm gonna get stabbed or if I'm gonna get beat up... 
because that's other people's problems. My problem right now is getting treatment, 
getting better. 
 
Where the vast majority of sexual offenders do their best to hide their offences in prison, Danny 
proffered his disregard toward other inmates as a testimony of his dedication to moral 
habilitation. Further into the interview though, he too fell into the narrative pattern of giving 
evidence of change along with a declaration of a better future self. “Being in treatment... I'm 
  115 
more aware of myself now. I've learned to really look at myself and know what I need to know 
to keep myself safe and others safe.” 
This “I’ve Changed, I’m Better,” narrative strategy was always framed, often explicitly, 
within a discourse of old versus new selves that functioned to highlight the transformation made 
by the participant. Treatment was most often credited for this change. Describing the kind of 
person he used to be, Tanner indicated that, “Before, I was recluse. I wouldn’t do anything 
really, and the only time I would be helpful was if I could get something out of it.” When asked 
how his changes came about, he explained that, “Therapy did it. I realiz[ed] that there’s more to 
me than just that.” When later asked about what makes him a good person, Tanner described his 
volunteer work at a shelter and how he would give talks to church groups about his experience. 
Tanner also refused to accept the honorarium I provided to research participants, saying that it 
was his way of “giving back.” The behaviour of his described “new self” was a dramatic shift 
from his descriptions of how he used to be. 
Sometimes the claim that a person had changed was prefaced by an explanatory model of 
their offences that not only established narratives of selfhood before and after treatment, but also 
demonstrated the expansion of self-awareness and self-knowledge instilled by the treatment 
process. Chris was a Caucasian man in his late 20s. He was adamant that his “life [was] totally 
changed” now: 
I found out that it was a lifetime of loneliness, despair, abuse, neglect, all of these things 
for years that kept piling up and then it all added up. Bad relationships, bad 
communication. I’m bipolar and FAS... and [did not have] enough self-awareness about 
red flags... to detect when I’m not working properly.... [I had] a lot of depression.... I had 
no support.... Everything all around me was just crap, so it just all bottlenecked and 
exploded. Once I learnt all about this, then I relaxed and I’m like, “Okay, I’ll be fine 
now.” 
 
Describing how he had constant reminders about his offence, even now that he had been out of 
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prison for roughly one year, Chris used this particular claim not just to convince others that he 
was a better person now, but also to convince himself of the same when feelings of self-stigma 
and abjection arose. “I remind myself that I’m not that person anymore. I’m a changed person. 
That was me back then. I made a mistake. I wasn’t well. I’m a much better person now. I’m not 
sick, I’m healthier now.” Chris explained his offences as the result or symptom of the cluster of 
problems he was experiencing at the time. He drew upon a medicalized discourse of fetal alcohol 
syndrome, depression, and alcoholism that he had to overcome in order to get better. His use of a 
sickness metaphor provided an explanation of his offence that minimized his stigma by assuring 
others he was not inherently deviant.  
Employing rhetoric of self-improvement using vague phrases such as “getting better” did 
not provide a clear sense of direction as to where Chris or others were going in their 
development, but it did make a claim of redemption in an effort to counteract his abjection from 
society. The “I’ve Changed, I’m Better” narrative theme was a morally charged discourse with 
very abstract and unclear dimensions. “Better” was defined in the context of no longer being the 
same person of their past selves after having gone through a developmental transformation of 
newfound self-awareness, coping responses, and behavioural changes. Thus, this strategy is a 
claim of moral habilitation or at least of some progress along that trajectory.  
Chris was one of only a few men who viewed their negative experiences as a form of 
blessing that provided hard earned lessons (Goffman, 1963). He, along with Tanner and Jason, 
all felt that their lives were significantly better now than prior to their convictions and were 
thankful for those changes even though the means through which they came about were painful. 
For these participants, going through imprisonment and treatment were things that they had to do 
in order to “get better.” Statements such as this provide a clue into how moral regulation can 
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work to morally habilitate one cluster of men who are labeled as sexual offenders. Research 
participants who invoked a claim that they were better or they had changed in a positive way all 
held in common the assertion that their lives before or between their offence(s) were miserable 
and lonely, or that they were at one point a sick or horrible person. These were men who did not 
know what to do to improve their lives or even that they could be improved. Thinking that no 
one cared about them or that there was nowhere to go, it was much easier to just continue in their 
dysfunctional lives. The individual agency and will to make and follow through on beneficial 
decisions did not seem to be present. Even for men who appeared more agentic, opportunities to 
“get better” were limited. In the time between his charge and his conviction, Kevin sought out 
treatment for his “sexual deviance” but was turned away repeatedly since the only therapy he 
could find specific to sexual offending was available through the criminal justice system and 
required someone to be convicted first.  
The coercive element of moral regulation is social control. The narrative claim in this 
section substantiates that imprisonment, be it the first time or the third, was needed to initiate 
their moral habilitation. That process of being caught, convicted, and coerced into treatment was 
afterwards viewed as what was needed to happen in order to get better. It is important to note 
that not all men needed to be coerced into treatment. There were those like Kevin and Jason who 
eagerly welcomed the opportunity to get help for their problems, but even these highly motivated 
men needed that initial push to kick-start their agency. The coercive element of social control 
forced these men to publicly confront their actions and their problems. Their experience at the 
time was painful and humiliating, but in retrospect, it was the start of a moral transformation of 
self.  
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4.4.2  “It’s Their Problem” 
Condemning the condemners (Sykes & Matza, 1957) and rejecting the rejecters 
(McCorkle & Korn, 1954) are two variations of an impression management technique where the 
subject of stigmatization dismisses in some form those who are perpetuating their 
marginalization. Constructing the condemner as someone who is to be pitied or as needing help 
to overcome their ignorance is another manifestation (Goffman, 1963). Research participants 
routinely engaged in narratives that incorporated variations of these techniques by dismissing the 
negative actions and attitudes of others as, “It’s Their Problem.” 
For Carl, rejecting the rejecters may have been a skill that he developed as a child to deal 
with teasing by his peers. As an adult, he still used this mechanism to cope with his stigma. In 
the process of telling me how it took him a year and a half to tell his one friend about his record, 
Carl also noted how at other times he had been too trusting. “I don’t like lying. If somebody 
wants to know me... they’ll know me for who I am, what I was. And if they don’t like me, well, 
goodbye.” Rejecting those who would hurt him was Carl’s way of protecting himself 
emotionally and maintaining some sense of self-worth or self-respect. Similarly, Shane bolstered 
himself by challenging others’ beliefs and assumptions, a behaviour he believed others saw as 
arrogance. Referring to one instance of public confrontation, Shane explained how his attitude 
fed into his reaction: 
I derive a lot of what strength I have from defiance.... It made me feel like challenging 
[them]. It made me feel just like, “Fine. Think what you want. Screw you.” Which is not 
how I want to be either. I want to be like, “Let’s all just move past this and grow 
together.” But a lot of people aren’t willing to do that. I find myself occasionally sinking 
to their level, which is sad. I don’t know, but you gotta find strength somewhere. 
 
Shane, who was very involved in his Christian faith, managed to construct himself as being on a 
higher moral ground than people who are ruled, in his mind, by their ignorance. Moreover, he 
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constructs himself as intellectually superior through his ability to challenge cultural discourses 
where others just blindly accept them. Shane’s assertion of moral superiority as expressed in 
others’ lack of willingness to work together amounts to a downward social comparison that 
allows him to justify his dismissal of people and their negative attitudes.  
The central feature of the “It’s Their Problem” narrative strategy is that the stigmatized 
subject attributes the source of the interpersonal conflict or disapproval to some flaw in the other, 
not himself. The claim becomes a form of self-absolution where the sexual offender is the 
wronged party; but instead of being released from their guilt or shame, finding flaw in the other 
fortifies their strength to resist the negative emotions elicited by the confrontation. Evan, a 
traditional Saulteaux man, made sense of other people’s negative reactions as symptoms of their 
own problems and insecurities. “When somebody keeps putting me down, you [wonder] why? 
Are they jealous? Or is there something else there? You have to just think, that's their garbage, 
that's their character. You don't want to carry anybody else's garbage around.”  
In focusing on their individual processes of moral habilitation, some participants found it 
helpful to recognize the boundaries between what they could and could not control. The claim of 
a person’s right to his or her opinion was part of their common rhetoric in this matter. When I 
questioned Danny about his thoughts on other people’s impression of him, he emphatically 
exclaimed, “Who cares how they see me? It's not up to them how I want to be.” Like many other 
men, Danny indicated that, “[People] are allowed to have those opinions and those views, but if 
they're gonna be disrespectful or endanger my life, then I'll have something to do about it.” It 
was a common enough sentiment among the men I interviewed:  if people did not go out of their 
way to bother them, they did not care about what others thought.  
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Condemning the condemners through narrative appeared to have a positive influence on 
participants’ self-concepts and abilities to cope with stigma. It established a boundary identifying 
what they had the power to work on for themselves and what they needed to learn to let go. This 
self-protective claim reinforced their confidence and the sense that they were entitled to feelings 
of self-worth, despite what others might think. Furthermore, the argument that stigmatizers have 
their own problems and issues that they should be working on could be a leveling discourse that 
serves to minimize the differences between offenders and non-offenders. Being perceived as 
someone who is just trying to work on his problems like anyone else serves to contradict the 
pervasive discourse that sexual offenders bear some essential deviance, illness, or capacity for 
evil. That said, the next strategy was much more adept at claiming that sexual offenders are not 
much different from other people.  
4.4.3  “Everyone Makes Mistakes” 
Some of the men in this research attempted to minimize their stigma by normalizing their 
errors as part of their individual learning processes. Arguing that “Everyone Makes Mistakes” is 
a narrative strategy that attempts to position sexual offenders as no different from any other 
person. “To err is human,” the poet Alexander Pope once wrote. The challenge that sexual 
offenders run into with this argument is that public sentiment generally holds that the magnitude 
of their “mistake,” the sexual violation of another, is so great and so unforgiveable that there 
must be something fundamentally wrong with them in the first place. The cultural discourse that 
contributes to this sentiment typically omits the broader context in which a sexual offender’s 
behaviour develops, which may be why the men who used this argument would frequently 
situate their “error” within a mini life narrative. For example, Jason situated the evolution of his 
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crimes in the context of a troubled childhood and adolescence while asserting that the measure of 
goodness in the offender was his initiative to learn from the past: 
Some people that I’ve encountered truly are sick and dangerous people, but there is also 
the other end. People like me, we made a mistake. We grew up not knowing any 
different. We were abused as children [and] we thought that was normal. So you grow up 
doing the same thing, but then you get in trouble. You’re shown and you’re taught that 
it’s wrong. So what are you gonna do about it? Are you gonna keep going or are you 
gonna change? 
 
Themes of morality and redemption are deeply embedded within this narrative claim. In Jason’s 
example, he aligned the “sick and dangerous” offenders with those who were not willing to 
change, while men like him who were making efforts were more worthy of inclusion in society. 
Through this claim, men found another way to assert a superior moral evaluation of themselves, 
but this time using their agentic capacity to learn from their mistakes and commit to a path of 
moral habilitation as the support for their argument.  
“Everybody is going to screw up in their life at some point in time,” Jacob asserted. 
“Nobody’s perfect. If you’re perfect, there is something seriously wrong.” By normalizing error 
and unintentional harm as something as intrinsic to humanity, Jacob set up an argument that 
projected immorality to the people that endorse stigmatizing discourses:  
To not give a person at least a second chance... is really selling them [short].... People do 
bad things. Even little things that people think nothing of can affect another person in a 
huge way that they don’t realize, and to not give that person at least a second chance to 
try and rectify it or at least give some sort of proof that this isn’t what they are... is 
wrong. I think that people become no better than the person that they’re judging really, at 
that point. 
 
Jacob was a first time offender who explained his offence in the context of marital problems, 
depression, and a gradual degradation of his mental state. Consequently, he separated himself 
from repeat offenders so that he could concede to part of the public discourse that he otherwise 
rejected. Continuing his narrative, he elaborated, “Of course saying that, if you turn around and 
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do it again a second, third [time], or more, then there’s a serious problem and something else 
isn’t right.”  
Two additional observations from this excerpt are also noteworthy. First, Jacob’s phrase 
extolling the importance of having an opportunity to prove “that this isn’t what they are” 
highlights the central figuring of conflict between an essentialized master status (Dotter & 
Roebuck, 1988; Lacombe, 2008, 2013) and the offender’s perception that he is much more than 
the sexual offender label suggests. Conflict between social and personal identities is the main 
concern with another narrative strategy, “That’s Only a Part of Me,” but through Jacob’s 
narrative excerpt we can see how the men adopt multiple claims that were fluidly manipulated to 
support their overall arguments. Second, Jacob’s reference to intentionality where “even little 
things” can harm others reflects a consistent undercurrent in many interviews that aim to separate 
the truly “sick” premeditative offenders who predate upon their victims from the first time 
offenders who see their offences as unintentional harms. Of course, it is this latter group that is 
constructed as being worthy of another chance at redemption, whereas repeat offenders like 
Jason, Danny, Tanner, and Shane cannot use this more nuanced facet of the narrative strategy. 
Instead, they tend to focus on claims such as “I’ve changed, I’m better,” “It’s Their Problem,” 
and “That’s Only a Part of Me.” 
Jacob criticized the dehumanizing aspects of public discourses, the messages that sexual 
offenders are untreatable, that they should be locked up permanently. He said that he recognized 
“where the message is coming from,” that it is “from people who have done it more than once or 
twice.” Stating that he understood the principle, he still argued:  
Something really needs to be done to explain to society [and] to get them to understand 
that, yes, this person did something bad [but] they’re still a human being. They’ve served 
their time that is considered appropriate and now they’re part of society. They should be 
given every opportunity to be part of society. 
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Jacob’s discourse was loaded with moral declarations such as “something needs to be done” and 
“they should be given every opportunity.” He also injected another claim that is related to the 
rhetoric of “Everyone Makes Mistakes,” that is, he claimed that, “they’ve served their time.” 
This last claim is a common appeal in the argumentation of men seeking re-acceptance into 
society after a criminal conviction. It is used as a justification for redemption but it is a weak 
attempt at begging social inclusion. Public discourse is just too replete with the contrasting belief 
that the Canadian justice system is too easy on criminals and that imprisonment does not equate 
with habilitation. 
The “Everyone Makes Mistakes” narrative strategy is an attempt to decrease the moral 
distance between offenders and non-offenders so that instead of being constructed as 
dehumanized personifications of evil, the sexual offender might be viewed as someone who 
succumbed to his problems through a series of increasingly bad decisions, a failing that people 
may relate to better. This strategy engages with a normalizing discourse to remind its targets that 
error, regardless how big or small, is a part of the human condition and one that creates 
opportunities for psychological growth. Morality and a rational challenge to ethics are used to 
argue that everyone should be afforded a second chance to learn from their errors. The claim that 
“Everyone Makes Mistakes” calls attention to a form of resistance that uses challenge rather than 
deflection because it bears the potential for people to alter their views of sexual offenders as they 
learn more about offending behaviour (Thoits, 2011).  
4.4.4  “I’m Not a Pedophile, I Wasn’t as Bad as...” 
The sexual offender label is not exactly nuanced. It is like a blunt instrument in that it 
lacks the refinement of being able to differentiate between degrees of harm and degrees of risk. 
In public discourse, this label connotes a binary assumption for both harm and risk. The sexual 
  124 
offender is seen as having grievously and irreparably harmed their victim and constitutes a great 
hazard to the public at large. However, this imagery does not accurately represent the reality of 
sexual offending. The victim of “Invitation to Sexual Touching” will likely experience much less 
trauma than the victim of “Aggravated Sexual Assault.” Men convicted for sexual offences know 
well these gradations and utilize them to their fullest advantage by claiming that their offences 
were not as bad as they could have been.  
One of the first topics addressed in sexual offender treatment is that of denial and 
minimization. Both of these are part of treatment responsivity because to either deny 
responsibility for or minimize the seriousness of their crimes is believed to interfere with the 
offender’s ability to respond to treatment (Beyko & Wong, 2005; Langton, Barbaree, Harkins, 
Arenovich, McNamee, Peacock, Dalton, Hansen, Luong, & Marcon, 2008; Looman et al., 2005). 
Broadly speaking, minimization is a discursive technique employed to reduce the perception of 
offensiveness attributed to a particular act or event (Benoit, 1995; 1997). In the forensic context 
of treatment for sexual offenders, minimization is manifested in various ways, such as denying 
that the victim was harmed, saying the victim was acting in a provocative manner or deserved 
the assault, or attempting to diminish their own responsibility by citing intoxication or some 
other external factor. Where these forms of minimization are pathologized as cognitive 
distortions in SOTPs, they are common and even normative techniques of narrating one’s 
experiences (Waldram, 2010, 2012). Minimization should not be confused with a similar 
impression management technique, that of differentiation. Both techniques can be used to 
decrease the offensiveness of one’s actions, but where minimization attempts to claim that the 
act itself was not serious, differentiation attempts to decrease the negative feelings directed 
toward the perpetrator (Benoit, 1995; 1997). An offender could use minimization and 
  125 
differentiation to claim that his crime was not as offensive as another’s or that he is not as bad a 
person as the next. However, since the vast majority of this study’s participants had been through 
treatment, minimization was extremely rare in their interviews.  
 Unlike minimization, differentiation was highly evident in men’s narratives. On the first 
day of his community-based treatment maintenance program, Chris was worried about which of 
his co-participants might have been a pedophile, at least until the treatment facilitator clarified 
that no one in the group had been convicted for offences against a child. In part, he was worried 
that others would think that he was a pedophile. “Not like I have anything against them ‘cause 
I’m not saying that I’m any better than a pedophile. We’re all bad. It’s still a bad crime. It’s just 
the label.” Chris continued on in a confused manner as he walked a tightrope between justifying 
his offence against an adult as “less bad” than an offence against a child and following his 
treatment lesson to not minimize the impact of his offence on the victim. He did not want to 
show any indication of minimizing his crime while still trying to contextualize it as less harm 
inducing than other possible offences. 
Chris appealed the polarized public perception of sexual offenders with the gradated 
harms of different offences. He claimed that all sexual offences are bad, but some are worse than 
others. Gradations of “badness” are endemic to the general discourses and claims making from 
most men in this research. When men engaged in claims such as “I’m Not a Pedophile” or “I 
Wasn’t as Bad as...” they were differentiating their crime as less harmful and less morally 
offensive than another, thus implying that they were more worthy of social inclusion than other 
sexual offenders. Differentiation in this context was clearly a means of engaging in downward 
social comparison so as to protect one’s sense of self and social position (Crocker, 1993). 
According to Carl, “What a lot of [sexual offenders] try to do is say, ‘I wasn’t as bad as this 
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person so why are you putting me in the same shoe as him...?’ You’re trying to vindicate 
yourself compared to what somebody else has done, and not be put in the same light as [him].” 
Some sexual offences are quite ambiguous in their legal titles. For example, the crime of 
Sexual Assault may include a range of violations of which penetrative rape is only one. 
Differentiation, then, can be seen as particularly important for men whose offences could involve 
a range of possible acts. Kevin engaged in differentiation because being labeled a pedophile, his 
best strategy for impression management was to clarify what degree of harm he inflicted upon 
his victim. Specifying his actual conduct during his offence allowed him to claim that he was not 
as bad as other pedophiles. Kevin met with his pastor and the man’s wife to explain the context 
of his offence. All they knew prior to this meeting was that Kevin had offended against his ten-
year-old stepson. 
I got into specifics with them because they wanted to know what was going on in my 
mind when I was offending and what the actual type of offending was.... I certainly want 
to clarify [to] people the type of offending that was going on because... right away people 
assume [rape] when they hear about a sex offence against a young boy.... That wasn’t the 
case with me. I’ve never fantasized about [penetration], thank God. That’s never been 
something that I’ve found arousing.... I mean, not that what I did is good or anything, but 
on the range of offending, it’s on the minor side as far as the physical impact. Obviously 
there’s a terrible emotional impact that goes along with any kind of sexual offence but the 
actual physical impact is on the minimal side, as far as the offending that I was doing. 
People usually feel better about that because they don’t want to think of me as a person 
who’s hiding in alleys and grabbing children at night... and raping them.  
 
Kevin framed his decision to disclose further details of his offence as setting other people’s 
minds at ease, which I felt was sincere and consistent with my impression of him as a sensitive, 
caring, and deeply remorseful man; yet, his narrative strongly served his own need to temper 
other people’s negative and abjecting impressions of him. He separated the emotional harm he 
acknowledged causing his victim from the physical harm that did not take place by clearly 
differentiating himself from pedophiles that might engage in penetrative acts.  
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Between news media and state press releases, sexual offenders have very little control 
over who receives information about their personal lives. By differentiating his actions, Kevin 
was able to restore some degree of control over the kind of information people received about 
him, and thus the kind of evaluation they may append to him. Similarly, Tanner’s experience 
when he was angry due to being outed by his nephew’s girlfriend is another illustration of how 
the control of information is an important dimension of impression management for sexual 
offenders. Differentiation in this context involved the comparison of stigmatized selfhoods by 
splitting a singular master status into its specific offences that were then ranked according to 
their perceived offensiveness. Noteworthy, while some narrative strategies described here 
challenge the identity and master status imposed by the generalized sexual offender label, stating 
that “I’m Not a Pedophile or I Wasn’t as Bad as...” was a form of deflection. Men accepted their 
broader abjected status but their deflection attempted to prevent further degradation to their self-
concept by engaging in downward social comparisons (Thoits, 2011). Furthermore, participants’ 
emphasis on the differentiation of offences is used as logic to argue against the polarization of 
good and evil that is put forth in most discourses on sexual offenders: they are not completely 
evil or bad because their offence was not as bad as compared to offenders who are “more evil.” 
4.4.5  “It’s Blown Out of Proportion” 
Some research participants would try to invalidate their labels by claiming that the stigma 
placed upon sexual offenders was completely “Blown Out of Proportion.” They resented the 
repetitive and over-mediated discourses that disproportionately vilified sexual offenders. At the 
same time they perceived that other crimes were hardly stigmatized at all by comparison. The 
media were thought to be the chief culprit due to the powerful influence they have over people’s 
beliefs and attitudes. When asked what he thought of all the negative messages and discourses 
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associated with sexual offenders, Jacob declared that, “a lot of it [was] crap.” Acknowledging 
that he understood society’s view, he blamed the media for their hyperbolized representations. 
I was a regular respectable member of society at one point at time.... I’m still, I guess, a 
respectable member of society. I just have a label now. The biggest problem is the media 
because a lot of it is blown out of proportion. They really pick and choose what they want 
to say and I really don’t think that’s right. 
 
Statements like Jacob’s reveal that sexual offenders not only challenge treatment practices 
(Waldram, 2007, 2012), but also the conduct of the news media. 
Minimization and differentiation strategies lay at the core of the “It’s Blown Out of 
Proportion” narrative strategy, but in rather unexpected ways. Differentiation between the 
various sexual offences, as exemplified by “I’m Not a Pedophile,” was extended in this argument 
to claim that the stigma associated with the label was disproportionate to what they had actually 
done. Continuing to use treatment language so as to not minimize his offence, Chris relayed a 
common sentiment: “I’m not trying to downplay what my crime was and... the seriousness of it; 
but... there are other [crimes] that are really serious too that do not get any attention at all. And 
[it] just seems kind of unfair.” In essence, Chris is objecting to what he sees as the minimization 
of other serious offences by the media. Even though his perception may be influenced with 
selection bias so that his attention is drawn to self-relevant information, he has clearly learned to 
eschew the minimization of more than just sexual offences.  
Another twist in the “It’s Blown Out of Proportion” strategy is the deployment of what 
might be labeled an anti-differentiation argument. Jason too blamed the media for people’s 
attitudes while highlighting what he thought was an irrational discrimination against just sexual 
offenders. According to him, too many people learned about sexual offending from television, 
where narratives such as, “Once an S.O.[sexual offender], always an S.O... [and] all this 
bullcrap,” were prevalent: 
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As far as I’m concerned, it’s just like any other crime. Next door to you, do you want a 
thief, a murderer, a child molester, or a drug dealer? For some reason [people] always 
pick on the S.O.. They would rather have a drug dealer or a murderer [living next door]. 
It’s a weird impression that society seems to have. 
 
Jason’s disagreement with the differentiation between sexual offences and other crimes had 
merit. The stigma of being labeled a sexual offender becomes a secondary form of punishment 
that can reinforce societal discourses and structures, thereby forging a behavioural pathway that 
encourages sexual offenders to be the essentialized incorrigibles that they are thought to be 
(Taylor, 2009). Jason implicitly questioned the intensified stigma applied to sexual offenders in 
his statement regarding the “weird impression that society seems to have.” While most crimes go 
against the moral order, sexual offences are especially objectionable because they represent a 
violation of bodily autonomy and a defacement of the sacred (Taussig, 1999). Furthermore, 
societal agreement that the moral order has been violated sets the stage for a collective response 
and moral regulation. 
4.4.6  “That’s Only a Part of Me” 
As part of their process of moral habilitation, sexual offenders must navigate through 
stigma and damaged selfhoods to construct a new internalized moral self. The first part of this 
undertaking involves patching up their fragmented self-concepts as they find ways to challenge 
stigma and crippling emotions such as self-loathing and worthlessness. In other words, they must 
learn to move on from that period of disruption. Learning to reject the label of sexual offender 
was a keystone for the narrative reconstruction of selfhood. The “That’s Only a Part of Me” 
narrative theme represents men’s rejection of the essentialized and totalizing master status of 
sexual offender, or the full out invalidation of the label. The previous narrative strategies 
identified here, with perhaps the exception of “I’ve Changed, I’m Better,” served to chip away at 
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the perceived validity of the label, encouraging the men to claim that being a sexual offender is 
“Only a Part of Me.” 
Men convicted of sexual offences readily reject essentialist claims that they are evil or 
that their label solely defines them (Waldram, 2009). As expected, the men in this research did 
the same. For example, Tanner was bothered by the prospect of vigilante justice, even though he 
had never experienced any himself. Such actions from an “uncivil” society were for him based 
on snippets of information the public receives about the labeled person. “They don’t know us,” 
he started, referring to sexual offenders in general. “They don’t know me. That’s only a part of 
me.” Tanner continued by challenging the reductionism inherent in the label through a biological 
comparison to our cellular composition. “What bothers me the most is people who think just 
because I’m labeled that, that’s all I am.... That’s just like saying, ‘You’re a bag of water,’ you 
know? ‘Cause it’s a part of us [but] it’s not us.” Clearly, Tanner considered his history of sexual 
offending as just one of many narratives that comprised his personhood. 
An anti-essentializing discourse that is commonly adopted from treatment involves the 
recasting of sexual offending as a problem that is external to the man’s selfhood: he is not the 
problem, but rather, he has a problem that he can change. This strategy not only gives hope for a 
better future to offenders but it becomes ubiquitous as a self-protective claim. Danny declared, “I 
don't view myself as having that label of a sex offender. I pretty much view myself as having a 
sex-offending problem, which I'm dealing with. I'm not a sex offender. It's a problem that I 
have.” In all cases, the label was invalidated as an essentialized typification that did not represent 
the entirety of the man’s personhood.  
Stepping further than the pervasive anti-essentialist arguments, Shane questioned the very 
basis upon which our identities develop. He initiated his critique when I asked the same question 
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that I posed to the others: what did it mean to have that label assigned to him? Like some other 
men, he responded with, “I don’t see it as a valid label.” He then launched into a narrative of his 
challenge to an authority figure on his use of the label: 
My very first probation officer and I had this conversation where he was always calling 
me an offender and I was like, “That’s not correct. I’m not offending nor do I have any 
option but to not offend right now because I’m on house arrest.” The way I see it, is [that] 
there’s got to be a point where your actions don’t define who you have become. Like if 
you steal something from a store when you’re seven... that doesn’t make you a thief when 
you’re ten unless you keep deciding to steal. So the label “sex offender” is just a 
designation we’ve given you based on one thing you did. 
 
Is it our actions that define the kind of person we are, and if so, when does an older pattern of 
actions stop defining us? According to Shane, “If you stop dealing drugs tomorrow, then you’re 
not a drug dealer anymore. And if you don’t offend, then you’re not an offender.” This action-
oriented identity may work in some situations but the stigma of sexual offending ascribes 
symbolic disfigurement to one’s personhood long past the time of the offence and/or conviction.  
Furthermore, Shane identified a paradox whereby members of society actually construct 
the sexual offenders that it collectively despises. “Standing up against [the label] takes effort and 
courage that aren’t always there,” he related. “It’s easier sometimes to just see yourself as [how] 
they want to see you. Then you’re just like, ‘Put me back in the box. That’s fine. Now I’m in this 
box. Great. Now what?’” Despite the energy it took to resist, Shane refused to accept being 
labeled and pigeonholed into what other people expected of someone who was a sexual offender. 
He insisted that society’s pattern of labeling and stigmatizing men convicted for sexual offences 
was detrimental and counterproductive: 
I don’t know why it’s done because society wants me to not be in the box. It would be 
beneficial to them were I not to be a sex offender. Labeling me as one and treating me as 
one is a mistake because they’re just encouraging me to be what they don’t want me to 
be. It’s a contradiction that I don’t understand. [...] They think the label is some kind of 
legitimate claim of who I am, and therefore they’re going to treat me that way. That’s 
why I think the labels should be gone.... They should treat you how they want you to be, 
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not how they don’t want you to be, ‘cause that’s insane. 
 
Shane’s observation is especially noteworthy because it highlights a contradiction between actual 
and perceived moral habilitation. To the public, it does not seem to matter if sexual offenders 
have been habilitated and pose little to no risk of actually recidivating. All that does matter is the 
fear associated with the perception that they could reoffend. In essence, the stigma of being 
labeled a sexual offender ensures that society will not allow the subject to ever be fully 
habilitated. Labeling theory has long asserted that imposing a label and description that classifies 
a person sets up a self-fulfilling prophecy. The person begins to be treated according to their 
label and thus is encouraged to conform to others’ expectations (Braithwaite, 1989; 
Tannenbaum, 1938). Foucault too understood that the act of naming an object brought it into 
existence (Foucault, 1976; Taylor, 2009). SOTPs may unwittingly construct sexual offenders as 
men who are “consumed by sex” by drawing them into protracted confessions of real or made up 
sexual fantasies (Lacombe, 2008, 2013). Intuitively, Shane recognized this paradox and adopted 
a view consistent with narrative theory, that is, the assumption that the narratives employed to 
explain the past and present will construct our understanding of the future (Presser, 2009). 
Shane’s rejection of the label was his way of agentically controlling his own destiny and refusing 
the representation of him imposed by others. He was “convinced that I don’t have to be who 
they’re labeling me as.” 
 “That’s Only a Part of Me” is a narrative strategy that challenges the eclipsing influence 
of the sexual offender label and declares it invalid. While challenging, as opposed to deflecting, 
forms of resistance attempt to change prejudice and discrimination, very few men in this research 
spoke of directly confronting stigmatizers to try and change their attitudes. Shane and Danny 
were the only participants who would confront others even though other men expressed similar 
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beliefs about the label, an observation that further suggests moral habilitation operates through 
the construction of docile bodies. Compared to men who used more deflecting strategies and 
were more accepting of the label, it is no coincidence that Shane and Danny appeared to be more 
confident because there is a positive correlation between self-esteem and challenging stigma 
(Thoits, 2011; Wright, Gronfein, & Owens, 2000). Direct confrontation can be a frightening 
activity for sexual offenders because they not only have to acknowledge their abjection but they 
have to rise above it, a difficult task if one is already low in self-esteem. One indirect, and thus 
safer, means of challenging stigma that Thoits (2011) discussed is to simply act in a way that is 
incongruent to people’s stereotypes. Shane raised this issue, only to conclude that people will not 
let him act as a non-offender because they expect him to reoffend and therefore respond 
accordingly.  
4.4.7  Summary 
 Previous research examining how criminal offenders as subjects of stigma engage in 
impression management strategies is consistent with the findings from this study. Ex-convicts 
manage their stigma through social withdrawal, preventative telling, and maintaining secrecy 
regarding their personal histories (Winnick & Bodkin, 2008), all of which were regularly 
described as part of men’s post-imprisonment lives here. “Passing,” the attempt to keep an 
invisible stigma from being revealed through techniques such as fabrication, concealment, and 
discretion (DeJordy, 2008), was every participant’s goal, even for those men who claimed that 
other people’s attitudes were “Their Problem.” Other coping responses like group 
disidentification and disengagement from stigma-inducing situations (Major & O’Brien, 2005), 
claiming their offences were out of character, deflecting to crimes or offenders thought to be 
worse, and claims of a changed self (Presser, 2004) were all common. Participants described 
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avoiding other sexual offenders and resorting to social withdrawal when they could no longer 
cope with their stigma. While these strategies were moderately successful, social withdrawal is 
considered a dysfunctional tactic that can ultimately increase a person’s risk to reoffend 
(Quinsey, Harris, Rice, & Cormier, 1998). Very few men actually rejected the sexual offender 
label outright. Most accepted it along with responsibility for their crimes while still making other 
attempts to limit the effect of stigma upon them. Like Leary and Kowalski (1990) predicted, 
participants used multiple narrative strategies in attempts to achieve the maximum effect in 
protecting their self-concepts and identities. Their various claims were combined and 
overlapping in their narratives as each built a case against their stigmatization and for their 
societal re-inclusion. 
Sexual offenders narrated and managed their experiences of stigma somewhat differently 
depending on whether or not they are a first time or repeat offender. The men who were first-
time offenders, generally but not always, gave more intense descriptions of abjection from 
family and friends. Their offences were a shock to the people around them and their sudden 
stigmatization hit them like a wave as people rapidly ejected the men from their lives. The first-
time offenders were more likely to disclose how their offences made them feel like “losers” or 
“pieces of shit.” For repeat offenders, these experiences of stigma were not new so they were 
likely less salient in their minds and the interviews. Both groups of men spoke equally of fearing 
others would find out about their past, but references to fear along with the other emotional 
ramifications of abjection dissipated as narratives shifted into the present tense for most. As for 
the narrative strategies they used to manage their identities, there were no clear patterns. 
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4.5  Stigma and Moral Regulation 
Stigma is a discursive and context dependent force that shifts with the discourses and 
material conditions of society (Crocker & Quinn, 2000; Meisenbach, 2010). These characteristics 
establish stigma as a moralizing force that makes examples of what we ought not to be in order 
to have full citizenship. Stigma needs to be considered both a discursive and embodied form of 
moral regulation. According to Allan Hunt (1999):  
Moral regulation involves the deployment of distinctively moral discourses which 
construct a moralised subject and an object or target which is acted upon by means of 
moralising practices. Moral discourses seek to act on conduct that is deemed to be 
intrinsically bad or wrong. (p. 6)  
 
Like moral regulation, stigma is also formed and attributed to its target individuals or groups 
through moral discourses; but it is also embodied by the abject, visceral responses to polluted 
identities and by peoples’ physical distancing from the stigmatized Other. Stigma is frequently 
seen as an oppressive and socially inappropriate response when it is associated with 
discriminatory experiences such as racism, ableism, and homonegativity. For moral 
transgressions like adultery, criminal activity, blasphemy, or dishonesty, stigma is more closely 
associated with a deserved punishment. Where moral regulation was seen to involve persuasive 
means to induce desirable actions (Corrigan & Sayer, 1985; Hunt, 1999), Critcher (2009) argued 
that coercive means are also part of moral regulation, particularly when the regulatory aspect 
combines with the development of moral panic. Specifically, he identified mechanisms of social 
control such as state law, police forces, and punitive measures as coercive forms used to curb an 
undesirable behaviour (Critcher, 2009). More recently, moral regulation has been clarified as 
including both proscriptive and prescriptive systems to govern behaviour (Janoff-Bulman, 2012; 
Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Moral discourses invoke and regulate societal values and ideals to 
prescriptively encourage citizens to live up to a certain standard of behaviour. Criminal justice 
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systems are proscriptive mechanisms of social control that punish legally unsanctioned 
behaviour for which the persuasive force of moral regulation is ineffective.  
 The moral habilitation of sexual offenders involves both systems of moral regulation, the 
prescriptive and persuasive mode of governing, and the proscriptive and coercive elements of 
social control. Conviction, imprisonment, and treatment are all mechanisms of social control. 
Treatment is not controlled to the point of forced attendance, but participation often involves 
coercive incentives like gaining the possibility of parole or avoiding public notification upon 
release. The first-time offenders in this study, especially those who identified that “they had 
changed” or “they were better,” described how their confrontations with the criminal justice 
system motivated or provided the opportunity for them to change and improve their lives. The 
criminal justice system is a mechanism for social control but it provided a catalyst for some 
sexual offenders to gradually take control and agency over their wellbeing. They would not have 
participated in any form of treatment if they had not been subjected to criminalization and 
incarceration.  
The ubiquitous and stigmatizing discourses aimed at sexual offenders might be initially 
viewed as forms of persuasive moral regulation to discourage illegal and morally deplored 
activities, but this assumption is deceptive. Men convicted of sexual offences are routinely set up 
in various media sources as examples of and for public humiliation. Stigma pre-exists individual 
perpetrators’ offences with many offenders publicly displayed as examples of what happens to 
“deviants.” Consistent with the ideology of penal populism (Pratt, 2000), public humiliation is 
sometimes thought to be a form of persuasion that would prevent others from contemplating the 
commission of a sexual offence. On the surface, stigma appears to be a dissuading moral 
example but this assumption presupposes sexual offending as the rational, contemplative action 
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of a mentally healthy and balanced mind. More accurately, many sexual offences can be 
attributed to a series of impulsively performed, poor decisions comorbid with mental health 
concerns. They are most often not logically thought out but instead spontaneously acted out in 
moments where clarity and logic of mind are minimally present (Waldram, 2012). There is little 
intentional reflection or agentic decision-making upon which persuasion might have an effect. 
Consequently, stigma cannot be seen as having much in the way of preventative influence on 
sexual offending.  
This research demonstrates that stigma and abjection are much more effective as social 
controls that punish offenders socially and psychologically for transgressing the moral order. 
Social control acts to morally habilitate sexual offenders in two interdependent ways. First, the 
criminalization of an offender instigates his public stigmatization, which is a type of informal 
social control. It is unintentional but ultimately works to benefit moral regulation. Second, the 
formal social control of the criminal justice system functions to segregate sexual offenders from 
society, to punish and habilitate them. Expanding on Foucault’s (1976) work, Taylor (2009) 
argued that because sexual offenders are doubly punished through their stigma, society may be 
better off eliminating the label and shifting to a system where criminals are differentiated by the 
seriousness and degree of harm caused by their offences. Offenders would still be segregated, 
punished, and treated. Imagining this prospect, the current forensic practices of using offence 
categories to target treatment needs and guide treatment approaches could continue without the 
public labeling of sexual offenders; however, it is important to ask if there any benefit to the 
stigmatization of sexual offenders from the standpoint of moral habilitation? 
Despite the social abjection, loss of self-esteem, and potential recidivism risk associated 
with social withdrawal, stigma instigated an unexpected benefit for many of the men in this 
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study. The social and self-abjection added to an already unsatisfied life state to prompt 
participants into making significant life changes. Moral regulation acts through proscriptions that 
enforce behavioural inhibitions and prescription to encourage behavioural activation (Janoff-
Bulman, 2012; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Moral regulation as a punishing, informal social 
control had an unexpected benefit of activating the persuasive and prescriptive form of moral 
regulation by assisting men in establishing and pursuing more desirable life goals. Chapter 3 
identified the various motivations that influenced research participants’ moral habilitation 
processes. Stigma had the beneficial effect of being an extrinsic motivator for many participants. 
At the minimum, some men recollected their decision to take a treatment program as a means to 
avoid the stigma of community notification. As an extrinsic motivator, stigma was a persuasive 
form of moral regulation that channeled offenders into treatment and moral habilitation. The 
stigma that participants had experienced from previous convictions or from their arrest was 
punishing, but it also helped them identify a contrasting, “Better Life” that they could work 
towards. Having experienced an “Unfulfilling Life” filled with unhappiness and dysfunction, the 
disruption of their most recent conviction motivated them into a state of deliberate agentic 
willing. To clarify the theoretical implication here, moral regulation involved the proscriptive, 
punishing force of social control in conjunction with the persuasive, prescriptive mode of moral 
regulation so that both coercive and persuasive means were deployed to encourage moral 
habilitation in sexual offenders. 
There remains one complication to this framework, that is, society’s rejection of notions 
of sexual offender (re)habilitation. Discourses such as “once a pedophile, always a pedophile” 
cast fear and doubt into a populace, contributing to the ongoing abjection of men convicted of 
sexual offences. Despite a former sexual offender successfully completing treatment and 
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demonstrating his ability to remain offence-free, the public still retains their distrust and refuses 
to relinquish the label and associated stigma. Some men in this and other research (i.e. Elbogen 
et al., 2003) indicated that community notification laws and their synoptic effects reinforced their 
need to continually engage in relapse prevention measures. In contrast, however, a hostile public 
can also increase the propensity of an individual to reoffend (Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). It becomes 
clear that the intensity and duration of stigma is one of several critical factors in creating a 
balance between the positive and negative outcomes of formal and informal social control.  
Resisting stigma is an intentional, agentic behaviour on the part of the stigmatized 
(Horwath, 2006; Thoits, 2011). Agency was clearly manifested through men’s narrative 
impression management strategies. “It’s Their Problem” was partly characterized by setting a 
boundary between what men felt was important for them to care about and what was outside of 
their control and therefore not valued. It was an agentic decision to take that approach but it also 
became embedded in their value system and rhetoric. The two strategies, “I’m Not a Pedophile” 
and “That’s Only a Part of Me” both implied that self-determination was their most valuable 
weapon against their stigma. With the “I’m Not a Pedophile” strategy, participants made it clear 
that having control over their own information was incredibly important to them. Being 
publicized or outed by someone represented a loss of control over their near futures, but being 
able to preventively disclose information gave them the opportunity to explain their stories 
within their desired context and conditional statements. Control over their personal information 
allowed them to engage in impression management strategies. As for the narrative strategy, 
“That’s Only a Part of Me,” rejecting the label and the expectations it constructed in others for 
how a sexual offender should behave acted as reclamation of control. Shane in particular made a 
claim for being who he wanted to be by resisting the labels and conditions that others placed 
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upon him. 
4.6  Conclusion 
 Stigma is an intensely moral experience for it invalidates one’s worth as a human being 
and it threatens “what is most at stake for actors in a local social world” (Yang, Kleinman, Link, 
Phelan, Lee, & Good, 2007, p. 1525). Stigma-induced rejection strikes a damaging blow at the 
heart of one’s identity and self-concept. The personal and social identities of men convicted of 
sexual offences become polluted by their crimes. The intensity of the stigma associated with 
sexual offending pushes their disqualification beyond discrimination and other more subtle forms 
of marginalization to complete abjection from society.  
Men convicted of sexual offences used various narrative strategies to persuade others to 
reverse their social exclusion. These claims also served to protect their identities and self-
concepts, to agentically resist their low status on social hierarchies, and to (re)claim some 
measure of self-determination and self-respect (Maruna, 2001).More importantly, stigma 
neutralization and impression management protect one’s sense of self (Goffman, 1963; Maruna, 
2001; Sykes & Mazka, 1957) and therefore improve the odds that an offender can be moral 
habilitated. Stigma is a tremendous barrier to help seeking. Cognitive distortions and complex 
rationalizing can convince an offender that what he is doing is acceptable to continue, but the 
perpetrator who knows that he has a problem and needs help is understandably reluctant to do so 
when there is no known service to seek out and only public humiliation and imprisonment are in 
store for him. 
The stigmatization of men who have sexually offended is a double-edged sword in 
society. Stigma inflicts a psychological, social, and material punishment for those who violate 
the moral boundary of sexual violation. It sets them up as an example for what others can expect 
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if they do the same, reinforcing the moral standards of society. It appears to be a logical and 
deserved consequence for perpetrators but might backfire by encouraging them to conform to the 
label and the stigmatizing expectations of others. Conversely, stigma might have the benefit of 
motivating men away from an “Unfulfilling Life” so that they begin striving for a “Better Life.” 
Society at this point in time appears emotionally committed to the stigmatization and abjection of 
sexual offenders. In treatment, sexual offenders are taught to emulate an idealized, cultural form 
of sociality that does not exist in an unforgiving society (Waldram, 2012). Many men, 
particularly high-risk offenders, do not complete SOTPs (Olver, Stockdale, & Wormith, 2011), 
which suggests that alternative means of engaging treatment participants may be fruitful 
(Waldram, 2008a, 2010, 2012). The findings from this research indicate that institutional 
treatment programs can instill beneficial changes in sexual offenders. It is more difficult to 
determine to what degree these changes come from free agentic will to engage in moral 
habilitation or from the subjection of docile bodies to a morally regulating governmentality. 
Clearly evident, however, is the extent to which moral habilitation requires extensive inner 
fortitude to overcome a lifetime of dysfunctional patterns and to persevere despite a hostile 
community that treats men convicted of sexual offences as if that is their only possible role 
within society. If evaluations of Circles of Support and Accountability are any indication 
(Wilson, & Prinzo, 2001; Wilson et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2005), social 
support throughout community (re)integration is an integral component to moral habilitation.  
If crime had a simple cause in deviant malice and forethought, the punitive model of 
crime prevention might actually be effective, but there is growing awareness in the scientific 
community that it is not the best approach (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Petrunik, 2002). Sexual 
offenders with few supports and a very negative sense of self will resort to avoidance measures, 
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socially withdrawing and maybe even reoffending as a way to deal with their distress 
(Tewksbury, 2005). Still, the entire effect that stigma has on sexual offenders’ moral selfhoods is 
not yet clear. For that I turn to the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: STIGMA AND MORAL SELFHOOD: THE FOUR SELVES OF ETHICAL 
SELF-REFORMATION________________________________________________________ 
 
 
After being released, I started talking... to some of the victims that I’ve been 
charged with. I came forward and took responsibility.... I explained to him what I 
did to him was wrong and it was not his fault. I didn’t ask him to forgive me.... I 
don’t deserve his forgiveness unless he wants it.... It took a lot of courage to do 
that.... I took responsibility, which helped a lot in therapy. It actually helped a lot 
with the victim empathy because actually seeing the responses [from victims]. 
Yeah, that was hard. (Tanner) 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Stigma inevitably influences a person’s selfhood and self-concept, particularly when it 
evokes a strong negative response, as is the case with men labeled sexual offenders. In the 
previous chapter, I established the range of experiences that stigma elicits for sexual offenders 
and the effects it had upon their lives. Criminal offenders in this and other research (i.e. Maruna, 
2001; Presser, 2004) have demonstrated the variety of narrative claims often used to protect their 
identities and manage the impressions of others. Impression management strategies do have 
some positive effects for facilitating social interactions but they do not erase the negative impact 
of stigma upon sexual offenders’ self-concepts. The formation of a positive self-concept and 
moral selfhood is inseparable from the moral habilitation of sexual offenders. This chapter 
details how the stigma of being labeled a sexual offender has affected participants’ self-
appraisals from incarceration to community (re)integration along with the changes to self-
concept that take place during the ethical self-reformation process. Men’s narratives indicated 
that the resolution of their damaged moral selfhoods involved a broad trajectory of ethical self-
reformation where the influence of stigma on the self lessens over time.  
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Stigma has a profound impact upon selfhood in terms of self-concept, self-esteem, 
identity, affect, morale, and behaviour (Crocker & Quinn, 2000; Leary, 2007; Link, 1987; Major 
& O’Brien, 2005; Pachankis, 2007), which is accentuated by selfhood’s fundamentally 
interpersonal nature. As relational beings, we are motivated by the need to belong to a social 
group, so much so that any activity that enhances our sense of belonging also enhances positive 
emotions within us (Leary, 2005; Tice & Baumeister, 2001). The relational aspect of selfhood is 
formed through our relationships to the significant and influential people in our lives along with 
the social comparisons that we make to others (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Chen, Boucher, & 
Tapias, 2006; Tice & Baumeister, 2001). In Chapter 4, participants’ narrative strategies to 
manage their self-concepts and the perceptions of other people often involved social comparisons 
to those perceived as worse, or worse off from them. Chen et al. (2006) postulated that the most 
influential social comparisons might be those that are made in relation to the significant others in 
our lives. If this is the case, it would explain the deeper emotional impact of stigma when 
participants were rejected by their significant others, family, and friends, as compared to the 
lesser impact of rejection by strangers or the generalized public. 
5.2  Selfhood 
The self or “psyche” has been a topic of speculation long before psychology ever became 
a formalized discipline (Leary & Tangney, 2003). There is no right or wrong answer when it 
comes to how we as enculturated individuals define our personhoods, for the answer truly 
changes with the lens through which one views the self. A cultural tendency of Western society 
is to embrace an essentialized selfhood, a core sense of “this is the authentic me” where different 
behaviours are viewed as temporary deviations from one’s true self (DeMunk, 2000). This view 
of the self is commonly exemplified through statements such as, “I wasn’t myself” or “I need to 
  145 
find myself.” From a narrative perspective of selfhood, individuals construct their senses of self 
through a discrepant body of meaning-making moments that are authored and manipulated into a 
coherent whole (Becker, 1997; Bruner, 2002). The narrative self is like a collection of stories 
that, taken separately, reveal multiple selfhoods; but when put together, selfhood is more like an 
epic novel that is made up of numerous chapters that are just facets of a diverse whole. Through 
the narrative lens, a single action or even cluster of actions does not make up a permanent, all 
encompassing self and identity.  
Psychology has focused on a vast array of self-related phenomena of which self-concept 
is only one topic of study. Self-concept is typically defined in psychology as the cognitive 
structure of one’s selfhood that both contains and processes all of the individual’s self-relevant 
information (Campbell, 1990; Demo, 1992). Simply put, self-concept includes the beliefs and 
feelings toward one’s own being. To be clear, selfhood differs from self-concept for the former 
implies the broader, holistic sense of our experiential, self-reflective personhood. When I write 
of selfhood, I am thinking of the entire state of the individual being, complete with our capacities 
as rational, autonomous agents who must be considered within the expansive context of political, 
sociocultural, and historical subjectivities.  
Identity speaks to the various context-dependent roles and self-aspects that are 
encompassed with the self and become part of one’s self-definition (Hogg, 2003; Owens, 2003). 
There are many ways that people choose to define themselves. The most common of these are: 
personal and demographic characteristics, behavioural patterns, social roles, occupations, 
historical details, emotional tendencies, and life goals (McConnell, 2011; Owens, 2003). The 
ways with which we choose to describe our selfhood can reveal various aspects about our 
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individual personalities, but looking for the commonalities between narratives is informative for 
learning about the cultural construction of self. 
Identities may be viewed as multiple self-aspects that contribute to one’s overall self-
concept (McConnell, 2011). These self-aspects are context-dependent and explain why our 
behaviours and cognitions vary from one situation to another. McConnell’s multiple self-aspects 
model implies that selfhood is a collection of highly variable personas, much in the same way 
that the narrative model of self is a collection of storied events that routinely reconstruct one’s 
sense of selfhood (Bruner, 2002). The belief in a stable and authentic self that has been so 
prevalent over the past century (de Munck, 2000) is not so much inaccurate according to 
McConnell as it is dependent upon the perspective taken and the individual characteristics that 
are being assessed. Personality theories typically focus on the stable aspects or limited contexts 
of selfhood, but certain traits or personality characteristics that are likely to be stable within 
situations may be quite variable across situations (McConnell, 2011). Similarly, Chen et al. 
(2006) indicated that people have multiple relational selves that are dependent upon the 
specificity of the relational context in which those selves are formed and maintained. For 
example, we will have one relational self with our spouse or partner that is much different from 
the relational self we have when around a professional colleague.  
Self-knowledge is the foundation of selfhood, which is formed through our awareness of 
the behaviours, thoughts, and feelings that we experience in relation to specific others (Chen et 
al., 2006). The construction of selfhood relies upon our cognitive capacity to narrate experience 
so that new understandings of our identities are formed through shifting self-knowledge (Bruner, 
2002). As part of our selfhood, self-stories construct narrative identities as “evolving life 
stor[ies]” that give meaning and purpose to our existence (McAdams & Olsen, 2010, p. 527). 
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The narrative identities that constitute selfhood are always formed in part by what we think are 
others’ expectations for us (Bruner, 2002), which is consistent with theories of a relational or 
interpersonal self. We generally try to conform to group norms and perform impression 
management to enhance our sense of belonging to others. 
Selfhood is made possible through our human capacity for self-awareness as we make 
that most basic distinction between self and not-self. Self-awareness and its consequent, self-
reflection, leads to care for one’s own survival and the deliberation of possible outcomes for 
important decisions (Martin et al., 2003), which define the most basic form of moral agency. 
Relational selfhood expands an individual’s care for the self into a concern for others as well that 
requires more ethical reflection on the possible effect of a course of action. Similar to agency, 
moral selfhood is founded in our reflexive capacities to respond in ways that will maintain 
personal accountability and interpersonal responsibility (Lewis, 2003). It is this ability to make 
oneself and his or her actions the subject of ethical reflection that determines selfhood as a moral 
concept. Being that selfhood is underpinned by the capacity for ethical reflection, moral selfhood 
identifies one’s subjective sense of being a good, or not so good, person. Judgments of moral 
selfhood are established in part through social comparisons to the collective evaluations of moral 
worthiness characteristic of a cultural group (Monin, 2007). Morality is collectively negotiated 
into broad codices and scripts that are subject to frequent disputes, contradictions, and context 
dependent variations. Consequently, moral selfhood situates an individual within this broader 
cultural setting of contested moralities so that the evaluation of one’s moral worth is equally 
variable and context dependent. Moral selfhood is much like self-esteem and self-worth but 
where the latter two are distinct and measureable psychological constructs, moral selfhood 
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assumes the broader cultural influences and subjectivities that go along with selfhood as 
previously defined. 
The construction of a moral selfhood can be accomplished through the manner of 
narrativizing one’s life events to substantiate one’s essential worth in society. In a study of how 
violent criminal offenders narratively construct their moral selfhoods, Presser (2004) observed 
three different trajectories of (re)habilitation employed by participants to claim their inherent 
moral worth. Return narratives made claims of moral transformation back to the original moral 
state occupied prior to the subject’s engagement in crime. Stability narratives marked an 
offender’s belief that he was essentially a good person who acted out of character. Elastic 
narratives involved claims of a changed selfhood, but these claims were also frequently vague or 
contradictory. Furthermore, Presser observed that offenders had a tendency to frame their moral 
transformations as heroic endeavors whereby they had to overcome internal struggles like mental 
illness or addictions. The life narratives that men are expected to present as part of their 
treatment programs become modified from the individual’s initial telling into a group 
constructed “autobiography” that conforms to the expectations set by treatment providers and 
other treatment participants who are encouraged to participate as part of the process (Waldram, 
2008a). These coerced re-emplotments and confabulations ultimately modified how offenders 
communicated their sense of moral selfhood to the world by eliminating instances of 
rationalization, denial, and minimization from their life stories. The practice of narrating oneself 
as moral person is common amongst most people, but the motivation to do so is especially 
strengthened by the stigma of a criminalized identity.  
Enhancing one’s sense of moral selfhood requires continued engagement in ethical self-
formation, a process that “concerns practices, techniques, and discourses of the government of 
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the self by the self, by means of which individuals seek to know, decipher, and act on 
themselves” (Dean, 1994, p. 156). Dean described self-formation as an autonomous process that 
progresses in interaction with political subjectification, and I will add, sociocultural 
subjectification. Ethical self-formation involves a sustained effort to modify one’s habits, 
cognitions, affects, and general conduct in the direction of socially approved expectations. Men 
who have committed sexual offences have deviated from society’s moral standard of accepted 
manifestations of selfhood. Consequently, ethical self-reformation is the main but often 
unacknowledged objective of moral habilitation in sexual offender treatment programming. 
Major disruptions in our lives create opportunities for growth often by dismantling the 
self-knowledge we previously held to be true (Becker, 1999). As I demonstrate in the 
forthcoming pages, the psychological, social, and economic consequences of committing a 
sexual offence often force offenders to reassess their self-knowledge and self-concepts. Damaged 
selfhoods and identities are much like cognitive dissonance. They present a state of 
disequilibrium that must be resolved. One means of resolving the fractured state of a dissonant 
selfhood is to maintain consistency of one’s self-knowledge by denying responsibility and 
resisting any notion of wrongdoing. In essence, the individual seems to make the decision, 
however unreflectively, to remain much of the same person as he was prior to the offence. The 
rationalization, minimization, and denial of one’s offences are common strategies used to protect 
an offender’s selfhood and reduce cognitive dissonance, but they are among the first targets of 
moral habilitation in treatment (Mann, Webster, Wakeling, & Marshall, 2007; Marshall et al., 
2009b; Waldram, 2012).  
Another means of dealing with a dissonant self is to engage in a process of self-
reformation. The moral habilitation of sexual offenders during treatment is exacted in large part 
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through a training regime in ethical decision-making. Offenders are required to deliberate upon 
various hypothetical situations involving community interactions and the ideal manner of 
response (Waldram, 2012). Relapse prevention, therefore, involves the recognition and 
routinized avoidance of high-risk situations and locations. High-risk situations, like being in the 
presence of a child or alcohol, are taught to be events that require an immediate response, that is, 
to remove oneself from the situation. Because the avoidance response must be learned, high-risk 
situations represent instances of moral breakdown where the person must leave a state of 
unreflective automaticity in order to navigate an ethical demand by intentionally determining the 
best course of action (Zigon, 2007; 2009). Ethical self-reformation is the intentional 
reconstructing of moral selfhood to internalize the learned ethical demand response, thus 
transforming it into the automatic, unreflective response that is embodied morality (Zigon, 
2007). Concurrent with ethical self-reformation is a progression of evolving self-appraisals and 
moral selfhoods. 
5.3  Four Discourses of Ethical Self-Reformation 
Moral selfhood is revealed in the self-appraisals that we make. Self-appraisals may be 
thought of as the articulation of one’s self-concept, self-esteem, or self-worth, often followed up 
by narratives to substantiate the person’s conclusions. These appraisals are not neutral but rather 
embedded with valuations of worth or life satisfaction. Our sense of worth will fluctuate over the 
lifespan as we learn from errors, make achievements, and adapt to the many different social 
interactions we will have. Life narratives become more complex as we age and commonly 
exhibit themes of personal growth, particularly as we integrate important life events into our 
selfhood (McAdams & Olsen, 2010). It is when that personal growth involves the agentic 
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striving to transform oneself into a more virtuous person that ethical self-reformation comes into 
play. 
SOTPs can stimulate and support the process of ethical self-reformation if the participant 
is willing. This transformation of moral selfhood was evident in the self-appraisals that men 
described in this study. Research participants represented a cross-section of time in the 
community, from 30 days post-release to ten years. During the data analysis, four trends in 
participants’ self-appraisals became apparent. It was clear in their narratives that the men went 
through various stages of self-appraisal as part of their moral habilitation. These stages were far 
from being linear, progressive, and discrete. Informants would describe setbacks that reignited a 
previous self-appraisal even after they thought they had moved on from that part of their life. 
They also frequently experienced the dissonance of multiple self-appraisals at a time.  
The four clusters of self-appraisal are labeled to reflect informants’ changing experiences 
of selfhood: the Abject Self, the Confused Self, the Developing Self, and the Tautological Self. 
The Abject Self describes the feelings of shame and worthlessness that are typical of convicted 
sexual offenders. In the Confused Self, participants were seen as trying to work out what kind of 
person they must have been to violate another in that manner. The Developing Self encapsulates 
a perspective of continuous growth or self-improvement, or to a lesser degree, having undergone 
some form of transformation due to conviction and/or treatment. Lastly, the Tautological Self 
symbolizes one’s self-acceptance and desire to avoid essentialized labeling or characterization. 
Taken together, participants’ narrations of their selfhoods from conviction to community 
(re)integration are indicative of an evolving self-concept that runs parallel to moral habilitation. 
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5.3.1  The Abject Self: From Shame to Guilt 
Self-abjection occurs when we commit an action that we perceive as a violation to our 
principles and selfhood that consequently elicits a feeling of Otherness to oneself (Miller, 1997). 
Along with the sense of having acted in a contrary manner to our sense of self, self-abjection 
often involves self-directed feelings of disappointment, disgust, derogation, and regret from 
having made the repellent violation. The Abject Self describes a self-appraisal characterized by 
feelings of shame, humiliation, worthlessness, guilt, remorse, and self-disappointment. Observed 
in nearly all interviews, the Abject Self may be seen as the first stage in a broad and general 
trajectory from offence to moral habilitation. Most participants identified some measure of 
experiencing shame and worthlessness that were replaced, in time, by guilt. For a small number 
of participants, those emotions eventually gave way to acceptance. 
Often confused as the same, shame and guilt are similar but distinct affective responses to 
having committed a negative act (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tagney, 1991; 
Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). Guilt is an emotional state that one experiences 
following the performance of a disapproved behaviour but shame involves the negative global 
assessment of selfhood following engagement in a disapproved act (Tagney, 1991). Shame and 
guilt differ primarily in how individuals interpret and experience the instigating events (Tangney, 
Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), a finding that suggests that feelings of shame might be 
transformed into feelings of guilt as the individual re-interprets the cause of the incident to be 
“bad behaviour” instead of being a “bad person”; however, research has so far been silent on this 
point.  
Even though shame and guilt are phenomenologically distinct emotional experiences, 
they can be instigated by similar situations because proneness to guilt or shame is thought to be 
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partly an attributional style that composes a portion of one’s personality (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). A clear way to differentiate between shame and guilt is to look at the attribution the 
subject makes for his wrong action. Shame is expressed through phrases like, “This wouldn’t 
have happened if I wasn’t such a bad person,” and the guilt-laden person would be more likely to 
say, “If only I hadn’t done that” (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Another means of 
differentiating shame and guilt is to look at the emotion being described. Words such as 
humiliated, depressed, ashamed, and deprecated are more indicative of shame, whereas guilt can 
be identified by feeling reproached, blameworthy, remorseful, repentant, and conscience-stricken 
(Hoblitzelle, 1988).  
The psychological outcomes of shame and guilt are said to differ as well. Guilt may be an 
uncomfortable experience but it does not undermine a person’s daily functioning; shame can be a 
debilitating state since it is accompanied by feelings of worthlessness, low self-esteem, and the 
tendency to withdraw from social interactions (Tangney, 1991, p. 599). As a personality trait, 
proneness to shame is considered a maladaptive response style that undermines agentic capacity 
to interact and cope more effectively (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Shame makes it 
difficult for sexual offenders to show empathy for their victims and make reparations since they 
can become too absorbed in their own negative affect to concern themselves with others 
(Marshall, Marshall, Serran, & O’Brien, 2009ab).  
Self-image and self-esteem are the first casualties of shame. Even for sexual offenders 
who might have started out with a good measure of self-esteem, once they undergo the court 
procedures, conviction, and imprisonment, there is usually little of their original self-esteem left. 
The justice system is the main culprit for this degradation because the entire process from arrest 
to imprisonment focuses entirely on the individual’s sexual offence, frequently pathologizing 
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him as deviant, while omitting any or all references to the positive aspects of his personhood 
(Marshall et al., 2009). Out of all the various effects of stigma on selfhood, shame was especially 
salient in men’s narratives suggesting that it was a powerful presence in their lives. These 
emotions were frequently linked to negative public perception and the sexual offender label. 
Kevin spelled it out quite clearly: 
Something I really have to battle and I’m sure every offender in some way really 
struggles with [is] self-image. Self-image is such a difficult thing to deal with because 
you can’t help but look at yourself as you think other people look at you. 
 
Depression is a pervasive problem for sexual offenders. Like other men, Jason’s 
depression went hand in hand with social withdrawal and shame over his life situation. Telling 
me about a time just before he started “to break out of [his] depression,” Jason said: 
I just completely closed myself off from other people, completely. It got to the point 
where... mom called me. We used to talk every week. She calls [and] says, “Jason, I 
haven’t talked to you in two months. What’s going on?” But I was working nights, which 
really helped me avoid people. That was my whole motto: I hate people. It became my 
mantra because it just seemed like everywhere I turned, I was having such a hard time.  
 
“With people?” I asked. “Yeah,” he clarified. “And that’s probably what happened in... the jobs I 
was getting. It was just crappy jobs [and] there was a few... where I was actually embarrassed to 
be working.” Listening to Jason, I could see that his shame bled into all aspects of his life, 
tainting his self-esteem, and made his moral habilitation into the successful person he was at the 
time of his interview all that much more something to celebrate. “I was cashier at a convenience 
store... and a friend of mine from the church came... in with his friends and, God, when he left I 
was so embarrassed I started crying.” Wondering why this meeting had such a forceful impact, I 
asked Jason why he was so embarrassed. In response he offered, “I think [it was] just [that] my 
life could be more than this.” Even though he describes it as embarrassment, the intensity and 
painfulness of the experience is more indicative of shame (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 
  155 
1996). 
Stigma can be experienced as a bodily sensation (Yang, Kleinman, Link, Phelan, Lee, & 
Good, 2007), suggesting that stigma-induced shame may be similarly felt. I asked Carl if the 
negative public discourses about sexual offenders made him feel different about his self. 
Expecting a more typical response like those that identify self-esteem or self-worth, I was taken 
aback by Carl’s answer. “[They] make me feel dirty, [that] I don’t fit in.” “Feeling dirty” is 
typically thought of as a metaphor but it can also imply an embodied reaction that imbues an 
anxiety-laced sensation of residue or taint upon oneself. Feeling as if he does not fit in aptly 
describes the experience of abjection. His invisible stigma allows him to pass as an included 
member of society until his status as a sexual offender becomes known. Carl had been repeatedly 
cast out by friends and employers, which contributed to a sense of learned helplessness. He had 
given up trying to find work and meaningful friendships. “What’s the use sometimes,” he 
wondered. “When you go into a job situation and you get turned down, it snowballs right back in 
your face again.” 
Shame, guilt, and empathy are all moral emotions although shame is the least productive 
of the three. Shame can impinge moral habilitation by blocking the ability to feel empathy 
toward one’s victim (Marshall, Marshall, & Serran, 2009; Marshall, Marshall, Serran, & 
O’Brien, 2009). The offender may cognitively prevent himself from recognizing the harm he 
caused his victim in order to protect himself from the negative feelings that accompany shame. 
Or, he may become so wrought in his own negative affect that he is too self-focused to be 
capable of empathy. Treatment programs address shame and the subsequent empathy deficits by 
working to improve participants’ sense of self-worth and ability to cope with stressful 
circumstances (Marshall, Marshall, & Serran, 2009). To this end, the primary strategy used in 
  156 
treatment is to emphasize the individual’s positive attributes while reassuring him that his 
offence was just one aspect of his past behaviours (Marshall, Marshall, Serran, et al., 2009; 
Waldram, 2012). This strategy comes not only from the treatment staff but also becomes part of 
the group process. Kevin explained: 
The important thing about group [treatment] is it lets you step outside yourself and view 
yourself as other people see [you]. Your self-image can be so negative, to have the other 
guys say, “Well hang on a second, Kevin. I see you in the kitchen making eggs for so and 
so. That’s not somebody who’s a monster. That’s not somebody who’s evil.” You go, 
“Oh gee thanks. I appreciate that. You’re right.” Those kind of things are extremely 
helpful. 
 
The goal of this strategy is to transition the offender away from the shame of believing his 
offence was a function of being an incorrigibly bad person and into a new understanding of his 
offence as a transitory state in his life that is possible to overcome (Waldram, 2009). In other 
words, SOTPs encourage men to accept that they are good people who made bad mistakes that 
do not have to be repeated. Ethical self-reformation would be an impossible task if sexual 
offenders were convinced of their inability to be anything else. 
This cognitive strategy of differentiating between behaviour and selfhood is readily 
adopted and adhered to by treatment participants. Tanner described his experience of treatment 
having a positive effect upon his self-image. He said, “[The label] doesn’t bug me as much 
[now], but in the past it did. I didn’t like looking at myself in the mirror because that label 
always stuck. Especially going through court.” “How did that change?” I asked. “Going through 
treatment, I realize[d] what I was doing was wrong, but I’m not a monster. I’m just a guy that has 
problems.” Tanner’s experience is a demonstration of the transition from shame into a guilt-
based response concomitant with enhanced self-esteem. Offenders who have overcome their 
shame, ostensibly through (re)acquiring an adequate level of self-esteem in treatment, are now 
capable of moving forward to feel empathy for their victims and to make reparations such as 
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engaging more fully in the treatment process (Marshall, Marshall, Serran, et al., 2009). 
While shame and guilt have been identified as two phenomenologically different 
emotions, there is much less said about the nature of their relationship with one another. The 
forensic literature in particular does not at all address the developmental processes of these two 
emotions. Shame is treated as an obstacle to empathy and guilt a facilitator in a manner that 
suggests a linear process of emotional transformation (i.e. Hanson, 2003; Marshall, Marshall, & 
Serran, 2009; Marshall, Marshall, Serran, et al., 2009). Shame is an affective response that must 
be diminished to make room for empathy. A number of questions are left unanswered regarding 
the relation between shame, guilt, and ethical self-reformation. Can shame and guilt be 
experienced concurrently? Given Tanner’s experience above, guilt does appear to replace shame; 
but what is the nature of this process? The serial nature of Marshall et al.’s model (Marshall, 
Marshall, & Serran, 2009; Marshall, Marshall, Serran, et al., 2009) suggests that shame precludes 
empathy, but it is valuable to ask if empathy and shame can coexist. What sort of dynamic would 
their coexistence present?  
A theory of shame and guilt needs to account for the experience of cognitive-moral 
dissonance, which can confuse the shame-guilt distinction. Even though they are different moral 
emotions, shame and guilt overlap to a large degree making it difficult to discern one from the 
other. The affective component of shame can be manifested as a quick “wince reaction” rather 
than a clear emotion resulting in the appearance of “by-passing” the shame experience directly 
into one of guilt (Lewis, 1971, p. 233). Lewis illustrated that feelings of shame are not always on 
the fore of one’s consciousness so that guilt over not living up to one’s own standards of 
behaviour may actually be the manifested emotion. Where shame is more of an affective state 
developed in relationship to the disapproval of one’s whole self, guilt is a self-initiated and 
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focused, ideational experience (Lewis, 1971). Guilt and shame can alternate as the subject re-
evaluates his or her thoughts and feelings. The two can also become “fused” together in 
situations where guilt is particularly acute (p. 267). Combining Lewis’s phenomenology of guilt 
and shame with the present narratives strongly suggests that there is a temporal element involved 
where the strengthening of ego and self-concept over time lessens shame and replaces it with 
guilt. 
Chris’s sense of shame had deepened by taking the Victim Harm module of treatment and 
learning about the full impact his actions might have had on his victim. Following Marshall, 
Marshall, Serin et al. (2009), Chris should have either become overwhelmed and self-focused in 
his own shameful distress, or he was actually feeling guilt. What he describes experiencing 
though, seems more complicated: 
I took that victim harm part in the program and ever since that I get nightmares. If I 
wasn’t as strong and [didn’t have] the support around me, I’d almost pretty much kill 
myself. Mind you, it [wouldn’t] do much good to do that.... [My actions] destroyed her 
life. I don’t think that there’s enough bad words that I know that I could say about myself 
for how I feel about what I’ve done to her, and to her family... her friends, and their 
community. 
 
Clearly, Chris has learned through treatment how to sympathize with his victim and may be 
learning to empathize as well. Some of his language such as, “[wouldn’t] do much good,” 
suggests guilt in that he is thinking about reparations. But other references like “enough bad 
words” and “piece of shit” below reveal the close relationship between the shame and abjection 
he is still feeling along with his self-stigmatizing identification with the label: 
There’ll be a bunch of women around... and I’ll walk by and I’ll say [to myself], “I’m a 
free man but they don’t know I’m a sex offender.” I’m not ever going to do nothing to 
them but some other guy might. It hurts. Not like I’m ever going to do anything ever 
again.... I just say, “I’m just a piece of shit.” That’s how I feel. And really I’m just a 
horrible person because of what I’ve done.... I have not forgiven myself for what I have 
done.  
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Chris’s sense of guilt and remorse are confirmed in this section. His shame coexists with guilt for 
he fully regrets his actions but cannot yet keep himself from feeling like a “horrible person.” His 
experience exemplifies the Abject Self. Kevin, who had no knowledge of Chris, used almost 
identical language. In reaction to being routinely ostracized from family events that included his 
niece and nephew, he said, “I found myself really depressed and really getting into the whole 
self-hate. ‘Why did I do this? Why am I such a shit?’ I’m a horrible person and if I hadn’t done 
this, [my ostracism] wouldn’t have happened.” In light of these findings, the common acceptance 
that shame inhibits one’s ability to empathize with others needs to be attenuated while further 
investigation regarding the intensity of shame and its impact is warranted.  
One explanation for the coexistence of shame and guilt may involve the separation of the 
cognitive and affective components of shame. Shame is clearly identified as an affective state 
even though it includes cognitive and behavioural aspects (Tangney, 1991). Treatment, typically 
designed with a cognitive-behavioural paradigm in mind, works to get offenders to identify their 
thoughts and emotions so that they can understand how their internal states affect their 
behaviours (Schaffer et al., 2010; Witt et al., 2008). Treatment uses cognitive strategies like the 
separation of behaviour from selfhood to modify offenders’ cognitive patterns so that they can 
accept responsibility for their offences, engage in treatment, and eventually regulate their 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviour. As Kevin articulates his struggle, the cognitive aspect is the 
most malleable and responsive to treatment, whereas the emotional part of the self takes a much 
longer time to adapt to new patterns of being. Explaining his overall impression on his 
community (re)integration experience, Kevin had the following to say: 
The negative stuff I think is more centered around my own issues. Healing myself, 
forgiving myself. There’s a long way to go there and I think a lot of the stuff that I feel as 
far as anxiety is self-inflicted. I understand up here in my mind where I need to go and 
it’s just getting the rest of me there. Conceptually, cognitively, I understand... it’s the 
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emotional part of me and the baggage that I’ve collected over the years that I still have to 
[work on]. 
 
On a cognitive level, Kevin knows what he needs to do to get his life back on track and he can 
tell himself that he deserves to find happiness and feel good about himself but the road to 
implementing change and believing he is a good person despite his actions is much longer. The 
separation of cognitive and affective components is also a characteristic of stigma (Major & 
O’Brien, 2005). 
 The treatment strategy of separating one’s behaviour from the person effectively splits 
shame into its affective and cognitive components. The feeling of “I am a despised person” 
remains while the cognitive appraisal is gradually shifted away from that belief into one that at 
first thinks, “not all of me is bad” to the common statement among participants that, “I’m a good 
person who did a bad thing.” The feeling of shame may subside somewhat but its expected 
resurgence is now managed by the cognitive reinforcement that a bad act does not equate with a 
bad person.  
Chris’s tendency to self-stigmatize meant for him that any time he heard of a sexual 
assault on the news or even entertainment media, he would be reminded of his Abject Self. “It’s 
always in the back of my mind,” he told me. “And the thing is, I can’t get rid of it. Sure I’ll 
forget about it for a while and get distracted, but it comes back. Not the actual event but the fact 
of who I am.” So while Chris could not completely stop the emotional and cognitive fallout from 
his actions, he implements a strategy he learned in treatment that has trained him to begin 
thinking differently about himself in hopes that someday his emotions might follow. Continuing 
his narrative, he explained, “But then I remind myself that I’m not that person anymore. I’m a 
changed person. That was me back then. I made a mistake. I wasn’t well. I’m a much better 
person now.” This quotation may sound familiar because it also exemplified an impression 
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management strategy previously identified as “I’ve changed, I’m Better” in Chapter 4. Returning 
to that claim serves to show how men would blend cognitive strategies learned in treatment with 
other shared discourses, all in attempts to protect or rebuild their damaged selfhoods.  
Recognizing that cognitive changes to the self are easier to follow through on than the 
emotional changes provides a way to understand how shame can slowly be replaced by guilt. The 
intensity of stigma experienced by sexual offenders means that these changes are most likely to 
take place over a protracted period of time, at least for those men who have not numbed 
themselves to their emotions, leaving them incapable of empathy. Experiencing reminders of 
their offences is common and leads to the resurfacing of the Abject Self. Kevin recognized the 
complexity and confusion of affect and cognition, shame and guilt that complicated his self-
image and identity long after his offence: 
There’s constant reminders. I’ll be sitting in a restaurant and see a dad with his son and 
I’ll flash back to my time with my victim. Instantly there’s this regret. Why couldn’t I 
have been a better father? I loved him, how could I hurt him that way? So then I have to 
balance that [and] say, “The whole relationship wasn’t about offending. There were 
many, many, many other aspects to that relationship. 
 
As the various reminders and feelings of stigma diminished over time, so too would feelings of 
shame it seemed.  
The Abject Self represents the combination of shame and guilt that can inhibit or 
stimulate ethical self-reformation, depending on the individual. Stigmatizing public responses 
exacerbate and protract the experience of the Abject Self. This research demonstrates that even 
after completion of a sexual offender treatment program, shame, guilt, and empathy overlap one 
another in a messy, shifting dynamic. If the experiences of some participants are any indication, 
the Abject Self will likely resurface less and less over time to eventually become just another life 
chapter from the past. 
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5.3.2  The Confused Self: Trying to Find the Answer 
In Western society at least, we all experience some form of drive to understand who we 
are as a person. Times of crisis, trauma, and disruption open opportunities to acquire more self-
knowledge if we assert the agency to take advantage of the situation. The Confused Self 
represents who we are in that period of disruption as we strive to understand our motivations, 
behaviours, and goals. The stigma, shame, and guilt of the Abject Self are typically accompanied 
by confusion as the offender struggles to reassess who he now is as a person. The Confused Self 
describes participants’ narratives of a confounded selfhood along with their recognition process 
that self-discovery is a necessary part of further growth. It identifies their attempts to resolve the 
dissonance of having acted in violation to their senses of self. Cognitive dissonance refers to a 
state of discomforting tension that an individual might experience when s/he encounters a 
discrepancy between his or her actions and the person’s identity or self-concept (Festinger, 1957; 
Tavris & Aronson, 2007). For sexual offenders, cognitive dissonance is a moral issue because 
their offences often contradict the belief that they are, or were, essentially a good person. The 
Confused Self is a necessary component to ethical self-reformation that involves the critical self-
reflection required to come to terms with one’s harmful actions and commit to self-improvement. 
The psychological impact of becoming a sexual offender appeared to be particularly 
harsh for the first-time offenders in this research. Their narratives of community responses and 
social interactions seemed more focused on describing the dramatic shock and disbelief they felt 
about their convictions than did the repeat offenders in this research. Now labeled as sexual 
offenders, the men with only single convictions had found themselves in situations that they had 
never anticipated. Sometimes, participants with multiple offences re-experienced that shock 
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through occurrences during subsequent prison terms and treatment. Shane aptly identifies how 
going to prison resituated his self-concept:  
Getting beat up in prison by someone... who’s a crap criminal just like everyone else in 
there, just because of what my offence happened to have been, that’s a pretty crappy 
moment when you realize that you’re so low down that even the bottom feeders think that 
you’re a bottom feeder. It sort of gives you a whole different impression of who you 
might be. 
 
When I asked Shane who he was as a person, it made sense that there was uncertainty in his 
response. “I don’t know,” he said. “Honestly, I like to think of everyone as being in the same 
boat.... We’re all just broken people trying to fix what’s broken and find what’ll make us whole.” 
Shane explained that he did not have a strong identity tied to a familial role or a career and when 
he finally did describe how he views himself, his answer gave the impression of being embedded 
with his ongoing struggle with mental health:  “I kind of see myself as just someone who’s trying 
to find the answer.... You know, trying to find a reason to get up in the morning that I can care 
about.” 
Cognitive dissonance theory explains how people use various cognitive strategies such as 
self-justification, distortion, and denial in order to preserve one’s sense that s/he consistently acts 
in ways that are competent and respectable (Aronson, 1992; Festinger, 1957). Conviction, 
imprisonment, treatment, and the stigma of being identified as a sexual offender all disrupt those 
cognitive mechanisms that stabilize and reinforce an offender’s sense of self, however precarious 
it might be. Kevin described how he, “Always had a fairly good opinion about myself, [a] fairly 
good self-image.” Part of his struggle was the feeling that he had disappointed so many people 
that he cared about. Since his conviction, he had difficulty reconciling the kind of person he 
thought himself to be and the person who hurt someone he cared for. He no longer had the same 
self-image that he did prior to getting caught for his offence: “It’s a bit more like a Picasso now. 
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There’s pieces everywhere and some make sense and some don’t.” It was not that he was 
completely at ease with his offending behaviours prior to his arrest; rather, the doubts and 
negative affect of his dissonant self were being managed by cognitive, self-defensive strategies, 
what forensic treatment labels “cognitive distortions.” Now that he had been convicted and 
publicly denounced, his only recourse was to rely upon impression management techniques.  
The Confused Self can affect multiple facets of one’s life. Regan’s sense of mastery and 
his identity as a respected businessman had disintegrated with his offence. “I seemed to help a lot 
of people,” he described of his past. “But now I feel that I’m not even in any position to be of 
help.... Look what I’ve done.” Regan’s confidence in himself had obviously been shaken: “I 
guess basically what I’m saying is... I thought I was a person that could help [others]... but yet I 
couldn’t even... help myself.” I pointed out to Regan that there seemed to be a contradiction in 
how he viewed himself now. “Yeah, exactly. I always thought I was a leader.... I did some 
incredible stuff and yet here I sit.” Regan hoped to recover his life along with his status in the 
community as a respected entrepreneur but the thought of having to start his life all over again in 
his mid 60s had disabled his motivation to do so. Uncertainty and self-doubt of one’s identity, 
selfhood, and future direction were common emotions experienced by the Confused Self. 
Stigmatizing discourses disseminate pervasive messages that are difficult to resist, even 
for otherwise confident and critically thinking men. Even Shane, who pretty much challenged 
everything about culture and society, had difficulty with mainstream discourses about his 
selfhood. I asked Shane if the sexual offender label changed the way he thought about himself 
and despite just vociferously arguing against the validity of the label, he conceded, “Well sure. 
It’s hard to go against the majority.” Shane spelled out how self-doubt took hold in his mind. “If 
they’re all choosing to categorize you that way, maybe there’s a reason? Then you get thinking, 
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‘Well, why would they all choose to categorize me this way? Maybe I should categorize myself 
this way?’” He attributed his loss of confidence to getting stuck into the “mob thinking” that is 
perpetuated by majority society.  
The undercurrent to the Confused Self involves morality, ethical self-reformation, and 
essentially how informants defined what it means to be a good person. Kevin’s quotation from 
the previous section where he wondered about being a better father, “I loved him; how could I 
hurt him that way,” exemplified not only the transformation from shame to guilt but also the 
cognitive dissonance he experienced as his identity as a stepfather fell apart. There is a moral 
element to cognitive dissonance in that people are motivated to maintain the belief that they are a 
good person (Aronson, 1992); but the present research indicates that another, more specific form 
of dissonance is at work. While the majority of research participants indicated that they 
considered themselves to be a “good person,” by accepting responsibility for their crimes they 
were confronted with evidence that they were assuredly not the kind of good person they had 
originally thought themselves to be. Where dissonance theory identifies cognitive strategies such 
as denial or minimization to deal with cognitive dissonance, participants had learned in treatment 
that these strategies are cognitive distortions and instead relied upon impression management 
techniques to moderate others’ reactions. Consequently, men experienced a conscious moral 
dissonance that, while similar to ethical demand (Zigon, 2007), is focused primarily on one’s 
sense of moral selfhood, not ethical decision making. Questions about their moral worth as 
human beings were commonly raised by research participants, sometimes just as subtle 
statements about self-worth or expressions of feeling like a “horrible person,” and other times 
through narratives of confusion or disbelief for how the individual could do such a thing. 
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Narratives of confused selfhood bore subtle moral implications for most informants. 
Many men expressed some form of essentialized moral selfhood through claims of having 
always been caring or some other marker of inherent goodness. In these situations, participants 
typically explained their offences as acts that were aberrations or out of character for them, a 
common narrative strategy (Presser, 2004). Other men claimed moral selfhood by separating 
their past, offending selves from their present, habilitated selves. In contrast to these 
essentialized versions of moral personhood to which most men adhered, Shane indicated a more 
nuanced take on morality that vividly rendered the moral, cognitive, and emotional disarray that 
characterizes the Confused Self. Shane’s narrative was prefaced by his perception of what it 
means to be a good person: “I don’t think anyone’s capable of being good ‘cause everyone is 
going to do something wrong and I don’t think it’s possible for everyone to be bad because 
everyone has got some goodness in them.” I forewarned Shane that that my next question was 
going to contradict what he had just told me. “Do you see yourself as a good person,” I asked? 
Shane responded, “I can’t really answer that question because ironically, most of the time I 
don’t... I’m still sort of looking at [myself] with the societal filter.” He then followed up with his 
narrative of struggling to come to terms with his own sense of ethics, morality, and selfhood: 
I know logically that no one’s really good and no one’s really bad, but it’s hard.... Back 
when I was still trying to sort all this out, I would be sitting in church and I’d be singing a 
song... and also sort of watching the six year old girl in the pew in front of me do 
whatever she’s doing with her dress. I’d see that and I’d put the two together in my head. 
I’d think, “Well, God’s gotta like worship but I’m sure he can’t like this other thing.” Do 
they invalidate each other? Does one make him really disappointed and the other one sort 
of absolve me? Then you start thinking, “Well maybe none of it’s worth anything, ‘cause 
it’s all tainted….” Maybe I’m just too broken. Maybe the vase is not just shattered but 
ground into dust and you just can’t glue it back together.  
 
In this first half, Shane’s narrative reveals how the Abject Self is entwined with the Confused 
Self. Shane was trying to make sense of his moral selfhood to determine the criteria for being 
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considered a good or a bad person, and into which of the two categories he fell. His Abject Self 
tainted his entire being, at times overriding his attempts to feel hope and confidence for the 
future. His confusion becomes even more apparent in the second half of his narrative: 
It’s easy to get into that mentality and it’s safe because you remember it from all the 
other times you felt like crap. But it doesn’t make it real either. It just makes it harder the 
next time to believe in yourself and when no one else is believing in you... then their 
actions are half justified. Like I sit down in the pew and the guy picks up his daughter 
and moves her over to the other side of me. Part of me resents that you did that cause if 
you left her there, it might have give me hope, but part of me thinks that maybe you 
should have done that ‘cause maybe I would have looked at her funny or something.... 
And then your brain goes like fifteen directions at once and you don’t know who you are 
anymore. So I don’t know. Am I the guy who was looking at her or am I the guy who’s 
singing the worship song? They’re two different people, kind of, ‘cause they’re two 
different ideologies and they’re about as separate from each other as humanly possible. 
So to be both... what does that mean? I’m not acting on anything inappropriate. So does 
that mean that I’m really a good person ‘cause despite that attraction, I’m putting more 
effort into not being that. Does your choice and effort make you who you are, or is who 
you are inherit[ed]? Because I see that girl and I’m attracted, does that make me a bad 
person? Or am I a good person because I choose to live otherwise despite that?  
 
The narrative self is composed of multiple stories that represent different facets of the individual 
so he or she is not defined by a single story. At times, Shane seemed to ascribe to the 
characteristics of narrative selfhood, but yet struggled considering the powerful impression 
enforced in public and institutional discourses. Shane spoke of irony that identified the 
contradiction between his logic-based cognitions and beliefs, and his emotionally driven 
thoughts about himself. He was experiencing a state where two parts of him were diametrically 
opposed and there were no easy answers for how he could resolve this fractured sense of 
selfhood. Shane identified the power of the Abject Self while denying its ontological facticity: “it 
doesn’t make it real either.” Despite intellectually disputing the Abject Self, his efforts to be a 
good person felt thwarted when he was treated as the person he does not want to be. His will and 
confidence to work on his ethical self-reformation was set back as he confusedly vacillated 
between essentialized categories of good and bad. Yet at other times, Shane did adopt the 
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language of narrative selfhood where who he was fluidly changed from situation to situation, and 
he refused to be defined by his offences. The Confused Self ultimately is a hall of mirrors where 
self-representations shift, become distorted, and distract the subject from finding a suitable 
pathway out of his moral-cognitive dissonance. It is a space of flux where notions of morality 
and selfhood are challenged until resolution is found. 
5.3.3  The Developing Self: Working on a Better Person 
The Developing Self identifies participants’ sense of their current selfhood as just one 
phase in their ongoing growth and self-improvement. The perspective of a Developing Self 
emerges through one’s resolution of his Confused Self as he begins to view his problems as 
opportunities for growth. Typically, this selfhood was expressed in relation to men’s goals and 
their desired future selves meaning that the Developing Self is largely defined by the temporal 
aspects of self that compare the current “me” to the old and future possible versions of “me” 
(McConnell, 2011). Furthermore, the Developing Self often encompassed a commitment to 
working on the self (Zigon, 2011). The Developing Self was unique from the Abjected and 
Confused Selves for while the latter were observed in the narratives of nearly all participants, 
only the more agentic men described their selfhoods in terms of the former. 
The chronology of these first three selves was evident in Jason’s narration of his present 
self. Jason described his Abjected and Confused Selves from his past to situate his present, 
Developing Self. He explained, “I always thought that I was happy until I went through the jail 
system and discovered who I was up to then. [I] realized that it was just a happy face covering a 
whole bunch of crap.” Jason continued by defining his present self through his intention to obtain 
the goals that he had for his desired future self. “I’ve just been working towards a place where I 
can just feel good about myself and just be like everybody else,” he stated. Being like everybody 
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else for him meant to, “Feel good about their job, feel good about their life, feel good about 
work, and everything else.” Jason’s goal was to have what Zigon (2011) identified as a “normal 
life” where the desired ideal is to live between the extremes of poverty and wealth while 
maintaining a life of responsibility and law abidance. Accordingly, Zigon defined normal 
persons as responsibilized subjects who are self-regulating and adhere to a moral code by 
limiting certain behaviours, emotions, thoughts, and relations. The Developing Self is the 
acquired subjectivity of being a responsibilized subject. 
 This subjectivity has two defining qualities. First, the Developing Self is a self-concept 
that is based upon progressive, ongoing growth, and is enabled by habitual self-reformation. 
Participants who exhibited this pattern held forward-looking orientations combined with images 
regarding the kind of person they would like to become. Kevin, for example, explained that, 
“I’ve only been in treatment for a few years. This is going to be a life long project.... I’m not 
building a house that’s going to be finished one day.” Chris viewed himself as being in “a state 
of change” where, “I’m really trying to work on who I am and... a lot of the problems that I’ve 
had in the past.” Chris, Kevin, and other men spoke of “working on the self” in a manner that 
suggests that they are a “self in progress” with an evolving personhood, thus exemplifying the 
changing nature of selfhood. “Working on the self” is a labour of one’s will to “enact an internal 
transformation of the self so as to allow for the fulfillment of certain socially and morally 
expected behaviours” (Zigon, 2011, p. 110). SOTPs can elicit a new self-awareness and 
subjectivity in willing participants that creates the foundation for moral habilitation via working 
on the self.  
 The second quality of the Developing Self is that it is directed by moral valuations of 
worth that inform one’s transformation. When Chris spoke of working on his self, he elaborated 
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upon what that meant for him: “I’m working for a better person, more well rounded and happy, 
and more satisfied [but] not in the unhealthy way. You know, not in the temporary satisfaction 
way.” Chris’s words echoed Taylor’s (1985) articulation of agency that places higher moral 
value on the decision to pursue long-term contentment over immediate, but potentially 
counterproductive, satisfaction. In Chris’s example, it was more virtuous to deny or delay one’s 
immediate gratification in order to achieve the more valuable goals of a responsibilized subject. 
The moral influence of Mel’s ethical self-reformation was explicit. Mel was a Caucasian man on 
parole after having served the institutional portion of a life sentence. Although he had never been 
convicted of a sexual offence, he took a SOTP because he saw it as beneficial to some of his 
previous life patterns. When I asked him about the kind of person he would like to be in the 
future, he quickly replied, “I’d like to be more like Jesus.” I followed up on his reasoning. “Well 
that’s part of my spiritual thing,” Mel responded. “To be more like him. To be more loving, more 
caring, not... caught up in this materialistic, squash everybody, and walk over people for the 
buck” kind of society. “How is that different from the kind of the person you are now,” I asked? 
“Well it’s a growing process, growing and learning each day,” Mel replied. He went on to 
describe how his favourite author of self-help books prescribed learning, loving, and laughing for 
a fulfilled life.   
Instead of explicitly adopting an attitude of life-long work on the self, quite a few 
participants took the perspective of having undergone a transformation from an old to a new self, 
as if they had made all of the changes they felt necessary to their lives. They directly linked 
beneficial changes within their selves to their prison or treatment experiences and frequently 
narrated their development in the language of an old and new self. Their desired future selves 
were limited to achieving the markers of a normal life. For example, Mathieu viewed himself as 
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“more social, more positive, [and] not as materialistic as before.” The social interactions of his 
old self were all computer-based and took place in the virtual world with a fictional online 
identity. “It was fake stuff,” he said. Mathieu’s transformation now included regular in-person 
social activities with friends from his support group. He claimed, “I prefer [real] life.... It’s more 
fun being me now than I used to be.” When it came to their desired future selves, many of these 
men expressed contentment with who they were in the present, rather than seeing their selves as 
Shane put it, “a little version” of his future self. 
Consequently, there are two variations of the Developing Self. The first takes a more 
future-oriented perspective on one’s ongoing, continuous growth throughout his or her life. The 
second variation is more present-oriented and views the self as having achieved the level of self-
reformation desired by the subject. The difference between these perspectives may be attributed 
to two factors. Three men who expressed selfhoods of ongoing moral striving – Chris, Shane, 
and Mel – identified fairly strongly with Christianity. As for Kevin, he problematized his 
personhood as having a “deviant sexuality” to which he referred several times and expected to be 
a lifelong problem. These very different influences seemed to make the notion of ongoing self-
work highly salient.  
The Developing Self also identified small but significant changes for some participants. 
Todd and Dennis, both of whom had intellectual disabilities, experienced improvements to their 
self-esteem following completion of their most recent treatment programs. Both men had long 
histories of sexual offending and had attended treatment programs more than once. Todd’s sense 
of self-esteem came from meeting people who appreciated his company, which substantiates the 
value of positive human contact for theories of a relational self (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Tice & 
Baumeister, 2001).“Nobody has ever liked me that much,” Todd admitted. During and after his 
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treatment, “all these people [were] telling me what a good guy I am and I’m thinking to myself, 
‘They can’t all be wrong or lying.’ So yeah, I see myself totally different from before I went to 
treatment.” Having someone compliment him “was totally new” for Todd. Both he and Dennis 
experienced improved self-concepts by developing the sense of mastery and pride in learning to 
self-regulate their thoughts and behaviours to avoid high-risk situations. “For [a] long time I 
always thought... I was no good for nothing,” Dennis said. He had difficulty articulating how he 
felt differently about himself and was only able to allude that he was more empowered to avoid 
problematic situations.  
Not all development is progressive and the changes wrought through moral habilitation 
become highlighted when the Developing Self is contrasted with more regressive goal patterns. 
A small minority of participants desired to reclaim what they had lost with their sexual offence, 
which in itself is understandable when it comes to financial security, the respect of others, and 
self-esteem. However, Carl claimed that his past, present, and desired future self were all the 
same. “I really haven’t changed. I still help people, I [am] still very kind hearted, [and] willing to 
listen.... The only thing I have changed is to not be around kids as much anymore....  I’d still like 
to be a father again. That’s one thing I miss [and] if I do get remarried, I’d like to have one more 
kid.” Carl ascribed to an essentialized view of a core, stable, inner selfhood that problematized 
his ability to adapt to change. While some men have a progressive selfhood and talk about 
change and growth, Carl’s selfhood can be described as regressive in his desire to return to his 
previous state, largely I suspected because the role of “good father” is one of the few sources of 
self-esteem and identity that sustained him. His loss of this role explained why his desired future 
self was regressive and emulated what for him was a romanticized version of this previously 
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“happy” time in his life. Carl’s regression combined with his trouble with moving on 
demonstrated the importance of having multiple positive identities. 
5.3.4  The Tautological Self: I Am Who I Am 
The influence of Western individualism can be witnessed in how we choose to define 
ourselves. The most common means of self-definition we use involves individual characteristics 
such as our behaviour in certain situations, relationships and social roles, personal qualities, and 
goals for the future (McConnell, 2011). When asked to define themselves, people choose self-
categorizations and identities that are salient to them (Hogg, 2003). Where most participants 
chose to identify themselves through such individual characteristics, over one third of them were 
reluctant to define their selves in specific terms. The Tautological Self refers to a state of self-
acceptance where participants avoided the essentializing of selfhood by declining to characterize 
themselves in any one particular way.  
The Tautological Self was expressed primarily through two phrases: “I am who I am” and 
“I’m me.” Interviewing Jason, I asked, “Who are you?” “I’m me,” he quickly replied. “I hate that 
question. I really do because what do you want to hear? There’s so many different things and 
I’ve been asked that in job interviews and stuff. I hate that question,” he laughed. “I am who I 
am. I used to come up with things to say to that but I don’t know if I’m just getting into my old 
age or what, but, I am who I am.” Similarly, Todd had just finished telling me how being labeled 
as a sexual offender had influenced his behaviour and interactions with other people. Asking if it 
made him feel different about himself, he responded, “Nope. The way I see it, I am who I am.” 
Todd’s situation was different given his intellectual disability. His disability combined with the 
onset of sexual offending behaviour at the age of 13 possibly culminated in the normalization of 
stigma in his life. The stigma of his adult offences did not change his self-concept nearly as 
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much as his experiences of having other people compliment him in treatment. He fully accepted 
his selfhood, deviance and all. Todd’s biggest motivator of his behaviour was maintaining the 
respect of others. The main implication is that the Tautological Self cannot always be seen as 
some endpoint of psychological growth, especially without taking into consideration the global 
factors contributing to one’s personhood.  
Mel’s portrayal of the Tautological Self was somewhat unique but reveals more in the 
way of its meaning. In response to my query about who he was, Mel parried, “I’m that little 
green man with a spaceship.” Quickly laughing that he was just kidding, he followed with a more 
serious response. “Who are you,” Mel repeats. “I am who God made me.” At my prompting, he 
went on to describe the personal characteristics through which he viewed his life, but those were 
less telling than his original reaction. Like the other men who narrated a Tautological Self, he 
resisted the idea that his selfhood could be defined through a simple description and chose 
instead to offer an evasive circular response. His first reaction was made in jest but may very 
well be symbolic of a sense that his life experiences had been so atypical, or alien, that any 
attempt to pin down his selfhood was farcical for him. Evan provided a similar sentiment 
regarding his life experiences and the strength he derived from them: “An average [person]... 
couldn't compete with you because of all you've been through.... They couldn't comprehend it 
because there's just too much.” 
Mel’s second faith-based response also signified an evasion but moreover, it indicated a 
self-acceptance and fortitude that was less apparent in other men’s responses. When I asked how 
his self-concept was different now from the past, he answered, “I see myself as having value and 
worth and meaning, something that was never there when I was younger.” Self-acceptance 
comes not only from faith but also from pride in success and mastery. Jason had internalized his 
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treatment and was proud that he had never considered reoffending in the ten years since. For 
him, the success of overcoming what previously appeared an insurmountable obstacle became a 
source of confidence and self-esteem.  
Another possible reason for sexual offenders to express the Tautological Self may be 
their desire to step away from a stigmatized history. For some, a significant portion of their lives 
were spent in prison, as compared to someone else who will spend years in higher education or 
pursuing a particular occupational pathway. Their lives are more likely to have fewer positive 
identifiers with which to project a valued social status, especially now that their sexual offences 
have tainted their other identities. Participants seemed to experience a sort of “fading 
permanence” regarding their label. With their Abject Selves, men’s offences were an indelible 
blemish on their identities, but as time went on, their stigma gradually shifted lower on the 
salience hierarchy until their offences were no longer a major part of their lives (Stryker & 
Serpe, 1982). The expression “I am who I am” assertively established to others their self-
acceptance despite an undesirable history and a devalued identity. Furthermore, the Tautological 
Self projects an air of confidence that does not rely upon the validation of others.  
Social categorization is a person’s way of becoming part of an in-group but identification 
with that group contributes to depersonalization as the individual conforms to the group norms 
(Hogg, 2003). The reluctance of some sexual offenders to socially categorize themselves may 
further be a response to the deindividuation, classification, labeling, and even dehumanization 
imposed upon them throughout their interactions with the criminal justice system. Refusing to 
classify themselves in conventional terms is a means of resistance and self-determination that 
was largely denied to them during incarceration and parole. It may also be a reaction to 
participants’ subjection to the stigmatizing and essentializing sexual offender label. The 
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Tautological Self represents an acceptance of one’s life trajectory for all its good and bad times, 
but it goes further to involve more than just self-acceptance. The Tautological Self entails 
resisting an essentialized, determinant selfhood while embracing the flexibility of one’s being. 
As the subject moves on with his life, the label becomes less and less meaningful while his past 
experiences are viewed as being just one of several narratives that have formed who he is now.  
5.4  Conclusion 
Narrative identities are formed when a person “envision[s] his or her entire life – the past 
reconstructed and the future imagined – as a story that portrays a meaningful sequence of life 
events to explain how the person has developed into who he or she is now and may develop into 
who he or she may be in the future” (McAdams & Olsen, 2010, p. 528). Along that sequence, 
people make appraisals about their present sense of selfhood that are formed in relation to their 
past selves, desired future self, and the ideal qualities of personhood that are deemed of value 
within the cultural context. The Abject, Confused, Developing, and Tautological Selves 
represent the self-appraisals sexual offenders made as they transitioned from dysfunction to 
improved wellbeing. These different selfhoods would overlap and become more or less salient 
depending on the individual’s current situation. Still, there appeared to be a general trajectory for 
these selfhoods in that the Abject Self was narrated typically in the retrospective context of 
incarceration and early-stage community (re)integration, whereas the Tautological Self was 
derived from declarations of greater self-knowledge in the present and acceptance of events in a 
more distant past.  
The impact of stigma decreased along the same trajectory. Narratives involving self-
stigma were most prevalent in the Abject and Confused Selves through feelings of shame, guilt, 
and cognitive dissonance. The Developing Self can be seen as emerging despite the stigma men 
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would experience. As for the Tautological Self, stigma was a phenomenon of little consequence. 
Hence, this research demonstrates that stigma is an instrument of moral regulation. Public shame 
brings about disciplining activity from other people like expressions of contempt and disgust that 
can also be shared by the subject (Miller, 1997). The internalization of the shame brought on by 
stigma is especially observable with the Abject Self and somewhat less so with the Confused 
Self. Moral regulation entails the deployment of individualizing discourses to subjectivize and 
influence individuals’ ethical self-reformations, often to take responsibility for the harm their 
behaviour poses (Hier, 2008). Men convicted as sexual offenders are subjectivized by the 
classifications, labels, and stigmatizing discourses as punishment for their offences. Ethical self-
reformation involves making oneself a responsibilized subject and engaging in a regimen of self-
work, in this case, the regimen taught in sexual offender treatment programming.  
Selfhood is a continually evolving subjectivity that is influenced through relationships, 
experiences, and self-knowledge, all of which are set within a moral and cultural milieu. The 
four self-appraisals noted in men treated for sexual offences – the Abject, Confused, Developing, 
and Tautological Selves – represent various self-aspects that appear to shift in their salience as 
time passes. Moreover, these self-appraisals can be viewed as subjectivities in one’s trajectory of 
ethical self-reformation. As for stigma, it may be useful as an informal punishment with 
diminishing effects across the moral habilitation process but only for those individuals who are 
psychologically willing and ready to make themselves subjects to the rigid state program of 
treatment.  
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CHAPTER 6: SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT: A MORAL ENTERPRISE________ 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
The sexual violation of another person is a heavily moralized act, and rightly so. 
Moralization is a process of invoking truth-claims about the virtue, or lack thereof, of a particular 
action or idea through the rational engagement of “discourse[s], symbols, [and] actors... to 
generate ways of thinking about oneself and others” (Hier, 2008, p. 181). More active and 
specifically engaged than moralization, moral regulation describes a targeted campaign against a 
moralized behaviour or action that is perceived as harmful to individuals or threatening to the 
moral order of a society (Critcher, 2009; Hunt, 1999, 2003). Moral regulation can take place 
through formal institutional moral discourses or through the more spurious public discourses and 
reactionary behaviours instigated against sexual offenders by an unwelcoming community. 
Treatment programs for sexual offenders operate through moral habilitation, the re-forming of 
individual subjectivities, typically via technologies of the self, so that they conform to the social 
and moral expectations of a society. Moral habilitation acts upon an individual’s moral selfhood 
– that is, one’s sense of being a self-reflecting, principled individual –to activate his or her 
engagement in ethical self-reformation, which is the concerted deployment of technologies of the 
self to effect transformation into a better, more pro-social person. 
The stigma of the sexual offender label is obvious but this study represents to the best of 
my knowledge the first experiential documentation of how stigma affects sexual offenders while 
they are attempting to restart their lives after imprisonment. Furthermore, the moral aspects 
inherent to sexual offender habilitation have only become the topics of qualitative investigation 
in recent years (i.e. Waldram, 2009, 2010, 2012). Moral selfhood, and ethical self-formation in 
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its traditional sense, have both long been subjects of study (Appiah, 2005; Foucault, 1988; Rose, 
1996), but these concepts have not been brought together in the realm of sexual offender 
habilitation and (re)integration until now. I have developed several propositions and conclusions 
during the course of this research that invite new directions for quantitative and qualitative 
researchers to follow. In Chapter 3, I introduced research findings that expand the 
conceptualization of motivation and treatment responsivity. Chapter 4 described the wide-
ranging experiences of stigma that can affect sexual offenders and articulated the different forms 
of moral claims-making and narrative strategies they adopted to resist their stigmatization. In 
Chapter 5, I identified a general trajectory of an evolving self-concept that runs parallel to the 
long process of moral habilitation. 
The objective of this research was to investigate how men convicted of sexual offences 
narrated their transformation from dysfunction into a state of improved wellbeing, and by 
extension into an offence-free lifestyle. Stigma and agency were central theoretical concepts, but 
moral development was always implied as a foundational element in men’s transformations. The 
ubiquity of participant narratives that made reference to becoming a “better person” underscored 
the centrality of morality and moral habilitation to this research. Moral habilitation is initiated 
during sexual offender treatment (Waldram, 2012), but it is also an ongoing process that must be 
maintained well past the individual’s release from prison in order for him to remain offence-free 
in the community. Stigma bears clear influences upon individual agency and moral habilitation 
by motivating sexual offenders to engage in ethical self-reformation, even though this seems to 
be a fine balance since the public notification of one’s label and conviction can also be a 
destabilizing force (Ackerman & Sacks, 2012; Freeman, 2012; Jeglic et al., 2012; Lasher & 
McGrath, 2012; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000).  
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There remain several questions to be answered when taking into consideration the 
multiple sources of stigmatizing and regulating moral discourses to which sexual offenders are 
subject, and how these forces affect their habilitation. Primarily, how might the cultural, social, 
and psychological forces be combined to enhance the way in which we understand the moral 
habilitation of sexual offenders? What is the relation between will or agency and ethical self-
reformation? How does stigma relate to ethical self-reformation as compared to moral 
regulation? Responding to these questions requires a model that will need to bring together the 
sources, variety, and effects of moral discourses and stigma on individual agency and motivation. 
Zigon’s (2008, 2009) tripartite framework of morality discriminates between institutional 
moralities, public moral discourses, and embodied moralities, and therefore provides a 
foundation for modeling the moral habilitation of sexual offenders. Moral regulation theory 
(Critcher, 2009; Dean, 1994; Hier 2011; Hunt, 1997, 1999) explains the connection between the 
different forms of morality and the moral habilitation of individuals. Moreover, Zigon’s (2007) 
theory of moral breakdown can explain the psychological elements of ethical self-reformation as 
sexual offenders are trained to break out of the unreflective behaviour that was their embodied 
(im)morality into the conscious decision-making that characterizes ethical demand. The next 
section brings together these questions along with the ideas developed in previous chapters into 
one overarching theoretical model of moral habilitation in sexual offenders.  
6.2  The Moral Habilitation of Sexual Offenders 
 Moral habilitation is an enterprise that involves the coercive forces of social control and 
stigmatizing punishment, the persuasive forces of prescribed moral regulation to encourage the 
seeking of a better life, and the agentic will to make it happen. The “enterprising individual,” is a 
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discourse that exemplifies the assumption that moral selfhood entails the aspiration and pursuit 
of self-enhancement and personal fulfillment (Rose, 1996). Rose writes: 
The self is to be a subjective being, it is to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal 
fulfillment in its earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of 
individual responsibility, it is to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts 
of choice. (p. 151) 
 
The ideology of enterprising individuals is underwritten by neoliberal influences that over the 
past several decades have shifted focus even further onto individuals as responsibilized subjects, 
so that people are constructed as independent, sovereign subjects who are culpable for their life 
outcomes (Zigon, 2011). The ideology of the sovereign subject, or having free and independent 
will, is a falsehood that promotes the illusion of independence, and the great insight from cultural 
psychology is recognition of the substantive degree to which “cultural traditions and social 
practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche” (Shweder, 1991, p. 73; Taylor, 
2004). As responsibilized subjects, we are expected to be enterprising individuals who exercise 
our autonomy to engage in self-enhancing practices according to the prescribed and legitimated 
moralities of society (Rose, 1996). According to Rose, the enterprising self is an active and 
calculating self, in other words, an agentic self. The illusion of the sovereign subject reinforces 
neoliberal ideology that minimizes the influence and impact of the social forces that affect the 
agentic self. For the sexual offender seeking ethical self-reformation, the loss of hope that change 
is even possible and the sense that no one cares about him are both perpetrated through 
stigmatizing discourses, social ostracism, and failed attempts to seek a different life path. These 
cognitive-emotional states strip the agency and self-determination from the enterprising 
individual. 
 Enterprising individuals engage in what Zigon (2011) described as “working on the self,” 
the active process of self-improvement. Moral habilitation is an intensified, directed form of 
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working on the self. It is the remaking of the individual through the instillation and 
internalization of self-surveillance so that he conforms to an acceptable moral standard. The men 
that became involved in this research wanted to become responsibilized citizens. They wanted to 
get better, be respected, and live autonomous, productive lives. Even though not all of them 
remained offence free after we met, all of them were motivated to make changes so that they 
could have a “better life.” They may have started off as non-enterprising individuals, but the 
majority of participants became enterprising ones through the coercive guidance of treatment. 
6.2.1  Ethical Self-Reformation 
 Moral habilitation is in effect the desired goal of SOTPs but it may take many years to 
achieve the state of embodied morality that is its hallmark. The process of becoming morally 
habilitated is an exercise in ethical self-reformation. It is “ethical” because the process is a 
conscious endeavor that exists between the previous unacceptable embodied morality that 
enabled the sexual offences to occur and the new pro-social embodied morality that is the desired 
endpoint. Moral habilitation does not occur within a social or cultural vacuum, and so the 
analysis of SOTPs needs to step out of disciplinary isolation and methodological singularity to 
consider how broader moral, social, and cultural forces affect the experiential realities of men 
undergoing this process. Figure 1: The Ethical Self-Reformation Model of Sexual Offender 
Moral Habilitation displays a theoretical model that provides exactly this sort of framework. This 
model brings together the observations and findings from the previous three analytical chapters 
into a cohesive framework grounded upon an anthropological conceptualization of morality 
(Zigon, 2009).  
 The Ethical Self-Reformation (ESR) model that I propose introduces the experiential 
elements of individual agency, motivation, and will to the three dimensions of morality: 
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Figure 1: The Ethical Self-Reformation Model of Sexual Offender Moral Habilitation 
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institutional moralities, public moral discourses, and the development of a new embodied 
morality (Zigon, 2009). Briefly, institutional moralities, such as those promoted through SOTPs, 
combine with public moral discourses to act upon the individual sexual offender’s self-concept 
and personhood. These two moral forms also have an effect upon the individual’s senses and 
experiences of agency, motivation, and will. Ethical self-reformation takes place in the dynamic 
interaction of the ethical demand that is driven by treatment, and the stigma and synopticism that 
emerge from public moral discourses. Moreover, ethical self-reformation describes the informal 
monitoring and moderating of one’s own conduct (Critcher, 2009) that is sometimes referred to 
collectively as technologies of the self (Foucault, 1978, 1988; Rose, 1996). It is the main activity 
of enterprising individuals in their quest for self-improvement and their deliberate pursuit of a 
more virtuous future. Moral habilitation is the eventual internalization and embodiment of the 
new morality practiced during ethical self-reformation. 
6.2.2  Institutional Moralities and Public Moral Discourses 
 Institutional moralities are propagated through formal organizations that are recognized 
for the authority they convey in society (Zigon, 2009). These moralities directly legislate, orate, 
and enforce the dominant normative ethics of society. Most of the institutional moralities 
affecting sexual offenders are available to all citizens: taboos against sexual relations with 
children, religious edicts about sexual behaviour and the treatment of others, the principle of free 
will to give or withhold consent for sexual activities, and the criminal code of law. The criminal 
justice system represents another institutional morality, as does the specialized, scientific 
discourse created by forensic psychology. The criminal justice system explicitly defines 
gradations of morality through the laying of judgment on all offences. The institutional morality 
of forensic psychology is much more implicit. It defines sexual offenders in terms of pathologies 
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while actuarial assessments construct individuals as levels of risk or probabilities to reoffend, all 
of which are practices that in effect place individuals on a continuum from most to least moral. 
SOTPs are sources of direct moralization for it is their job to instill a new pro-social morality 
compatible with social expectations. The nature of this induction to a new morality takes the 
form of governmentality whereby an institutional authority manipulates the individual with 
morally regulating discourses and practices to form new subjectivities (Dean, 1994; Foucault, 
1977; Lacombe, 2008, 2013; Waldram, 2010, 2012).  
 Where institutional moralities became evident in this research was in the way they were 
described retrospectively by the men interviewed, and in the way those moralities were enacted 
in community life. Distancing one’s self-worth from his offence(s) to transform shame into guilt 
was one morally imbued strategy that assisted ethical self-reformation. Self-surveillance of 
thoughts, emotions, and one’s physical environment represented the implementation of 
institutional moralities. The self-surveillance trained and expected in SOTPs is an 
institutionalized form of moral breakdown and ethical demand. Ethical self-reformation requires 
the disintegration of the previous dysfunctional embodied morality so that the automatic thoughts 
and responses that supported sexual offending behaviours are brought back into conscious 
awareness. Moral breakdown is this disruption of unthinking, automated embodied morality into 
a state of conscious reflection (Zigon, 2007) that is accomplished when treatment staff challenge 
offenders and designate aspects of their being as pathological or distorted. Moral breakdown 
signals the ethical demand to work through and resolve the dilemma through the most 
appropriate course of action (Zigon, 2007). Following moral breakdown, the new institutional 
morality must be consciously practiced by sexual offenders in each situation that poses an ethical 
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demand until it becomes internalized into the automaticity of embodied morality that is moral 
habilitation.  
Although institutional moralities and public moral discourses are separate entities, they 
exist in dynamic interaction so that at times the two can be reinforcing and at other times 
undermining (Zigon, 2009). Public moral discourses frequently echo institutional moralities 
along with the myriad of popular beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours represented and 
reinforced by citizens. They come from a wide variety of non-institutional sources, from the 
organized, such as media, to the idiosyncratic revealed in art forms, literature, and the private 
sphere of family life (Zigon, 2009). The moral regulation of sexual offenders through 
institutional and public discourses is made possible through the combination of actors who 
subscribe, enforce, and reinforce these messages. Discourses have the power to construct a social 
environment so that it has a regulatory effect on those within it where people monitor their own 
conduct and the conduct of others (Glasbeek, 2006). In contrast to Foucault’s (1975) panoptic 
gaze where the state monitors multiple subjects at once, the synoptic gaze instilled by sexual 
offender discourses entails the surveillance of the singular offender by ubiquitous seen and 
unseen others (Mathiesen, 1997; Waldram, 2012). 
Public discourses have the added effect of stigmatizing sexual offenders, setting them up 
to be ostracized from family, friends, and the greater community. Stigma serves as an informal 
punishment and form of social control to prevent the individual from committing future sexual 
offences. Although stigma was one of several motivating factors for research participants, it can 
potentially backfire to reinforce offending behaviours. The punitive effect of ostracism will often 
motivate subjects to conform and expend efforts to regain even partial social inclusion; but it can 
also result in feelings of frustration and powerlessness that could instigate antisocial or 
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aggressive actions in order to regain recognition or control over a situation (Case & Williams, 
2004). Stigma presents a barrier to overcome throughout the ethical self-reformation process, but 
especially so in the early stages of their community (re)integration. 
Paradoxical to its punishing effect, there is some evidence in this research to suggest that 
stigma can have some benefits to the ethical self-reformation process. Consistent with men’s 
narratives of “hitting rock bottom,” the distress of an unfulfilling, stigmatizing existence can 
motivate their desires for a better life and increase the salience of their future goals. Beginning 
with their community (re)integration, community release notifications from the state and media 
publicity will heighten stigma while instituting a synoptic environment where the sexual offender 
knows any member of the public might observe him at any time. In conjunction with their desire 
to not reoffend, the invisible watchful eye of the synoptic gaze reinforces offenders’ motivation 
to continue their engagement in ethical self-reformation.  
Stigma can also be a motivational force that pushes offenders to seek and work for public 
redemption. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated how in reaction to their stigma, sexual offenders adopt 
a variety of their own moral discourses and impression management strategies to make moral 
claims of a reformed selfhood. Men used these various narratives to convince themselves of their 
moral habilitation as much as they were using them to convince others of the same. The insights 
and self-reflections gained from the lessons and institutional morality of treatment became part 
of the explanatory model they would use to appeal for acceptance by others. Their narratives 
made claims of normality indicating that they had learned from their mistakes and were now 
capable of maintaining boundaries and self-control.  
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6.2.3  Making the Change: Agency, Will, and Motivation 
In the middle of the ESR model, there is a circle that represents the agency, motivation, 
and will of the individual that must resolve the conflicts and expectations of institutional 
moralities and public moral discourses: ethical demand, stigma, and synopticism. Ethical self-
reformation takes place along this interchange.  
The theory of agency described in Chapter 3 is founded in the emergence of reflective 
self-knowledge that arises from a particularly situated context. Agency is central to personhood 
(Martin & Sugarman, 2003) so while we all possess an agentic capacity, not everyone acts upon 
it equally. Given the multiple emotional, mental, and social barriers that obstruct help-seeking 
behaviour, it makes sense that sexual offenders might be more motivated to avoid any 
association with treatment. Participant narratives revealed that, contrary to assumptions of 
recalcitrance, some sexual offenders were highly motivated and capable of directing their agency 
to their ethical self-reformation. Where some men just went along with the treatment activities, 
others invested themselves in every opportunity to understand their past and reform their moral 
selfhoods. Their individual agentic capacities were variably crafted through the institutional 
moralities and public moral discourses along with the support of family, friends, Circle of 
Support and Accountability (COSA) members, psychiatrists, and other treatment providers. 
Under some of these influences and in reaction to others, the meaning of their offences changed 
and became embedded in a newly emerging value system.  
Motivation is a vital component to treatment responsivity and ethical self-reformation. 
Learning how an individual offender is motivated to participate in or resist treatment will help to 
tailor the program to his specific characteristics and psychosocial needs. Instead of viewing 
sexual offenders as unmotivated for treatment, it would be advantageous to reconfigure the 
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perspective to consider the other motivations that are competing with or hindering men’s 
willingness to fully engage in treatment. While those men who displayed strong indications of 
agency in their narratives described treatment as an opportunity to get better, most participants 
started their treatment programs only after some form of coercion. The majority of the men from 
this latter group eventually came to identify with various aspects of ethical self-reformation as 
the program continued. Being highly motivated in treatment does not mean that the individual is 
intrinsically motivated. Men described little pleasure regarding their participation in treatment, 
but they were highly invested in their transformations and therefore viewed treatment as a means 
to an end. Their ethical self-reformation was guided by the desire to live the “normal life” of 
responsibilized subjects (Zigon, 2011). Keep in mind that these findings were derived from men 
who were successful in completing their treatment programs. Future research should investigate 
these subjective experiences with men who refuse treatment or are unable to complete their 
program.  
Reframing motivation from how it has conventionally been theorized in responsivity 
research would be especially beneficial for addressing the reluctance that many Aboriginal men 
might experience. The unique history of Aboriginal peoples with colonization, residential 
schools, and structural discrimination has ruptured cultural relations so that many Aboriginal 
men have little to no trust of or in the criminal justice system. Further, there is a disconnect 
between the therapeutic modalities of traditional Aboriginal healing and mainstream, Euro-
Canadian treatment programs (Waldram et al., 2008). As described by research participants, this 
disjuncture was lived out in treatment as an erosion of trust that inhibited treatment engagement. 
Even the one participant who attended a healing lodge identified the overarching bureaucratic 
structure of it as inhibitive of trust and traditional protocol. In this context, the appearance of 
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“lacking motivation” needs to be more accurately recognized as the motivation to protect oneself 
against an outside threat. 
Will is imperative for ethical self-reformation. Part of men’s will to change was derived 
from the gradual subjugation to the governmentality of institutional moralities; but they had to 
arrive at a point where they internalized the need to commit to their transformation. The sense of 
ownership and goal-directedness of will to become morally habilitated were described as being 
derived from men’s individual motivations, and the desire to obtain their goals assisted in 
maintaining a focused effort (Throop, 2010). Motivation is an active form of willing; it is an 
orientation of directed intentionality from an agent that is channeled toward a particular course of 
action (Mattingly, 2010). Drawing from Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy that uses the phrase 
“moral pilgrims” to situate human agents as if on a journey of moral selfhood, Mattingly places 
moral willing as a narrative re-envisioning of a self that is continuously evolving. Treatment 
combined with the normative expectations for what constitutes a desirable life seemed to provide 
men with images of a possible future self. Like working on the self, moral willing is part of the 
self-sustained transformation into a better, more resilient person. The will to change is not a one-
time decision and instead requires the ongoing envisioning of one’s goals in order to consistently 
work on the self. Commonly, research participants identified an instigating event that solidified 
their position that life changes were needed. They formed a determined mindset to work on the 
self with the vision of a more fulfilling and crime-free life as a better person. This vision 
maintained their motivation as long as they did not experience any competing motivations that 
would inhibit their treatment engagement.  
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6.2.4  Moral Habilitation 
Moral habilitation is the hoped for result of SOTPs as indicated in the ESR model. 
Ethical self-reformation and moral habilitation involve the directed manipulation of subjectivities 
with the aim of instilling a standard of conduct that will eventually become internalized and 
unreflectively enacted as an embodied morality. Entry into the criminal justice system radically 
alters one’s subject position. The sexual offender becomes bound to multiple discourses that 
variably construct him as a deviant, a pathology or mental illness, a risk level, a collection of 
treatment needs, and a burden to society. Although treatment involves coercion and demands a 
loss of autonomy, it is also an opportunity to accept subjugation in hopes of eventual renewal 
and recommencement of a respectable life back in broader society. The compliant sexual 
offender is the one who accepts the temporary loss of autonomy in treatment by becoming a 
docile body to be molded by institutional discourses and practices (Foucault, 1975).  
Institutional ethnographies of SOTPs have criticized moral habilitation and its 
subjugation of sexual offenders to governmentality for its limitations and potential harms 
(Lacombe, 2008, 2013; Waldram, 2007, 2010, 2012). The enterprise of moral habilitation that 
Waldram’s ethnography developed involves the pathologization of offenders’ life and offence 
narratives as instances of minimization, denial, and cognitive distortions that are replaced by an 
institutional narrative constructed through group processes and guided facilitation. Consequently, 
the men in treatment no longer connected with these confabulated stories in a therapeutically 
meaningful way (Waldram, 2010, 2012). Success in treatment translates into subjugation to the 
process and adoption of this new narrative. Similarly, Lacombe (2008, 2013) contended that the 
use of technologies of the self such as self-policing and the confession of deviant fantasies in 
treatment may construct an essentialized criminal identity whereby the offender is trained to see 
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himself as deviant and constantly at risk to reoffend. These two ethnographies both suggest that 
the institutional moralities projected in SOTPs are less about therapeutic value and psychological 
transformation for the offender, than they are about mechanically managing risk.  
In the present research, there were some indications from participants that treatment held 
limited therapeutic value for them but a greater proportion subscribed to the regimen of moral 
habilitation by engaging in treatment discourses and describing their own experiences of self-
policing. I suspect that had I observed a treatment program, I would have made observations and 
encountered more men that provided a critical perspective. As it was, this study recruited men 
who were willing to speak about their experiences and who were then asked to construct 
retrospective narratives of events that occurred anywhere from 30 days to ten years in the past. 
These circumstances are likely to have contributed to the more positive appraisal of moral 
habilitation in this research than in previous work (i.e. Lacombe, 2008, 2013; Waldram, 2010, 
2012). 
The remaking of an offender’s subjectivity into a morally habilitated state entails the 
narrative reframing of a deviant past combined with the willful self-monitoring and hyper-
vigilance of a new way of thinking and acting within their social worlds. This new subjectivity is 
that of the responsibilized subject who is capable of determining the consequences of his actions 
prior to following through on them, and who is capable of conducting his life in a manner 
consistent with the norms, expectations, and general morals represented within society. Moral 
habilitation does not occur within a social vacuum and it is essential to remember that the 
formation of new subjectivities must occur in a cultural milieu that denies the possibility that 
such changes are possible. In this context, sexual offenders frequently challenge the relevance of 
their treatment lessons, particularly in pro-social communication, recognizing that society itself 
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is “unruly” and will not reciprocate the same respect (Waldram, 2012). These tensions are 
manifested in the four selves of ethical self-reformation described in Chapter 5 that represent 
participants’ transforming subjectivities as they evolve from the first experiences of stigma and 
shame to self-acceptance.  
6.3  Discussion and Implications 
Moral regulation and governmentality are the pivotal mechanisms through which moral 
habilitation can occur. Moral regulation combines moral imperatives with politics and political 
developments: “The state appears not simply as a mechanism of repression, but also as a means 
by which subjectivities are constituted” (Glasbeek, 2006, p. 4). Governmentality, originally 
conceptualized as a function of state subjectification, now extends into civil society and the 
general public through moralizing discourses that collectively construct the standards for the 
ethical self-formation of responsibilized citizens (Dean, 1994; Hunt, 1999; Zigon, 2011). 
Through governmentality, individuals can be regulated and molded to conform to a particular 
ideal by adopting the ideologies and practices referred to as technologies of the self (Foucault, 
1975, 1988; Mitchell, 1994; Rose, 1998). Technologies of the self should be thought of as ethical 
practices: self-surveillance, self-regulation, or any form of activity one adopts to care for oneself 
(Foucault, 1988). Practices of ethical self-reformation are incited through the rationally 
calculated strategies of moral regulation and governmentality that induce the responsibilization 
of subjects (Hier, 2008). Moralizing discourses are one such example of how individuals become 
responsibilized. Accordingly, Hier (2008) linked governmentality, moralization, and discourses 
of risk to the responsibilization of subjects: “It is the collective subject position or symbolic 
dimension of harm that functions to stimulate corrective action in the self” (p. 183).  
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Sexual offenders are constantly exposed to moralizing discourses but it is treatment that 
trains them in technologies of ethical self-reformation. The dimension of harm arising from their 
abject status – real and symbolic – is induced through the empathy training by having them 
engage in activities to identify and connect to the imagined feelings of their victims. The 
construction of their crime cycle and relapse prevention plans form a large part of their ethical 
self-reformation. Presented and routinized throughout treatment, institutional moralities instruct 
sexual offenders in how to perform specific technologies of the self:  hyper-vigilant self-
surveillance of their emotions, thoughts, behaviours, and physical surroundings to identify any 
situations that could potentially increase their risk to reoffend or otherwise create compromising 
situations such as the violation of parole conditions or Section 810 recognizance orders. The 
state regulates sexual offenders until they have completed their terms of parole or probation, 
after which, synopticism is the only means through which sexual offenders are externally 
regulated. By that time, the correctional system as well as society hopes these newly integrated 
individuals have learned to self-surveil and self-regulate their actions, a task that many capably 
perform despite the ongoing fear from society that their success is impossible. Those who 
continue to struggle with community (re)integration or self-regulation may be less resilient to a 
stigmatizing and unwelcoming society, or may need more time and social support than is 
afforded, reinforcing the sentiment that sexual offenders are incapable of change. 
Ethics can be understood as techniques for self-improvement, particularly when they are 
deployed under a set of behaviours collectively called working on the self (Rose, 1996). 
Expertise is paramount to technologies of the self for it “provide[s] an objective, rational answer 
to the question of how one should conduct a life to ensure normality, contentment, and success” 
(p. 156). It is through this expertise, Rose asserts, that we are promised a means to alleviate the 
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distresses and psychological complexity of life in modern society so that we inhabit a better, 
happier life. Enterprising subjects willingly engage in technologies of the self because we are 
taught that they will improve our lives. Unfortunately, the promise of expertise falls apart for 
most of us as we internalize high expectations for a happy life free of suffering.  
Men convicted as sexual offenders are even further distanced from the fulfillment of this 
promise because their stigma follows them in society, chipping away at the edges of their hopes 
and desires. The claims of expertise to offer normality, contentment, and success may never be 
possible for some past offenders since their ability to be normal in society is already 
circumscribed. Todd, a homosexual pedophile of limited intellectual capacity, will never be 
normal or successful by society’s terms. He was motivated to engage in ethical self-reformation 
so that he could be respected and liked by others in his social group, an experience that was still 
relatively new for him. Unfortunately, his disability will severely limit the degree to which he 
can participate in “normal” society (Desjardins, 1999). Tanner, a man with several offences 
against children, had been able to cease his offending patterns but also accepted that he will 
forever need to manage his proclivities through the avoidance of children. Kevin too viewed his 
sexual deviance as a lifelong management project. Technologies of the self encourage 
enterprising individuals to turn their lives into “projects” of ongoing work on their emotional and 
relational lives (Rose, 1996). These activities may very well “maximize the worth of existence” 
(p. 157) for individual sexual offenders but not the worth of their existence as seen by many 
others. However, most of the men in this research surrendered to the idea that they might never 
be accepted by other people, and found solace in those family members and friends who did 
accept and support them. The narrative strategies they developed to deal with their abjection 
gave them the confidence to continue on their path to moral habilitation while the passage of 
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time dissolved the salience of their labels. Generally, the Developing and Tautological Selves 
tended to describe the self-concepts of participants who already had several years to readjust to 
community life with a hidden but stigmatized label. The other participants, for whom their 
crimes were more recent, displayed a stronger tendency to experience the Abject and Confused 
forms of selfhood. 
 Stigma is both a beneficial and detrimental force in moral habilitation that depends on a 
number of factors. It has the benefit of presenting sexual offenders with an incentive to get 
treatment once they have been convicted of their crimes. Fear of the stigma that an offender 
might face if the state determines that his risk level requires a public notification upon his 
eventual release is a strong motivator for treatment participation. Sexual offenders can also be 
convinced to attend treatment programs so that their risk and security levels might be reduced. 
Self-stigma or personal distress compelled some research participants to seek answers as to why 
they committed their crimes. Some men saw treatment as a source of help so that they could 
overcome the problems they had long known about or those of which they had just learned.  
Conversely, the negative aspect of stigma prevented men who may have wanted to 
resolve their problems from coming forward and seeking help. To seek help for pedophilia or 
some other problem would put them at high risk for stigmatization and criminal conviction. 
There are no rewards for coming forward with sexual deviancy in society. Likewise, “There’s no 
reward for being honest.... There’s just suspicion” (Shane) for disclosing one’s past to people. 
The other and more obviously detrimental aspect of stigma is that it significantly hinders past 
sexual offenders to integrate into community life, thus risking possible emotional destabilization 
and reoffence. Stigma prevents men from finding adequate housing, employment, and friends. 
As much as moral habilitation is about the normalization of the responsibilized subject, it is very 
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difficult for sexual offenders to have a normal life while attempting to integrate back into 
community life.  
 The positive and negative aspects of stigma may contribute to strategic reintegrative 
shaming, given that the individual has access to sufficient social supports. Reintegrative shaming 
involves addressing the negative behaviour while providing a welcoming space for the person so 
that he could have positive, supportive influences to help him refrain from relapses of criminal 
activity (Braithwaite, 1989; Yantzi, 1998). My experiences with participants who were core 
members of a Circle of Support and Accountability (COSA) were prime evidence substantiating 
the importance of social supports during community (re)integration. The social support network 
of the COSAs provided members with a safe space where they could talk freely about their 
struggles, concerns, and successes, something that was not possible when having to hide one’s 
label from others. Research on COSAs has demonstrated the success of this approach (Cesaroni, 
2001; Wilson, Cortoni, &McWhinnie, 2009; Wilson, Picheca, & Prinzo, 2007). The participants 
who were core members of a COSA spoke the most highly of the positive changes that they had 
instituted in their lives and the resounding improvements to their wellbeing that followed. 
 In many ways, the moral habilitation of sexual offenders can be compared to post-
traumatic growth. It may seem counterintuitive to consider perpetrators of crime as being 
traumatized by their own actions, yet in a manner of speaking this does appear to occur. The 
public humiliation, imprisonment, physical attacks, and isolation would be a highly distressing 
experience, even if well deserved. Tedeschi and Calhoun (1995) identified several principles to 
describe when growth is possible following trauma. One principle closely connected to this 
research states that growth can occur when the trauma occupies a central place within one’s life 
narrative. The disruption caused by the trauma is evidenced by discourses identifying a “before” 
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and “after” in the person’s life; in this case, sexual offenders frequently used these terms or 
spoke of an “old me” as compared to a “new me.” A second principle declares that wisdom 
comes from growth. A common outcome from treatment was enhanced self-knowledge and 
capacity for self-reflection. Their third principle is linked to the stigmatized and abjecting 
reactions from others that sexual offenders encounter. This principle indicates that for post-
traumatic growth to occur, the individual must have some form of positive evaluation for the 
present and the future (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). There needs to be some hope for 
improvement in oneself and his environment, which is why it is so important for treatment to 
build up men’s self-esteem and to reinforce sexual offenders as good people who did bad things, 
and give them confidence to learn how to not repeat the same mistakes. Community responses 
are not so supportive unfortunately. Stigma, along with perceptions of unchangeable deviance, 
contributes to the disintegrative shaming of treated sexual offenders that further reduces 
opportunities for successful community (re)integration (Robbers, 2009).  
6.3.1  Implications for Practice 
Of the many observations and conclusions made during the course of this research, some 
have direct implications for treatment. There has been debate in forensic psychology regarding 
the benefits and disadvantages of manualization in SOTPs (Hollin, 2009; Mann, 2009; Marshall, 
2009). Manualization refers to the practice of following a detailed, pre-determined treatment 
agenda that standardizes program content for all participants (Mann, 2009). Where the use of 
treatment manuals is beneficial for maintaining focus on criminogenic needs, evaluability, and 
ensuring treatment integrity (Mann, 2009), manualization also limits therapeutic freedom, 
innovation, and sensitivity, and it prevents the individualization of treatment (Marshall, 2009). 
The structure and premise of cognitive behavioural therapy and manualization requires that 
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sexual offenders’ communication styles conform to a discursive paradigm that effectively limits 
their autonomy; but outside of treatment sessions, sexual offenders have been observed to shift 
back into narrative, suggesting that the incorporation of the narrative mode of discourse into 
treatment may be a more effective approach to working with offenders (Waldram, 2007, 2008, 
2010, 2012).  
From the descriptions most participants in this research provided, their experiences of 
treatment involved a manualized approach in a group context with access to forensic nurses for 
one-on-one interactions, which is typical of the current pattern of SOTPs. Depending on time and 
budget constraints, individualized access to a nurse may be rather limited, which means that 
treatment participants are not given much assistance with other concerns. Participants with 
histories of sexual abuse indicated that they did not receive any form of treatment or counseling, 
even though they constructed these concerns as indirectly related to their offences. Danny, for 
example, was quite upset that he could not get help for his childhood experiences of abuse 
because they were deemed outside the purpose of treatment. Further individualization of 
treatment that works within offenders’ narratives, instead of opposing and restructuring them, 
seems warranted for it may very well strengthen the therapeutic alliance and enhance 
responsivity, thereby improving treatment outcomes. 
The current conceptualization of responsivity as a series of categorical variables that can 
hinder or facilitate an individual’s receptivity to a treatment program needs to be further 
developed to incorporate the “consumer’s” perspective. This research expands the understanding 
of treatment responsivity by advocating for a more individualized approach and for the reframing 
of what is usually perceived of as a “lack of motivation.” Motivation to engage in treatment 
comes from many sources but competing motivators may be stronger, particularly for Aboriginal 
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men who may hold little trust in the criminal justice system and are inhibited by the treatment 
modality. It may be much more advantageous to view the perceived lack of motivation as a form 
of resistance. 
Men consistently directed their resistance toward stigmatizing discourses and to a lesser 
degree, institutional practices. In terms of implications for praxis, resistance offers us a different 
way to consider the institutional and treatment practices participants considered unhelpful or 
even limiting their individual treatment goals. Resistance that is directed toward treatment is 
generally pathologized as some defect of the offender and his motivation, but these instances are 
better understood as indications of individual agency, and perhaps more importantly, as a 
‘diagnostic of power’ that calls attention to different forms of institutional domination and the 
construction of subjectivities (Abu-Lughod, 1990). Reframing resistance in this manner prohibits 
it from being translated into a weak will or a lack of motivation to improve oneself. As a 
diagnostic of power, resistance can be seen in many instances as an indicator of inappropriate or 
less effective treatment practices that may be due to cultural difference, or even more likely, the 
unique needs of individual offenders. Reframing resistance in this manner would have the added 
benefit of accounting for ethnicity and culture in a way that does not homogenize Aboriginal 
offenders as a universal group with identical backgrounds and needs. An individualized approach 
to treatment layered with the already proven manualized practice might be more capable of 
addressing the unique responsivity needs that are self-identified by program participants.  
6.3.2  Recommendations 
 One of the purposes of this research was to conduct a cultural analysis that would expand 
our knowledge of factors contributing to treatment responsivity for sexual offenders. To this end, 
several recommendations can be made. Most, but not all, of these recommendations are 
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consistent with the humanistic approach advocated in the Good Lives Model (GLM) of offender 
(re)habilitation (Ward et al., 2007). The Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR) model already 
incorporates many of the practices advocated by the GLM but in a manner that places them 
secondary to criminogenic needs (Andrews et al., 2011). The rationale for this prioritization is 
sound but impedes the capacity of SOTPs to be even more effective than they are currently. This 
research demonstrates that therapeutic alliance is still problematic, as is the confrontational 
approach for men who are more sensitive to the risk of potential psychological vulnerability. 
 Improving treatment responsivity may first be facilitated by enabling more opportunities 
for individualized therapy to address the whole person, in particular, the self-identified concerns 
of the offender that extend beyond institutionally-defined criminogenic needs. This change 
should consider the broader life histories and goals of offenders to address past traumas and 
mobilize achievable goals for a desired future. The neglect of trauma related to childhood abuse 
as related by some participants would appear to go against ethical practice and furthermore, 
sustain an environment of culturally unsafe practices, particularly for Aboriginal men. Cultural 
safety needs to be placed on the forefront so that offenders who have been victimized as children 
are given sufficient opportunity to be treated as victims, while being treated as perpetrators. 
Individualized access to treatment should include the ability to have a choice of therapist and 
therapeutic modality. For example, individuals may respond better to narrative or interpersonal 
styles of therapy, or to regular access to Aboriginal Elders and other forms of traditional 
Aboriginal healing. Moreover, it is possible that omitting a humanistic perspective in treatment 
subtly continues the dehumanization of sexual offenders since their lives are fragmented into 
targets for manipulation, rather that being considered as part of an integrated whole person. A 
more holistic and individualized approach that is undergirded by humanist principles may 
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improve offender “buy-in” to treatment programs as long as specific consideration is given to 
therapeutic alliance and reasonable limits to confidentiality.  
 Second, motivation must be more broadly defined to recognize that the appearance of 
lacking motivation may be deceptive because there could be other invisible and competing 
motivations that are affecting the offender and detracting from treatment responsivity. Self-
protection from correctional practices or activities that are perceived as making one more 
vulnerable is a powerful motivation to resist treatment. Structures and practices should be 
evaluated and adapted to minimize competing motivations. 
 The third area of recommendations revolves around program content. This research 
suggests that individuals who rely on a central fixed identity for their self-concepts may be less 
resilient to the intense stigma of becoming labeled. Consequently, it might be beneficial to 
encourage the development of multiple positive identities in treatment so that offenders have 
stronger self-concepts and self-esteem to cope with the stigmatized identity. Research 
participants frequently invoked a narrative based upon the theme that they had, “no choice but to 
change.” This discourse was associated with the realization that improving their situations 
required honest self-appraisal and the taking of ownership for their problems and the solutions. 
SOTPs already emphasize the acceptance of responsibility for one’s offences but it may be 
valuable for them to foster, if they do not already, this sense of ownership and commitment to a 
better future. Similarly, those individuals who described the most agentic behaviour toward their 
moral habilitation also indicated an adherence to developmental, lifespan approach to their 
growth and wellbeing. Likewise, it could be beneficial to promote such a development 
perspective in treatment so that offenders are encouraged to envision a long-range life plan. 
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6.4  Conclusion 
 The moral habilitation of sexual offenders is anything but straightforward. Forensic 
psychology has made exceptional strides in assessing sexual offenders’ treatment needs and 
outcomes along with best practices (Andrews & Bonta, 2006; Mann, 2004; Wormith et al., 2007) 
but other disciplines have made major contributions as well. Criminology and sociology have 
increased knowledge regarding different paradigms and models of correctional practice and how 
each affects the treatment and community (re)integration of sexual offenders (Bottoms, 1995; 
Farkas & Stichman, 2002; Lacombe, 2008, 2013; Petrunik, 2002, 2003; Pratt, 2000; Presser & 
Gunnison, 1999;Thomas, 2003;Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). Anthropological work has introduced a 
much-needed cultural analysis of the mediated environment (Lancaster, 2011) and treatment 
programs (Waldram, 1997, 2007, 2008ab, 2012). The application of morality and moral concepts 
to research on sexual offenders and offending behaviours has been undertaken (i.e. Fox, 2013; 
Lancaster, 2011; Valliant, Gauthier, Pottier, &Kosmyna, 2000; Waldram, 2009; Ward, Gannon, 
& Birgden, 2007), but this research represents the first instance of placing the treatment and 
community (re)integration of sexual offenders within a moral-sociocultural framework. 
 Sexual offending and treatment by their very nature are highly charged moral concerns 
that induce a sense of volatile urgency to protect and prevent victimization, and yet research on 
the moral aspects of sexual offender treatment and its outcomes has been disparate and 
patchwork. The Ethical Self-Reformation model is an interdisciplinary framework of sexual 
offender moral habilitation that combines the insights from psychology, anthropology, 
criminology, and sociology with the emic of the men who are the consumers and stakeholders of 
SOTPs. This model breaks down the process of moral habilitation while identifying the many 
variables that influence it. Some of these variables have been under-theorized for their effects 
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upon ethical self-reformation and moral habilitation, but stigma has been particularly neglected. 
Although detrimental to psychological wellbeing, stigma is both a form of moral regulation and 
informal social control that appears to be in some ways beneficial to ethical self-reformation.  
As demonstrated through the course of this research, not all men will achieve the state of 
the new embodied morality promoted in treatment, at least not immediately. Others will have to 
engage in the continuous and intentional self-surveillance that is the accepted new way of being 
for the morally habilitated subject, but is still short of automatic embodied morality. Others still 
may not identify with the need for moral habilitation, adhering to the prescribed self-surveillance 
only because there is the synoptic risk that others may observe them engaging in unapproved 
behaviours. Self-regulation is a consistent outcome of treatment, but moral habilitation requires 
strength of will, combined with continuous effort, over a sustained period of time. 
 Contrary to some public perceptions, the moral habilitation of sexual offenders is 
possible. While some men may have to engage in a lifelong process of managing their thoughts 
and behaviours, much like those with various addictions, the majority of offenders are able to 
learn from their experiences of criminalization and treatment to never offend again. The 
combination of public stigmatization, state coercion, ethical self-reformation, and a supportive 
but challenging social network can work together with a determined individual to make 
substantive life changes, and increase the chances of successful moral habilitation and 
community (re)integration. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
Part A: Situating information 
 
1. Were you sentenced under the provincial or federal system? 
 
2. Have you been convicted of only the one sexual offence or are there others? What sentence(s) 
did you receive for the sexual offence(s)? How much of your sentence(s) did you 
serve/complete? 
 
3. Did the province place a Section 810 recognizance order on you? What were the conditions of 
it? 
 
4. Have you been through a treatment program for sexual offenders? When and what kind of 
program(s) was it?   
 
Part B: Treatment experience 
 
1. Can you tell me about your experience first attending your (treatment) program? What were 
your impressions of it? What did it feel like to walk through the door into the group that very 
first day? 
 
2. Did you feel different about the program when you had completed it? Why? 
 
3. What are the most important things that you learned from treatment? Can you tell me about a 
time when you used this lesson in your day to day life? (Prompt for examples for each identified 
lesson). What were you thinking at the time? How did this experience feel? 
 
4. Can you tell me about a time when you disagreed with something that happened in the 
program? What did you do? How did others react? 
 
5. Do you think that the events that led up to your conviction could have been somehow 
prevented? How so? 
 
6. If you knew then what you know now after taking this program, how might the events leading 
up to your conviction be different? 
 
7. Do you think treatment works? Why or why not? 
 
8. Is there anything you want to add about how treatment has or has not be helpful to you in your 
day to day life? 
 
9. Are there any other important positive or negative experiences that you’ve had in this program 
that you want to tell me about? What about positive/negative (choose opposite to previous) 
experiences? 
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Part C: Community experience 
 
1. What is it like for you to live in the community as someone who has been convicted of a 
sexual offence? 
 
2. Is your life different now that you have this conviction? Can you describe to me how it is 
different? Do you have any examples of when you have needed to do things differently than you 
did before? 
 
3. Has there been any publicity around you or the crime you were convicted of? Can you tell me 
what happened? How did people react to you? How did you react?  
 
4. What kinds of things are you afraid of or anxious about? Can you give examples of how these 
feelings have affected your life? What kinds of things have you done to cope with your fears and 
anxieties? 
 
5. Can you tell me about an experience you have had in the community because someone found 
out about your conviction? How did you react? What were you thinking and feeling at the time? 
 
6. Do you try to prevent people from finding out about your conviction? Can you give specific 
examples of the kinds of things you do? 
 
7. Can you tell me about a time when you decided to tell someone about your conviction? How 
or why did you decide to tell that person?  
 
8. Can you tell me about a time or two when you were treated differently by family or friends 
because of your conviction? What were you thinking and feeling then? 
 
9. Are there other people in your community who know about your conviction? What kinds of 
reactions have you had from them?  
 
10. Do you tell people about being in treatment? Can you give me some examples of how people 
react to hearing about your treatment? Do you think it matters to people if you have been in 
treatment or not? Why? 
 
11. Have there been times when things you learned in treatment helped you to deal with people 
in the community? Can you tell me about them?  
 
12. Are there any other positive or negative experiences that you’ve had with people who know 
about your conviction that you want to tell me about? What about positive/negative (choose 
opposite to previous) experiences? 
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Part D: Experience of identity and self-concept 
 
1. How would you answer this question:Who are you? How do you see yourself? Did your 
conviction change how you viewed or felt about yourself as a person? Can you tell me how or 
give me an example? Why do you think that is?  
 
2. How do you think family and friends see you? (i.e. How would they describe you)?  
 
3. What is your impression of how society might see you? What does it mean to have the label of 
"sex offender" assigned to you? How has this label affected who you are as a person? (i.e. do you 
feel differently about yourself?) Can you give me some examples? 
 
4. What kinds of messages do people get about sex offenders? What do you think about these 
messages? Do these messages make you feel different about yourself? Can you give me an 
example of how they do that? 
 
5. Can you describe to me the kind of person you want to be in the future? How is that different 
from the person you are now? 
 
6. Do you feel like you’ve changed from the person you were before your conviction? In what 
ways? Examples? What affect has this change had upon how you view your life? 
 
7. Was there a moment in your life that you decided to change or did it just sort of happen? What 
was it that motivated you to make that change? Can you tell me about that time? 
 
8. What does it mean to be a good person? Do you see yourself as a good person? What kinds of 
things do you do that make you a good person? 
 
10. Can you tell me about a time when you refused to let someone or something make you feel 
that you were not a good person? What kinds of things were you thinking and feeling at the 
time?  
 
11. How easy or difficult is it for you put these events in your life behind you? Why? Examples? 
 
12. Is there anything else you feel is important to add before we finish? 
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Appendix C: Organizational Consent for Gatekeepers 
 
 
 
 
  Organizational Consent to Conduct Research 
 
The purpose of this form is to gain the consent of your organization to allow the researcher to 
conduct a portion of her dissertation research activities for the study entitled, “Discourse, agency, 
and self in the community treatment and integration of sex offenders.” 
 
Researcher(s): Janice Victor (Researcher), Dept. of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan 
 (306)966-1841 (office), (306)381-6980 (cell), email: janice.victor@usask.ca 
 James Waldram (Supervisor), Dept. of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan 
 (306)966-1670, email: j.waldram@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure:  The purpose of this study is to understand the treatment and 
community experiences of men who have been convicted of a sexual offence. It seeks to learn 
about what it is like to take part in a community-based sex offender treatment program and how 
men may be using their treatment lessons in the community. This research also seeks to 
understand the difficulties that may come from experiences with government legislation, 
policies, and practices, from community organizations, and from the stigma of being labelled a 
“sex offender.”  
 
This study will ask to interview men who have in the past or are currently participating in sex 
offender treatment. All participants must be living in the community. Participants may be 
interviewed up to three times and each interview may last up to two hours in length. The 
researcher will ask questions about participants’ experiences in a community-based treatment 
group and/or their experiences of integrating in the community following the receipt of a 
conviction for a sexual offence. Specific details regarding the sexual offence(s) will not be 
solicited. 
 
Potential Benefits:This research is important because it will help us to understand the effects of 
state legislation or policies and the community environment on the personal development of men 
who have participated in a community-based sex offender treatment program. It will also help us 
to identify “best practices” and learn in what ways treatment is being used in the community 
environment.  
 
Researcher Responsibilities:  The researcher will assume full responsibility for ensuring that 
the research is conducted according to the ethical guidelines established by the Tri-Council 
Policy Statement and the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board. The 
researcher will endeavour to meet all ethical and procedural requirements of the supporting 
organization to the greatest degree feasible. The researcher agrees to maintain the confidentiality 
and anonymity of the organization’s clientele to the professional and ethical standards agreed 
upon by the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board. 
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Organization Responsibilities:  Through this consent, ________________________________ 
agrees to support the researcher’s activities by identifying potential participants and providing 
them with information about the study. Additional resources such as private interviewing space 
are subject to negotiation. Any support for this research is greatly appreciated but if your 
organization must withdraw its assistance, the researcher will respect that decision with due 
explanation.  
 
Feedback:  The results from this research will be used mostly for academic publications and 
reports to professional associations and conferences. As a representative of a recruiting 
organization, you and your organization will be provided with a summary of the research 
findings approximately one year following the data generation. If you have any questions 
concerning the research project or its findings, you may contact the researcher at the numbers 
provided.  
 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board on October 27, 2008. Any questions regarding the ethical 
approval of this researcher may be addressed to that committee through the Ethics Office (966-
2084). 
 
Consent to Support Research Activities: 
I have read and understood the research procedures as outlined in the University of 
Saskatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board “Application for Ethical Approval.” I have 
had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. I consent to 
allow these research activities to occur through my organization, understanding that I may 
withdraw my consent at any time. Copies of the Application for Ethical Approval and this 
Consent Form have been given to me for my records. 
 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Name of Manager)     (Organization) 
 
___________________________________  _______________________________ 
(Signature of Manager)    (Signature of Researcher) 
 
___________________________________  
(Date)   
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Appendix D: Participant Invitation Letters 
 
Culture & Human Development Program 
Department of Psychology 
University of Saskatchewan 
9 Campus Drive 
Saskatoon, SK 
S7N 5A5 
 
Re: Letter of Invitation to Participate in Research  
 
Dear Sir: 
 
In order to protect your privacy, I have requested that the ____<insert agency name>____ forward this 
letter to you on my behalf. I am conducting a research study to learn more about the community 
experiences of men after they have been convicted of a sexually-based crime. For example, some of the 
things that I would like to know about are your experiences of: 
 
! Attending a sex offender treatment program 
! Sex offender legislation such as community notification 
! Correctional practices and policies 
! Dealing with people in the community who know about your conviction 
! Moving on with your life after a criminal conviction 
 
If you have been convicted of a sexual offence, are living in the community, and are willing to talk about 
some of the experiences you have had since then, I would like to hear from you. After meeting with the 
researcher, you may decide to participate or not. The actual research will not begin until you are informed 
of and are comfortable with what it will involve.  Participating in this study will involve your agreement 
to be interviewed alone by the researcher one or more times. Interviews may last one or two hours. It is 
important to note that you will not be asked any details about the offence you were convicted of and you 
will not have to answer any questions that you are not comfortable with. You will receive a small 
honorarium for your participation as a token of appreciation from the researcher. 
 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board on October 27, 2008. Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the University Ethics Office (306)966-2084. Out 
of town participants may call collect.  
 
If you are interested in learning more about this research study, please contact Janice Victor at (306)381-
6980 or janice.victor@usask.ca and more details will be provided.  
 
Thank you for your consideration, 
 
Janice Victor      James Waldram 
Primary Researcher     Research Supervisor 
(306)966-1841 (office)     (306)966-6170 
(306)381-6980 (cell)     j.waldram@usask.ca 
janice.victor@usask.ca 
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Appendix E: Letter of Informed Consent 
 
 
        Consent Form (Individual Interviews) 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project entitled “Experiences of Community-based Sex Offender 
Treatment and Community Integration.”  Please read this form carefully and feel free to ask questions you 
might have. 
 
Researcher: Janice Victor (Researcher), Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan 
 (306)966-1841 (office), (306)381-6980 (cell), email: janice.victor@usask.ca . 
 James Waldram (Supervisor), Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan 
 (306)966-1670, email: j.waldram@usask.ca 
 
Purpose and Procedure:  The purpose of this study is to understand the treatment and community 
experiences of men who have been convicted of a sexual offence. It seeks to learn about what it is like to 
take part in a community-based sex offender treatment program and how men may be using their 
treatment lessons in the community. This research also seeks to understand the difficulties that may come 
from government legislation, policies, and practices, from community organizations, and from the stigma 
of being labelled a “sex offender.”  
 
This study will involve participating in one or more individual interviews that may last up to two hours in 
length. The researcher will ask you questions about your experiences in a community-based treatment 
group and/or your experiences of integrating in the community following the receipt of a conviction for a 
sexual offence. The researcher will not ask you for any details regarding the offence you were convicted 
of. All interviews will be audio recorded but you may request that the audio recorder be turned off at any 
time. You may be interviewed up to three times if you so choose. Only if you agree, the researcher may 
ask to examine your case file or summary report to compare your caseworker’s perspective with that of 
your own. 
 
Potential Benefits:There is no guarantee that you will personally benefit from your involvement in this 
study. This study may be able to benefit society by improving community-based sex offender treatment 
and community management practices. This research is important because it will help us to understand 
the effects of state legislation or policies and the community environment on the personal development of 
men who have participated in a community-based sex offender treatment program. It will also help us to 
learn in what ways treatment is being used in the community environment. You will receive a small 
honorarium from the researcher as a token of appreciation. 
 
Potential Risks:  Participating in this research may only present very minimal risk given the precautions 
the researcher will take to protect your confidentiality and anonymity. There is a possibility however that 
in the unlikely situation where the researcher’s files are stolen, your confidentiality and anonymity may 
be compromised. There is also a slight risk that you may experience negative emotions or psychological 
effects due to the recalling of past events. Should this occur, you are advised to raise these concerns with 
your current treatment provider. 
 
Storage of Data:  All data and identifying information collected by the researcher including audio 
recordings, interview transcripts, and fieldnotes will be stored in a filing cabinet or on a password 
protected computer in a locked office on University premises. Only the researcher and her supervisor will 
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have access to these data. Participants’ contact information will be stored on a separate password 
protected computer so that it can not be associated with the data or any other aspect of the study. Data 
will be stored by the researcher for a minimum of five years. Once the data is no longer useful, it will be 
destroyed in a manner that will leave it beyond recovery.  
 
Confidentiality:  The researcher will protect the confidentiality of the information you share to the 
greatest degree possible. You will be asked to not use names, locations, or other specific details that may 
identify yourself or others during your interview(s). Identifying details will be omitted from interview 
transcripts. Participants will be identified only by a random case number created by the researcher. The 
information from this part of the study will be summarized and reported anonymously in aggregate so 
your information and statements will be combined with that of other participants. Direct quotations may 
be used but pseudonyms will be created and identifying information will be omitted or modified to 
protect your identity. 
 
The information that you share will not be discussed with anyone other than the researcher's supervisor. 
However, if you reveal information that suggests you present immediate harm to yourself or others, the 
researcher is legally obligated to inform authorities. If you provide details about activities that may be 
illegal or incriminating to yourself or others, this information could be subpoenaed by a court of law. 
 
Right to Withdraw:  Your participation is voluntary andyou can choose to answer only those questions 
that you are comfortable with answering. You can withdraw from the study at any time, for any reason, 
without penalty, and without loss of your honorarium. Your withdrawal will not affect your standing in 
any group or individual treatment that you may be participating in. If you withdraw from this research, 
any data that you have contributed will be retained by the researcher. This data will be used for analysis 
purposes only and will not appear in the published findings in any identifiable way including as 
quotations. If interviewed more than once, the researcher will advise you of any new information that 
could have a bearing on your decision to participate and she will invite your feedback and ongoing 
consent prior to and following each interview.  
 
Feedback or Follow-Up:  The results from this research will be used mostly for academic publications 
and reports to professional associations and conferences. Brief summaries of the research findings will be 
provided to participants, community organizations, and other professionals who assisted in this research 
approximately one year following the data generation. If you have any questions concerning the research 
project or its findings, you may contact the researcher at the numbers provided.  
 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Behavioural Research Ethics Board on October 27, 2008. Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Ethics Office (966-2084). Out of town 
participants may call collect.  
 
Oral Consent to Participate:I have read and explained this Consent Form to the participant before 
receiving the participant’s consent, and the participant had knowledge of its contents and appeared to 
understand it. The participant has been provided with an unsigned copy of this form to keep. 
 
_______________________________ Date 
 
_______________________________ Signature of Researcher 
 
Case number: __________ 
 
